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ABSTRACT 
Using the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants in Canada for 2001-2005 the effects of 
matching pre-immigration and post-immigration occupational skills on immigrant entry earnings 
are analyzed, with a focus on the return to foreign experience. The main purpose of this research 
is to explore whether matching pre- and post-immigration skills can explain poor transferability 
of foreign work experience of recent immigrants in Canada. 
We employ factor analysis and obtain three broad skill factors from 44 occupational 
characteristics provided in the HRSDC’s Career Handbook. The survey contains rich information 
on immigrants’ last occupation before immigration to Canada and employment history after 
immigration. Using occupational information we assign each immigrant a skill-portfolio, which 
contains pre- and post-immigration factor scores for “intelligence”, “motor skills” and “strength” 
obtained in the factor analysis. A match for each of the three skill factors is constructed using 
normalized factor scores and is a dichotomous variable. We then use these match variables in 
regression analysis to examine direct and indirect effects of successful matching on immigrants’ 
log weekly wages. The indirect effects are analyzed through returns to foreign work experience 
and foreign schooling for immigrants who match their pre- and post-immigration skill factors. As 
well the effects of ability in English and French on the returns to foreign human capital 
conditional on matching pre- and post-immigration skill factors are studied. We first conduct 
cross-sectional regression analysis.  Then we expand the analysis and rerun regressions for a set 
of pair-wise immigrant sub-samples. 
We reach a conclusion that controlling for pre- and post-immigration skill match does not 
help in explaining poor portability of foreign work experience of recent immigrants to Canada. 
Although, we find that immigrants who obtain a match in “intelligence” or “motor skills” receive 
substantially higher earnings than immigrants who do not obtain any match. Immigrants who 
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obtain a match in “strength” factor have a very small and often insignificant advantage in 
earnings.  We also find that male immigrants who obtain a match in “intelligence” factor in wave 
3 receive a moderate positive return to foreign experience, which together with the baseline 
return to foreign experience still results in zero total effect. The regression analysis gives some 
interesting insight into returns to foreign human capital for immigrant sub-samples in wave 3. 
Male immigrants employed in professional occupations as well as male immigrants who are not 
visible minorities have almost zero return to foreign experience instead of negative. The baseline 
return to foreign experience holds negative for other sub-samples. Matching some of the skills 
slightly improves the returns to foreign experience for some sub-samples, but the total effect is 
often negligible. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Immigrant skills utilization is a major policy issue in Canada. The return to 
foreign work experience as well as foreign schooling is one of the measures of the extent 
to which immigrant skills are utilized in the Canadian labour market. It has been 
estimated that skills under-utilization results in an enormous economic loss and distracts 
foreign born from coming to Canada1.  Hence, the recognition of immigrant skills has 
become one of the policy priorities for the government (HRSDC, 2011).   
Strikingly, many studies in the literature on immigration find that recent 
immigrants in Canada receive a near zero return to foreign work experience (Schaafsma 
& Sweetman, 2001; Aydemir & Skuterud, 2005; Goldmann, Sweetman & Warman, 
2009; Green and Worswick, 2010). Researchers attempted to find underlying causes of 
such low portability of foreign experience to the Canadian labor market. They studied the 
effects of age-at-immigration (Schaafsma & Sweetman, 2001), source-country 
composition (Aydemir & Skuterud, 2005), macroeconomic conditions (Green & 
Worswick, 2010), knowledge of official languages (Ferrer, Green & Riddell, 2006) and 
even occupational match (Goldmann, Sweetman & Warman, 2009). On the other hand, 
studies in the literature on specificity of human capital have shown that skill- specific 
experience plays a more important role in wage formation process than firm-, industry- or 
occupation-specific (Poletaev & Robinson, 2008). Using longitudinal data on immigrants 
in Canada for 2001-2005 this research explores the average log wage return to foreign 
                                                 
1 The estimated loss of income associated with unrecognized skills/credentials of the foreign born is 
approximately 3.2 billion dollars (Conference Board of Canada, 2001). Reitz (2001) estimates that the 
annual loss due to under-utilization of immigrants’ skills is about2.4 billion dollars.   
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human capital conditional on matching pre- and post-immigration skills with a focus on 
the return to foreign experience.  
Remarkably, the return to pre-Canadian work experience is found to be 
discounted to almost zero and sometimes seen to be slightly negative for more recent 
immigrant cohorts (Schaafsma & Sweetman, 2001; Aydemir & Skuterud, 2005; 
Goldmann et al., 2009; Green & Worswick, 2010). Schaafsma and Sweetman (2001) 
conclude that “work experience in the source country is found to yield virtually no return 
in the host country.” (p.1069) Aydemir and Skuterud (2005) find that “the foreign 
experience of immigrant men from the east2 is worthless by 1995 – 9” (p. 661) They find 
that for men from the east the return to foreign experience is somewhat negative by late 
1990s. Green and Worswick (2010) conclude that “by the 1990s immigrants were 
effectively receiving a zero return to their foreign experience.” (p. 23) Goldmann et al. 
(2009) find that 2001 immigrants were receiving slightly negative return to foreign 
experience approximately four years after immigration to Canada. 
In contrast, the return to foreign years of schooling has remained substantially 
positive, although lower than for both Canadian-born population and relative to 
immigrant schooling acquired in Canada (Schaafsma & Sweetman, 2001; Aydemir & 
Skuterud, 2005; Ferrer & Riddell, 2008).  
Greater pre-immigration experience is found to be associated with poorer job-
matches (Chiswick & Miller, 2008). It implies that the return to foreign experience may 
be associated with the transferability of occupation-specific skills (Goldmann et al., 
2009).  A substantial body of the literature on specificity of human capital has studied 
                                                 
2 Aydemir and Skuterud (2005) define immigrants from the east as those born in Eastern Europe, Asia and 
Africa. The data suggests that the proportion of immigrants from the east rises to about 73% by late 1990s.  
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economic returns to work experience that is specific to a firm (Topel, 1991; Altonji & 
Williams, 1992), an industry (Neal, 1995; Parent, 2000), an occupation (Kamburov & 
Manovskii, 2009) and skills (Poletaev & Robinson, 2008). There is a unique study by 
Goldmann et al. (2009) in the literature on immigration that looks at effects of 
occupational match on the returns to foreign experience of immigrants in Canada.  
However, Poletaev and Robinson (2008) show that wage losses of displaced workers are 
associated with switching portfolios rather than switching industries or occupations. 
In this research we follow an approach proposed by Poletaev and Robinson (2008) 
in construction of skills and skill-match, and a model proposed by Goldmann et al. (2009) 
in studying the effects of skill-match on the returns to foreign human capital with a focus 
on the returns to foreign work experience. Our data consist of two important parts. First, 
the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants in Canada contains valuable information on 
immigrants’ last pre-immigration occupation and current main occupation in Canada. 
Second, we use occupational characteristics from the Career Handbook provided by 
Human Resources and Skills Development Canada and factor analysis in order to 
construct skill portfolios for immigrant pre- and post-immigration occupations. These 
skill portfolios allow us to construct matches between immigrant pre- and post-
immigration skills. Then we explore economic returns to foreign experience, foreign 
schooling, skill-matching, English and French ability and their interactions with a focus 
on the return to foreign experience. Then we expand our analysis focusing on immigrants 
who immigrated under Skilled Worker Principal Applicants immigration category, 
immigrants employed in regulated occupations and in professional occupations, as well 
as immigrants with a university degree and visible minorities. 
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We find that, although immigrants who match their skills on average obtain 
higher earnings, the baseline return to foreign work experience is still negligible. There is 
some moderate evidence of returns to immigrant experience acquired abroad conditional 
on skill-matching for male immigrants, but the total effect is still zero in most of the 
cases. The patterns of returns to foreign work experience conditional on skill matching 
differ across time and across immigrant sub-samples.    
We add to several streams in the labor economics literature. First, we add to the 
literature on Canadian immigration by exploring economic outcomes and the returns to 
foreign human capital for recent immigrants in Canada. Second, we add to the literature 
on specificity of human capital exploring effects of matching pre- and post-immigration 
skills on the returns to foreign work experience in order to determine if skill matching 
can account for low returns to pre-immigration work experience. 
This research is organized as follows. In the next chapter the literature review is 
presented. The theoretical background for the analysis is provided in the third chapter. 
The fourth chapter describes the data and methodology. The fifth chapter presents the 
descriptive results and the sixth chapter follows with a discussion of regression results. 
The last chapter concludes.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The return to foreign experience has been found to be negligible for the most 
recent immigrant cohorts3 (Schaafsma & Sweetman, 2001; Aydemir & Skuterud, 2005; 
Goldmann et al., 2009; Green & Worswick, 2010). Researchers, using different data and 
methodologies, have attempted to determine underlying conditions of these adverse 
economic outcomes of recent immigrants in Canada. They explored effects of source-
country composition (Aydemir & Skuterud, 2005), labour market entry effects (Green & 
Worswick, 2010), literacy in English and French (Ferrer et al., 2006), as well as effects of 
occupational match between source- and host-country (Goldmann et al., 2009). However, 
they could not fully explain low portability of foreign experience. One more plausible 
issue that could explain poor transferability of foreign experience is a mismatch of job-
skills (Chiswick & Miller, 2008).  Moreover, Poletaev & Robinson (2008) show that 
greater wage loss after involuntary displacement is associated with switching skills rather 
than switching industry or occupation. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study in 
the literature on immigration that looks at effects of matching skills on the returns to 
foreign experience. We take into account the Poletaev and Robinson’s (2008) finding and 
apply their approach for constructing a skill-match to determine if accounting for skill 
matching could explain poor transferability of foreign experience.  
In the following section we review studies that find zero return to foreign 
experience for immigrants in Canada. A detailed review of the literature on the specificity 
of human capital is provided in section 2.2. In section 2.3 we present findings of a unique 
                                                 
3 1990s to early 2000s. 
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study in the literature on immigration that explores the effect of occupational match on 
the returns to foreign experience. 
2.1 Returns to foreign human capital 
The literature on immigration has found that the decline in immigrant entry 
earnings is strongly associated with deterioration of the returns to foreign human capital. 
Specifically, the economic return to foreign work experience for most recent immigrant 
cohorts is found to be around zero (Schaafsma & Sweetman, 2001; Aydemir & Skuterud, 
2005; Green & Worswick, 2010). These studies still cannot fully explain low portability 
of foreign work experience of immigrants in Canada. The gap that I find in the previous 
literature is related to data construction used in these studies. The data they use do not 
contain any information on immigrants’ pre-Canadian employment and, hence, does not 
allow them to account for job-skills mismatch. 
Schaafsma and Sweetman (2001) study the decline in immigrant entry earnings 
over time using the Canadian Censuses of 1986, 1991, 1996 in the cross-sectional 
analysis. They report that average real annual earnings (in 1995 dollars) of immigrants 
between 1986 and 1991 exceeded earnings of Canadian born by $2000, but then fell short 
by $442 in 1996 as a result of a much bigger drop in average earnings of immigrants than 
of native born. 
The authors explore the causes that led to the decline in immigrant earnings. They 
find that age at immigration is negatively correlated to immigrant earnings. For instance, 
adults who immigrated between 45 and 64 years have substantially lower earnings 
compared to infants who immigrated before the age of five. Schaafsma and Sweetman 
(2001) explore underlying factors of this correlation and find that it can be explained by 
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the return to experience obtained in a sending country. The authors find that in the host-
country there is “virtually no return” (p.1069) to potential years of foreign experience for 
all three cross-sectional years. On the other hand, the return to years of education is 
around 6% and is similar to the return to Canadian schooling that varies between 5.5% 
and 7% across years. Interestingly, that English as a mother tongue boosts up the return 
to total experience for older adults, unlike those who immigrated young. 
Aydemir and Skuterud (2005) also explore causes of deterioration in immigrant 
entry earnings. They use the Censuses for the period of 1981-2001 and estimate flexible 
specification of the earnings regression including changes in immigrants’ language 
abilities, region of birth, changes in returns to foreign experience and schooling, 
macroeconomic conditions and general labour market trends. Similarly to Schaafsma and 
Sweetman (2001), they find a clear deterioration in the return to foreign labour market 
experience, but not in the return to years of foreign education. Thus, when experience is 
separated into foreign and Canadian there is strong evidence that Canadian employers 
value the source-country experience less than the host-country work experience. For 
instance, in a regression specification when experience is the same across cohorts and 
when the squared term of the experience is included, the return to Canadian experience 
for immigrants declines from 3.1% to 1.8% between 1 and 10 years of experience. The 
return to foreign experience over the same period declines from 1.2% to 0.8% for men 
and mostly close to zero for women. Altogether, the authors find that about ¼ to ½ of the 
decline in immigrant entry earnings can be explained by the decline in the return to 
foreign experience. 
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Aydemir and Skuterud (2005) suggest that compositional shift from European to 
Asian countries or a shift from economic class of immigrants to refugees has to be tested 
in order to identify if they can explain the deterioration in the return to foreign 
experience. Interestingly, even when the sample is split into Western (North America, 
Northern, Western and Southern Europe) and Eastern (Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia) 
source-country regions, the results still suggest a strong deterioration for male immigrants 
from Eastern regions. The division into source-regions is less relevant for females. 
Hence, the authors rule out the hypothesis of compositional shift effect, however they 
note that shifts within regions still remain unknown.  
Ferrer et al. (2006) using the 1998 Ontario Immigrant Literacy Survey and the 
Canadian version of the 1994 International Adult Literacy Survey to study effects of 
immigrant literacy skills on immigrant earnings. The data allow the authors to construct 
reliable measures of foreign work experience and foreign education. The sample is 
restricted to male individuals between the age of 16 and 60 with positive earnings. They 
find that although immigrant literacy skills have a significant positive influence on 
immigrant earnings and explains immigrant-native born gap in returns to education, 
controlling for literacy does not affect the returns to foreign experience. 
Green and Worswick (2010) using the Immigrant Database for the 1981-2003 
period, the Survey of Consumer Finances for 1981 to 1997 and the Survey of Labour and 
Income Dynamics (SLID) for 1997 through 2003 to investigate the causes of immigrant 
entry earnings deterioration over cohorts. They can explain about 25% of the 
deterioration between 1980-82 immigrant cohort and the 2000-02 cohort with flattening 
of the foreign experience profile, around 16% with the shift in source-country 
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composition and 39% with general labour market entry effect totaling into roughly ¾ of 
the total deterioration.  Thus for all levels of education and when the squared term of 
foreign experience is included immigrants receive a positive, but diminishing, return to 
years of foreign experience. Its interactions with cohort dummy variables suggest a 
downgrade of between 2.5% to 9% across cohorts, which means that the 2000-02 cohort 
has approximately 4% lower return to foreign experience than the 1983-86 cohort. This 
also suggests that the return to foreign experience is likely to become negative for more 
recent cohorts. 
2.2 Specificity of human capital 
The literature on specific human capital has focused on the extent of specificity of 
human capital with regard to firm tenure (Topel, 1991; Altonji & Williams, 1992), 
industry- (Neal, 1995; Parent, 2000), occupation- (Kamburov & Manovskii, 2009) and 
skill-specific experience (Poletaev & Robinson, 2008). There is a unique study that 
explores the effects of occupational match on the returns to foreign experience 
(Goldmann et al., 2009). However, Poletaev & Robinson (2008) show that skill-match is 
more important than industry- or occupational match for economic return to labour 
marker experience. There is no research in the literature on immigration that takes into 
account skill-match in studying return to foreign experience. We take this finding into 
account and explore effects of matching skills on the return to foreign experience of 
recent immigrants in Canada in order to determine if this can explain low portability of 
work experience acquired by immigrants prior to immigration. 
Neal’s (1995) work is the first to explore the importance of industry-specificity in 
worker’s postdisplacement wage determination taking into account job tenure and 
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potential work experience prior to displacement. His findings suggest that there is a 
substantial difference between wage patterns of displaced workers who find employment 
in the same industry and workers who switch their industry after displacement. Thus 
workers with predisplacement experience and job tenure who stay in the same industry 
after displacement have lower wage losses and greater wage returns to both their 
predisplacement experience and job tenure compared to workers who switch industry 
after displacement.  
Neal (1995) uses the Displaced Workers Surveys from the 1990, 1988, 1986 and 
1984 Current Population Surveys. The sample of the analysis is restricted to workers who 
were displaced after industry closing and does not include laid-off workers due to several 
reasons. The author notes it is plausible that workers are laid-off not randomly, but rather 
due to their lower productivity (as found by Gibbons and Katz, 1991). And second, there 
is a probability of a recall bias for laid-off workers (as found by Topel, 1990). In order to 
control for seasonality the agricultural sector is excluded. The other sample restrictions 
are applied to have individuals aged between 20 and 61 years old, who worked full-time 
(at least 35 hours a week) prior and after displacement; and currently have wages of at 
least $40 per week. The second part of the analysis is not presented for females as their 
potential work experience has a very low correlation with their actual industry tenure.       
Neal (1995) uses several methods to study the importance of industry-specific 
factor in worker’s wage profiles. First, he employs quasi-first difference approach. It 
consists of estimating a log wage difference between pre- and post-displacement wage 
separately for workers who switch their industry after displacement and workers who find 
employment in the same industry as their predisplacement one. This approach is 
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undertaken due to data limitations that do not allow employing difference-in-difference 
estimation, which would be preferable having pure experimental data. One of the key 
data deficiencies is unavailability to construct actual industry tenure. Therefore, the log 
wage difference is run on potential predisplacement experience, predisplacement job 
tenure, years since displacement, weeks unemployed; and each regression controls for 
occupational dummies and year-of-displacement dummies, as well as demographic 
characteristics.  
The results from quasi-first-difference estimation reveal a strong positive 
relationship between wage losses following displacement and both potential 
predisplacement experience and job tenure. The wage losses increase with potential 
predisplacement experience and job tenure twice as fast for industry switchers compared 
to industry stayers. Thus, for a male worker with 10 years of job tenure who switched 
industry after displacement the loss in log wages is around 0.27 log points higher than for 
a similar male who was displaced within his first year of employment and also switched 
industry. For males, an additional 10 years of experience with the same employer implies 
an increase in log wage losses after displacement of 0.27 for industry switchers after 
displacement but only 0.13 for stayers. In contrast, female predisplacement potential 
experience has a negligible and insignificant effect on wage losses. There is still a strong 
correlation between job tenure and wage losses for women. Excluding a square term, the 
loss in log wage after displacement increases with each additional year of job tenure by 
0.015 for industry stayers and by 0.025 for industry switchers.  
In the second part of his analysis Neal (1995) also employs Heckman’s (1979) 
two-stage procedure to correct for selection bias as workers who possess low industry-
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specific skills are more likely to switch their industry after displacement. The first step 
lies in estimating probabilities of switching industry using factors that are not correlated 
with workers’ wages directly, but are correlated with probability of switching their 
industry after displacement. The author argues that levels of employment in industries 
have no direct effect on wages, but has an effect on probability of switching industry. The 
second stage lies in the inclusion of transformed probabilities after the probit estimation 
in the wage equation as an additional control. In the same specification controlling for 
selection bias the results reveal even sharper difference between industry switchers and 
stayers. Thus, additional 10 years of potential work experience with the same employer 
increase the log wage loss by 0.31 for industry switchers and only by 0.10 for industry 
stayers respectively. After including additional controls, such as industry wage premium 
and union coverage rate, the effects are slightly weaker, but still indicate significant 
difference between industry switchers and stayers. 
In the last part of the analysis Neal (1995) estimates the return to predisplacement 
experience and job tenure for male industry switchers and stayers using wages after 
displacement and compares to the return to predisplacement experience and job tenure for 
the full sample using wages prior to displacement. The results suggest that the 
predisplacement wages for the full sample and postdisplacement wages for the sample of 
stayers are both strongly and almost identically correlated to potential years of 
predisplacement experience and job tenure, unlike the sample of industry switchers. 
Thus, for 10 years of job tenure the predisplacement log wage return is 0.23 for the full 
sample and the postdisplacement log wage return is 0.20 for the sample of industry 
stayers in contrast to the postdisplacement log wage return of 0.07 for the sample of 
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industry switchers. This indicates that firms of one industry should highly value 
predisplacement experience and job tenure in the same industry. 
Parent (2000) uses data from both the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY) that covers the period of 1979-96 and the Panel of Income Dynamics (PSID) that 
covers the period of 1981-92. In contrast to potential tenure that had to be constructed in 
Neal’s (1995) work due to data deficiency, both surveys used in Parent (2000) allow 
constructing direct measures of firm and industry tenure. The sample from the NLSY is 
restricted to male and female workers of age 18-24 in the 1979, whereas the sample from 
the PSID only restricted to white male heads of households aged 18-64. The first sample 
is restricted to workers who worked at least 20 hours a week on a full-time basis and did 
not go back to full-time studies within six years from entering labour force; the sample 
includes temporary laid-off or actively searching for a job workers, and excludes 
respondents who were in military at any time, employed in a public sector or in a 
government programs. The second sample is restricted to workers who at least worked 
500 hours and those who were not in the public sector. 
Parent (2000) employed several different specifications and techniques to 
estimate direct log wage returns to firm and industry tenure controlling for total years of 
experience, as well as several methods to check the reliability of interpretation of the 
results. First he used GLS to account for heterogeneity and then he used IV-GLS to 
account for endogeneity issue as the error term is likely to be correlated with the 
variables of interest. The industry tenure variables are constructed in two ways. The first 
one is continuous and adds up years of industry tenure if industry stays the same when a 
worker changes employer and is reset to zero otherwise. In contrast, the second type of 
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the industry tenure variable is non-continuous and when a worker changes industry when 
changing job is reset to the number of years that a worker had just prior to the change, 
instead of being reset to zero. The industry change is defined on the basis of both three- 
and one-digit code.  
The results from both the GLS and the IV-GLS estimations suggest that once the 
industry tenure variable is included, either continuous or non-continuous, the effect of the 
firm tenure is reduced almost twice. For instance, in case of the GLS estimation for the 
sample from the NLSY the coefficient of the linear firm tenure variable is reduced from 
3.7% to 1.6-2.2%, whereas the coefficient on the linear term of the industry tenure 
variable is approximately 4% for three-digit industry codes and around 3-4.4% for one-
digit codes. The results for the sample from the PSID are qualitatively similar; however 
the estimated coefficient on the linear term of the firm tenure variable is initially very 
small; then it drops from 1.1% to almost zero and becomes insignificant when the 
industry tenure variables are included. The coefficients of the linear terms of the industry 
tenure variables are approximately 2.1-2.2%. Thus the industry tenure variable reduces 
the effect of the firm tenure by 40% to 57%.  
The estimates of the IV-GLS in Parent (2000) reveal even bigger change in the 
effect of the firm tenure when controlling for industry tenure. Thus for the sample of the 
NLSY data the coefficient on industry tenure is between 2.2% and 4% for three-digit 
industry codes and is between 2.4% and 5% for one-digit codes, whereas the coefficient 
of firm tenure initially is around 2% and becomes insignificant when the industry tenure 
variable is included. And for the PSID sample the coefficients of the industry tenure are 
between 1.5% and 2.3% for both three- and one-digit industry codes and the coefficient 
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of the firm tenure is initially low, around 0.6%, and becomes even smaller and 
insignificant after the inclusion of industry tenure. Thus, in the case of the IV-GLS all of 
the effect from firm tenure is eliminated by industry tenure variables.  
In Parent’s (2000) work, there are several important pitfalls in the interpretation 
of the results that have to be handled before any conclusion is drawn. The author 
combines several methods proposed in the literature in order to provide clear 
interpretation of the findings. Firstly, total experience, firm and industry tenure are likely 
to be correlated with corresponding error term components, such as individual specific 
effect, quality of job-match and industry-match. The first component is handled by using 
GLS under assumption that the error term contains person-specific components. Then 
using a methodology proposed by Altonji and Shakotko (1987) in Parent’s (2000) IV-
GLS the firm and industry tenure variables are respectively instrumented by their 
deviations from job-match and industry-match means.  Hence the instruments by 
construction are uncorrelated with the components of the error term.  
While instruments help to solve some endogeneity issues, there is still a potential 
correlation between experience and industry-tenure with the employer-match component 
of the error term. The correlation between experience and firm-tenure or industry 
seniority and firm-tenure “arise … as a result of job shopping over the course of a 
worker’s career” (p.311). Thus, if longer industry-tenure helps to match employer better, 
then coefficients of the industry-tenure will be biased upward. Since firm tenure is highly 
correlated with industry tenure the coefficients of the firm tenure will be biased 
downward. Parent (2000) provides evidence of this concern by showing that quits with 
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and without switching industry occur much more frequently compared to layoffs (for 
both sample and for both three- and one-digit industry codes).  
Parent (2000) warns that another pitfall in the interpretation of his findings is a 
measurement error. It is important to understand whether a measurement error is driving 
a fall in tenure coefficients when industry tenure is included in the analysis. It is 
suggested that with inclusion of industry tenure, which is highly correlated to firm tenure 
measured with error, it is likely that the estimated firm tenure slope will be even more 
biased downward, because “the variance that is needed to identify the tenure coefficient 
is eliminated, thereby increasing the noise to signal ratio” (p. 318). First, the author 
replicates Neal’s (1995) estimates using own samples by regressing postdisplacement log 
wage on predisplacement tenure separately for industry switchers and stayers, and finds 
quantitatively similar results. As in Neal’s (1995) paper the postdisplacement log wage 
returns to predisplacement firm tenure for industry are much higher for industry stayers 
than for industry switchers.  
Parent (2000) suggests that if all workers who quit stayed in the same industry 
while all laid-off workers switched their industry then positive effect of employer tenure 
for stayers “would merely reflect job match gains for those who located a better match 
and not really the effect of transferable industry-specific skills” (p.319). Firstly, the 
patterns of quits versus layoffs are very similar for both industry-switchers and stayers. 
This suggests this is not the issue of selection effects. Secondly, Parent (2000) uses 
higher moments as instruments and compares results with OLS estimates. Similarity of 
the results implies no evidence for a major role of the measurement errors in explaining 
the decrease in the tenure effect. 
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In conclusion, after checking results for robustness and ruling out measurement 
error effects, Parent (2000) finds that industry-specificity plays a more important role in 
wage determination compared to firm-specific factors. 
Kamburov and Manovskii (2009) continue inspecting the extent of the specificity 
of human capital by studying the importance of occupation-specific factors in workers’ 
wage determination process.  They use data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics 
for 1968-93. For consistency with previous studies on specificity of human capital they 
restrict their sample to white male heads of households, aged 18-64, living in the 
continental US, with positive earnings (at least 1 dollar in constant 1979 dollars), who 
worked at least 500 hours in a given year. They exclude individuals who worked for the 
government, were self-employed, were in the military at any time, were farmers after 
1975, or were simultaneously employed in several jobs.  
In order to construct industry and occupation tenure variables Kamburov and 
Manovskii (2009) define industry and occupation switches on the basis of 1-, 2-, and 3-
digit codes with the help of the Retrospective Occupation-Industry Supplemental Data 
Files4 and using both “Employer_t” and “Position” partitions. The first partition identifies 
industry/occupation switches when a switch on the original PSID data is confirmed by an 
employer switch. And the second one identifies there is an industry/occupation switch 
when an employer or position switch is not a promotion. Following Parent (2000) they 
use “Partition T” suggested to be acceptable by Brown and Light (1992) in order to 
                                                 
4 In 1999, the PSID released the Retrospective Occupation-Industry Supplemental Data Files that 
retrospectively assign 3-digit 1970 census codes to the reported occupations and industries of household 
heads and wives for the period 1968–80. 
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identify employer tenure. This partition identifies employer switch if the reported 
employment duration is smaller than the time elapsed since the last survey interview. 
Kamburov and Manovskii (2009) use Parent’s (2000) model as a base, but include 
occupation tenure variable in addition to employer and industry tenure. Other controls 
include total labour market experience and years of education, dummies for 1-digit 
occupations and industries, years, residence regions, marital status, a union dummy, an 
employment rate and its lag; as well as a dummy that equals to one if a person is not in 
the first year of employer tenure. Similar to Parent (2000) they decompose the error term 
into an unobserved individual-specific component, unobserved quality of job-match, 
industry-match and occupation-match. Therefore they estimate the model using both OLS 
and IV-GLS. For the latter they use instruments proposed by Altonji and Shakotko (1987) 
and used by Parent (2000). They instrument tenure variables and their square and cubic 
terms with respective deviations from their means. The IV-GLS is estimated under the 
assumption that the error term contains a serially correlated individual-specific 
component. They also make a series of checks and argue that their findings are driven 
neither by correlation of tenure variables with non-own components of the error term nor 
by any measurement errors. 
The main finding of Kamburov and Manovskii (2009) is that occupation-
specificity plays a major and the most important role in wage determination process. 
Their finding is consistent and robust across different specifications; and the estimations 
from OLS and IV-GLS are qualitatively similar. Thus for all digit classifications and the 
partition “Employer_t” when only employer tenure is included among all tenure 
variables, the coefficient of its linear term is around 1.7-1.8% in case of the OLS and 
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around 6.6-8% in case of the IV-GLS. Consistently with Parent (2000) in case of the IV-
GLS when both employer and industry tenure are included in the regressions the 
coefficient on the linear term of the employer tenure drops significantly. In Kamburov 
and Manovskii (2009) the industry tenure accounts for about 55% and 14% of the 
employer tenure for one-digit and three-digit classification respectively as compared to 
40-45% in Parent (2000).  
In Kamburov and Manovskii (2009)’s paper, when all tenure variables are 
included in the regression analysis, the coefficient of the linear term of the employer 
tenure variable becomes close to zero (or even negative) and/or insignificant for either 
OLS or IV-GLS estimation. The coefficients for industry tenure are significant in some 
cases, but are only around 12-14% and become smaller and less significant moving 
towards three-digit classification level. In contrast, the coefficients on the linear term of 
the occupation tenure increase towards three-digit classification level from 3.9% to 4.7% 
in case of the OLS and from 2% to 2.9% in case of the IV-GLS and are always 
significant at 5% significance level. Altogether, in case of the OLS estimation and 3-digit 
classification a worker with 5 year occupational tenure receives between 14% and 20% 
return, and the IV-GLS estimates suggest a total return of about 11-12% for the same 
worker. The total returns to either employer or industry 5 year tenure do not exceed 3% 
and are insignificant.    
A paper of Poletaev and Robinson (2008) evaluates the relationship between 
wage losses after displacement and change in their skill-profiles using the Displaced 
Worker Survey for 1984-2000 and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) for 1992. 
Their sample for the analysis is restricted to full-time private sector workers aged 61 and 
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lower with wages of at least $40 in the past year, and excludes those who worked in 
agriculture or construction industry due to seasonality issue. The DOT provides detailed 
information on 12,741 unique occupations with 56 job-specific characteristics for each 
occupation. Using factor analysis to extract basic skill-factors from all 56 characteristics 
they construct a vector of four factor scores, so called skill-portfolio, that have zero mean 
and one standard deviation by construction: “intelligence” (40% of total variation), “fine 
motor skills” (20%), “physical strength” (12%) and “visual skills” (5%)5. Then they 
attach the skill-portfolios to 3-digit census occupations for workers from the sample.  
Poletaev and Robinson (2008) use predicted factor scores for each of the four 
basic skills to define three groups of skill-portfolio switchers and stayers and compare 
them to industry, occupation and skill-portfolio switchers and stayers. First, for each 
occupation they define the “main” skill as the one that has the highest score. They define 
“main” skill stayers as those whose “main” skill order does not change in post-
displacement job compared to pre-displacement. Second, for the “main” skill if there is a 
change in the order of the “main” skill, which is at least 0.5 of a standard deviation higher 
than the mean, they define that there is a change in portfolio one (PC1) if the change is at 
least half of a standard deviation in absolute value. Third, for the skills that are at least 
0.6 of a standard deviation higher than the mean they define that the change in portfolio 
one (PC2) occurs if the change is not less than 0.3 of a standard deviation in absolute 
value. In addition, for PC2, those who initially were classified as stayers are reclassified 
as switchers if the change in the “main” skill is at least one standard deviation even if the 
order of the “main” skill is the same.  
                                                 
5 In Poletaev and Robinson (2008) the factor called “visual skills” loads on color discrimination, color 
vision, far acuity, and field of vision. 
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In Poletaev and Robinson (2008), the results from investigating unconditional and 
conditional (on schooling, experience, pre-displacement tenure, years since displacement 
and weeks without work after displacement) mean log wage losses separately for 
industry, occupation and skill-portfolio reveal that losses for switchers are around twice 
higher than for stayers. Notably, while the mean log wage losses for industry and 
occupation are all approximately the same and range between 11% and 12% for switchers 
and between 5% and 6.3% for stayers the losses for skill-portfolio switchers and stayers 
are still greater accounting for about 15% for switchers and about 7% for stayers.     
The study of Poletaev and Robinson (2008) motivates this research as their results 
indicate that wage losses of displaced workers are closer associated with skill-portfolio 
change than with industry or occupation change. However, while they study returns to 
skill-tenure of Canadian workers, in our research we study returns to foreign experience 
of immigrants conditional on skills matching. Moreover, unlike Poletaev and Robinson 
(2008), who study effects of skill-match based on a main skill of an occupation, we 
explore effects of matching each skill separately. 
2.3 Returns to foreign human capital controlling for occupational match 
There is a unique study in the literature on immigration that explores effects of 
occupational match on the return to foreign experience (Goldmann et al., 2009). 
However, Poletaev and Robinson (2008) show that skill match is more important than 
occupational (and industry-) match. Hence, there is still a gap in the literature on 
immigration as there is no study, to the best of our knowledge, that explores effects of 
skill-match on the returns to foreign experience.   
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Goldmann et al. (2009) account for findings of the previous literature on specific 
human capital and focus on occupational specificity to study economic returns to 
immigrant human capital. Using the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada 
(LSIC) they investigate whether immigrants who match their source-country and host-
country occupation are better able to transfer their foreign human capital then those who 
do not match. They use different occupational groupings to construct match variables 
between different combinations of source-, intended and host-country occupations. The 
sample is restricted to immigrants aged between 25 to 59 years old at the time of 
immigration, who reported they ever worked prior to immigrating to Canada; the sample 
excludes former temporary foreign workers and former international students in Canada 
for “cleaner measures”. In their analysis of male Skilled Worker principal applicants6 
they also include the match between intended and host-country occupation, a match 
between source- and intended occupation and a match between all three of them together 
and their interactions with foreign experience and schooling.  
Goldmann et al. (2009) first include a set of control variables and dummies for 
matching of source- and host-country occupation (and no interaction terms). They find 
that earnings for immigrants who obtain match are 33.2% and 38% higher for male and 
female respectively compared to those who don’t match, whereas the returns to foreign 
work experience for both genders is -1% and are statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level and to the returns to years of schooling are close to zero or 
insignificant. When all interactions with foreign experience and schooling are included 
immigrant earnings for matchers are 29% and 33.5% higher for males and females 
                                                 
6 Citizen and Immigration Canada (CIC) classifies immigrants by immigration categories: Skilled Workers, 
Family class, Provincial Nominees, Business Immigrants, and Refugees. All of these categories are 
subdivided into principal applicants and spouses or dependents. 
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respectively, the returns to foreign experience are still -1% and the returns to foreign 
experience and to schooling for matchers are not significantly different from zero for 
both genders.  
Goldmann et al. (2009) extend their analysis by looking at the returns to foreign 
human capital for professional and non-professional occupations as well as licensed and 
non-licensed occupations and their interactions with matching source- and host-country 
occupation. For all specifications and both genders the returns to foreign experience are 
around -1% and are mostly statistically significant at the 1% significance level and the 
returns to foreign schooling are mostly statistically insignificant or close to zero. For 
male immigrants when all possible interactions of professional and non-professional 
occupations with match variable between source- and host-country are included the 
return to match variable alone is statistically insignificant anymore and any foreign 
human capital interactions receive no return with an exception of 5% return to each 
additional year of foreign school for matchers within non-professional occupations; 
however earnings are higher for those who obtain a match within professional 
occupations and within non-professional occupations by 41.8% and 37.5% respectively.  
In Goldmann et al. (2009), the results for female immigrants for the same 
regression specification as above are somewhat striking. The returns to foreign 
experience and schooling alone are zero and insignificant, while the return to match alone 
and to its interaction with years of schooling turn negative, -35.8% and -10.2% 
respectively, and are statistically significant at all levels, the returns to school for 
professionals, for matchers within professional occupations and matchers within non-
professional occupations are -5.8%, 16.2% and 16.9% respectively. Both professional 
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matchers and non-professional matchers receive 85.1% and 59.1% higher earnings 
compared to non-matchers. For regressions with all possible interactions of match, 
foreign human capital and licensed and non-licensed occupations the earnings are higher 
by 30.5% and 37.7% for male and female matchers respectively. The returns to foreign 
experience for those immigrants who match their source- and host-country occupation are 
close to zero and insignificant for both genders, while the return to years of schooling is 
2.6% and 5.1% for men and women respectively. Immigrant male and female matchers 
within licensed occupations have 12.3% and 29.1% lower earnings than those who don’t 
match.   
Goldmann et al. (2009) also look at the effects of combinations of matches 
between source-, intended and host-country occupations and their interactions with 
foreign experience and schooling for a sub-sample of male Skilled Worker principal 
applicants. Even for this sub-sample the return to years of foreign experience is negative 
and significant, -1.2%, and the return to years of education is zero and insignificant. 
Surprisingly, even for male Skilled Worker principal applicants, who obtain all 
combinations of matches between source-, intended and host-country occupations, the 
return to either foreign experience or schooling is statistically not different from zero at 
any significance level. In contrast, male Skilled Worker principal applicants who are able 
to match their source-, intended and host-country occupation receive positive and 
significant return to foreign schooling. Earnings are higher for Skilled Worker principal 
applicants who obtain a match between source- and host-country occupations, a match 
between intended and host-country occupation, and a match between source-, intended 
and host-country occupations by 26.45%, 30.3% and 18.5% respectively.  
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In this research we build on Goldman et al. (2009). We employ their model 
specifications; however, instead of occupational match, we explore returns to skill-match 
and its effect on the returns to foreign human capital with a focus on foreign experience. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter reviews the theory of Investment in Human Capital. The review 
starts with introduction of most prominent and seminal academic works that pioneered in 
creation of the theory. The review includes works on investment in schooling and types 
of training on the job. Then theoretical foundations for the regression analysis are 
introduced, which includes the Mincerian log wage equation and the human capital 
equation. The chapter concludes with a review of findings on the specificity of human 
capital such as firm-, industry-, occupation- and skill-tenures. 
 3.1 Investment in human capital 
The late 1950s to mid-1970s became a fruitful period for formation of investment 
in human capital. Becker (1964, 1994), Ben-Porath (1967) and Mincer (1974) provide 
rich and extensive theoretical ground in this matter. There are some remarkable economic 
works that have provided important empirical evidence.  
Mincer (1958) derives a theoretical model for personal income distributions with 
respect to training differences and provides empirical evidence using the Census data on 
income and occupations.  Training is subdivided into two types: (i) formal education, - 
years spent for schooling before an actual job; and (ii) informal education, - experience 
and skills received on the job. He suggests that total cost of training has two sources: 
opportunity cost, - the major source, and direct cost of training. The opportunity cost is a 
“deferral of earnings” during the training period. The direct costs are the costs of 
equipment, tuition and books. He focuses on inter- and intra-occupational life-time 
income differentials. The interoccupational are the differences in income streams 
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between occupations, whereas the intra-occupational are the differences within 
occupations. He concludes that interoccupational differentials are a function of 
differences in (length of) training. On the other hand, the intra-occupational differentials 
arise from on-the-job experience differentials. In his analysis of dependence of earnings 
on age he finds that the relationship is steeper for occupations which require more skills, 
either in terms of years of schooling or years of experience on the job.   He concludes that 
there is a rate of return to an amount of training: “… absolute differences in the length of 
training result in percentage differences in annual earnings.” (p. 301) 
Schultz (1961) provides an analysis of substance and formation of human capital. 
He states: “Although it is obvious that people acquire useful skills and knowledge, it is 
not obvious that these skills and knowledge are a form of capital, that this capital is in 
substantial part a product of a deliberate investment.” (p. 1) He also suggests that “the 
quality of human effort” can be improved through such forms of investment in human 
capital as health, on-job-training, formal education and internal migration. Interestingly, 
he indirectly talks about “specific human capital”. For instance, he says that farm people 
who switch to non-farm jobs earn substantially less than people with experience in these 
jobs of the same age, sex and race.  In order to measure investment in human capital he 
proposes to distinguish between consumption and investment, and separates them into: 
pure consumption, pure investment and expenditure that have both characteristics.  
Becker (1994) studied personal income differences of college graduates compared 
to high school graduates. He suggests that “social and private economic returns from 
college education would differ if a college education had different effects on earnings and 
productivity” (p.209).  
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Following Becker’s (1962) theoretical framework on costs of training Mincer 
(1962) attempts to take into account both direct and indirect costs of schooling. He uses 
the 1939-1958 U.S. Census data and attempts to estimate costs and rates of return of 
investment in human capital. He denotes “training”, both in school and on the job, as 
“investment in acquisition of skill or improvement of worker productivity”. In his 
analysis such forms of informal training as apprenticeship and medical specialization are 
considered. In order to compute indirect cost of schooling he uses opportunity cost of 
students comparing them to similar individuals who are, instead, in the labor force. In his 
estimates opportunity costs constitute around one half of total costs (public and private), 
and around three quarters of private costs accrued by students. The data suggest that with 
lower level of education there is lower level of on-the-job training and with higher level 
of education the opposite is true. He finds that there is a strong positive correlation (86%) 
between formal and informal training. It is, however, much more difficult to separate 
direct and indirect cost of on-the-job training due to lack of data. Instead, he uses an 
approach proposed by Becker (1962), and compares income streams of individuals with 
different levels of schooling, assuming that the rate of return to additional year of 
schooling is the same for college and high-school graduates. He stresses that the rate of 
return found from equating present values of net earnings of college and high school 
graduates is not the rate of return to schooling, but rather some average of rates of return 
to formal and informal training. He estimates a range of rate of reruns using three 
different assumptions about comparative income stream groups. Essentially he equates a 
stream of value of cost of training to future stream of total return. The stream of value of 
cost of training is the difference between wage of a trainee and wage of an untrained 
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person; and future stream of total return is the difference between wages of a trained 
person and untrained. He derives the following formula to determine a rate of return of 
investment in training: 
 ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ௡ ൌ ݀ܿ  
(3.1) 
where r is the rate of return, n is number of training periods in years, d is the increment in 
earnings in the alternative job after training is completed, and c is forgone earnings 
during the training period. Interestingly, he finds that the rate of return to such 
investments in informal training as apprenticeship and medical specialization is 
essentially the same as the rate of return to total costs of college education. However, the 
private return is higher for formal education compared to the one for informal training. 
The estimated rates of return to investment in on-the-job training for medical 
specialization for males in 1950 are between 9% and 13% compared to Becker’s (1960) 
estimates for college level education of 11%.   
Ben-Porath (1967) proposed a model of optimal lifecycle investment in human 
capital implemented through a human capital production function. His model was an 
important building block in the theory of investment in human capital. The aim of the 
model was to explain growth of earnings with worker’s age on the basis of production of 
human capital. He stated that individual “own abilities, innate or acquired, the quality of 
co-operating constraints and opportunities offered by institutional setup – all determine 
the “technology”, or the production function” (p. 352). He asserts that the stock of human 
capital is similar to tangible capital, and also has a depreciation rate. Services of human 
capital can be traded in the labour market for a rental. The production of human capital 
increases its stock at decreasing rate and, hence, causes a down-ward-sloping demand. 
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An individual maximizes his/her life-time wealth through allocation of his/her time 
between earnings, i.e. through working, and production of human capital, i.e. through 
training.  
Generally, Ben-Porath’s (1967) human capital production function together with 
Becker’s modification can be written as follows (Mincer, 1997): 
 ܳ௧ ൌ ݂ሺܭ௧, ܵ௧, ܺ௧; ܤ௧ሻ (3.2) 
where ܳ௧ is the individual’s gross investment in human capital in period t; ܭ௧ is the stock 
of human capital at time t;  ܵ௧ is the gross additions to the stock or the fraction of time 
devoted to the production of ܳ௧;  ܺ௧ are goods and services purchased for production of 
human capital at time t. Becker (1994) also adds a new term into the Ben-Porath (1967) 
production function, ܤ௧, which stands for the “limited individual physical and intellectual 
capacity” and is added to rationalize the assumption of diminishing returns. Becker’s 
(1994) modification aimed to analyze the optimal distribution of total accumulations of 
human capital across individuals. 
3.2 On-the-job training 
Becker’s (1964) book “Investment in Human Capital” has become one the most 
well-known and most cited works in the field of Human Capital. He builds a seminal 
theoretical base of understanding of investment in general and specific human capital and 
its role in a worker’s lifetime wage profile.  In the chapter “Investment in Human Capital: 
Effects on Earnings” (pp. 31-58) he develops two important concepts that have become a 
focus of the vast empirical literature on human capital. First, assume that worker’s 
productivity rises with accumulation of human capital. Human capital is perfectly general 
if accumulated worker’s skills benefit one employer to the same extent as another 
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employer. Thus an example of general human capital would be knowledge acquired 
during education period. On the other hand, employees also accumulate or master skills 
during on-job-training. Human capital is perfectly specific if one employer worker’s 
productivity benefits one employer while another employer one does not receive any 
benefit from the same worker’s skills. In other words, this worker cannot transfer 
accumulated skills across employers. Usually human capital is neither completely general 
nor completely specific. 
Becker (1964) aims to determine the rates of return to general and specific human 
capital. First, assume that an individual starts work with a certain level of productivity. 
Assume also that firms operate in competitive markets. From the firm’s profit-
maximization problem the equilibrium in each period, t, occurs when worker’s marginal 
product equals wages: 
 ܯ ௧ܲ ൌ ௧ܹ (3.3) 
If the firm makes a decision based on present value of future benefits and costs 
the equilibrium for such firm is when the stream of its future receipts, ܴ௧, equals to the 
stream of its future expenditures, ܧ௧, for period t from zero to n: 
 
෍ ܴ௧ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ௧ାଵ
௡ିଵ
௧ୀ଴
ൌ ෍ ܧ௧ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ௧ାଵ
௡ିଵ
௧ୀ଴
 
(3.4) 
Suppose that t=0 is the period when the training to a worker is being provided at a 
direct cost of k, then the equation (3.4) could be rewritten in the following manner: 
 
ܯ ଴ܲ ൅෍ ܯ ௧ܲሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ௧
௡ିଵ
௧ୀଵ
ൌ ଴ܹ ൅ ݇ ൅෍ ௧ܹሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ௧ାଵ 
௡ିଵ
௧ୀ଴
 
(3.5) 
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Let the firm’s return, G, be the difference between the stream of future receipts, in 
terms of marginal products, and future expenditures, in terms of wages, after the training 
period. 
 
ܩ ൌ ෍ܯ ௧ܲ െ ௧ܹሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ௧
௡ିଵ
௧ୀଵ
 
(3.6) 
Let k be direct costs of training, then the equation (3.5) can be rewritten as: 
  
 ܯ ଴ܲ ൅ ܩ ൌ ଴ܹ ൅ ݇ (3.7) 
Let the opportunity cost be measured as the difference between potential marginal 
product, ܯ ଴ܲᇱ, - when no training was provided -, and actual marginal product, ܯ ଴ܲ. 
Denote C as the total of opportunity costs and direct costs of the training. Then the 
equation (3.7) can be rewritten as: 
 ܯ ଴ܲᇱ ൅ ܩ ൌ ଴ܹ ൅ ܥ (3.8) 
 Therefore, potential marginal product that could be produced, ܯ ଴ܲᇱ, can equal to 
the wage in the training period, ଴ܹ, only when the firm’s return G is equal to the total 
costs that the firm accrues during the training period, C. 
3.2.1 General training 
Becker (1964) views completely general training as type of training that increases 
worker’s marginal productivity in many firms, not only in the firm providing this 
training. Hence, a firm would only provide general training to a worker if it does not need 
to pay the costs of such training. Then the return to the firm, G, equals to zero: 
 
ܩ ൌ ෍ܯ ௧ܲ െ ௧ܹሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ௧
௡ିଵ
௧ୀଵ
ൌ 0 
(3.9) 
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It follows, that a trainee alone would be paying costs for general training and 
receiving consequent returns. Thus, worker’s wage, ଴ܹ, in the period of his/her training 
would be lower than potential wage for his/her marginal product in case of no training, 
ܯ ଴ܲᇱ, exactly by the amount of the opportunity cost or, in other words, net of investment 
cost: 
 ଴ܹ ൌ ܯ ଴ܲᇱ െ ܥ (3.10) 
Equally the worker’s wage, ଴ܹ, would be lower than the wage paid for an actual 
marginal product during training, ܯ ଴ܲ, by the amount of the direct costs of the training, 
k: 
   ଴ܹ ൌ ܯ ଴ܲ െ ݇ (3.11) 
Thus, “earnings” of the firm during the training period would be an income flow, 
in terms of potential marginal product, net of capital or stock term, in terms of training 
costs. 
3.2.2 Specific training 
In contrast to the general training, Becker (1964) suggests that specific training 
raises worker’s productivity differently in different firms. For instance, perfectly specific 
training raises worker’s marginal productivity exclusively in the firm providing the 
training and is virtually useless in other firms. In this extreme case a worker’s wage in 
other firms is independent of (specific) training received with his/her employer.  
Consider two cases. First, assume that an employer bears all the costs, C, 
associated with on-the-job training and collects all the return, G, from future higher 
productivity of a trained worker. Then using equation (3.8) it follows that this worker’s 
wage, ଴ܹ, during the training period would be equal to potential marginal product, ܯ ଴ܲᇱ, 
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that could be produced if no training was provided and is higher that his/her actual 
marginal product, ܯ ଴ܲ. In contrast, assume that a trainee bears all the costs, C, by 
receiving a wage that is lower than the wage that would be paid in case of no training, as 
in equations (3.10) or (3.11). Then the firm’s return, G, would be equal to zero and the 
worker would collect the future return by receiving higher future wages equaling to 
higher marginal productivity. In the first case, when a firm bears all costs of training, if 
the worker quits, the firm is worse off because it does not collect any return and only 
bears losses in terms of lost capital and investment. In the second case, when a trainee 
bears all costs, and if the trainee if laid-off or fired, he/she bears all the losses as he/she 
does not collect return from receiving higher future wages neither in this firm nor in other 
firms as the training is specific. 
3.2.3 Training costs sharing 
In order to split the costs and the return between an employer and its trainee 
Becker (1964) brings in likelihood of a quit. Consider turnover to be a function that is 
negatively related to wages. Thus, with higher wages the likelihood of a quit decreases. 
However, to balance demand and supply of workers who would want to get the job with 
higher wages, the costs of training have to be shared with trainees. If the training is 
neither completely specific nor completely general, but rather is a sum of both, then a 
firm is not willing to pay for the general part of it.  
Let ܩᇱᇱ be a sum of return collected by a firm, ܩ, and by employees, ܩᇱ. Let a 
share, ߙ, of the total return collected by firms be ܩ ൌ ߙܩᇱᇱ, then a share of the total return 
collected by employees is ܩᇱ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻܩᇱᇱ. Using ܩᇱᇱ ൌ ܥ and equation (3.8) we obtain: 
 ܯ ଴ܲᇱ ൅ ߙܥ ൌ ଴ܹ ൅ ܥ (3.12) 
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which becomes: 
 ܹ ൌ ܯܲᇱ െ ሺ1 െ ߙሻܥ (3.13) 
The equation (3.13) is a generalization of training that consists of both types, 
when 0 ൏ ߙ ൏ 1. Hence, in case of completely general training, when ߙ ൌ 0, it reduces 
to the equation (3.10). In case of completely specific training, when ߙ ൌ 1, it is reduced 
to ଴ܹ ൌ ܯ ଴ܲᇱ.  
The analysis leads to several important implications. First, firms pay higher wages 
to workers with specific training and lower wages to employers with general capital. And 
second, firms offer employees with specific training higher than market wages to 
decrease turnover as these firms pay part of the costs associated with such training. 
 3.3 Earnings function 
In his seminal study Mincer (1974) builds a theoretical framework for 
understanding the relationship between schooling, experience and earnings. He 
specifically focuses on an econometric model for estimation of returns to schooling and 
on-the-job training.  
Assume that an individual without education has earnings ܧ଴ and they grow at a 
rate r with each year of schooling. Then the earnings in the next period can be written as: 
 ܧଵ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻܧ଴ (3.14) 
Assuming r is constant over time, the individual’s earnings after S years of 
schooling can be written as: 
 ܧ௦ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ௦ ܧ଴ (3.15) 
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides we get: 
 ݈݊ܧ௦ ൌ ܵ כ ݈݊ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ ൅ ݈݊ܧ଴ (3.16) 
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where ݈݊ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ ൎ ݎ for small ݎ. Then equation (3.15) can be rewritten as: 
 ݈݊ܧ௦ ൎ ܵ כ ݎ ൅ ݈݊ܧ଴ (3.17) 
Regarding that individual’s knowledge capacity is expanding while working, the 
post-schooling investment can be added to the schooling model: 
 ݈݊ܧௌ,் ൎ ݈݊ܧ଴ ൅ ܵ כ ݎ ൅ ߚଵ כ ܶ ൅ ߚଶ כ ܶଶ (3.18) 
where T stands for years of on-job-training or simply years of work experience, and the 
quadratic term ܶଶ captures the concavity of return to the training. Mincer (1974) and 
Becker (1994) believe that individual’s capacity to learn is limited and has diminishing 
marginal returns. Hence, the coefficient on the quadratic term in equation (3.18) has a 
negative sign in Mincer’s (1974) work.    
 Given, that individual earnings also depend on a vector of other characteristics, 
the standard equation in the literature on human capital can be written as: 
 ݈݊ ௜ܻ ൌ ܽ௜ ൅ ܾଵ  ݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜ ൅ ܾଶ ܧݔ݌௜ ൅ ܾଷ ܧݔ݌௜ଶ ൅ ܾସ ௜ܺ ൅ ݁௜ (3.19) 
where ௜ܻ stands for earnings of an individual i, ݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜ stands for years of schooling, 
ܧݔ݌௜ stands for years of work experience after completion of education and its square 
term ܧݔ݌௜ଶ, ௜ܺ is a vector of other individual’s characteristics (such as age, gender, race 
etc.), and ݁௜ is an error term or a random shock to individual’s earnings. 
3.4 Degree of specificity of human capital 
Becker (1964) mostly discusses specific training as specific to a firm. However, 
eventually he develops a talk around the extent of specificity. Thus specific training can 
be also specific “in a set of firms defined by a product, type of work, or geographical 
location” (p. 49), as well as industry, occupation, or country. The literature on specific 
human capital has attempted to investigate the extent and the importance of specificity of 
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human capital in formation of workers’ wage profiles. For instance, both Neal (1995) and 
Parent (2000) using different data surveys and different approaches find that industry-
specificity plays a more important role than firm-specificity in wage determination of 
displaced workers.  
The base for the specific human capital model is the following equation: 
 ݈݊ ௜ܻ௝ ൌ ܽ௜ ൅ ܾଵ  ݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜ ൅ ܾଶ ݂ሺܧݔ݌௜ሻ ൅ ܾଷ݂ሺ ܶ݁݊௜௝ሻ ൅ ܾସ ௜ܺ ൅ ݁௜ (3.20) 
where ௜ܻ௝  stands for earnings of an individual i in firm j, ݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜ is years of schooling, 
ܧݔ݌௜ stands for years of work experience after completion of education, ݂ denotes a 
function that includes both linear and quadratic terms of a corresponding argument, ܶ݁݊௜௝ 
stands for years of firm tenure,  ௜ܺ is a vector of other individual’s characteristics (such as 
age, gender, race etc.), and ݁௜ is an error term or a random shock to individual’s earnings. 
This equation can further be augmented by inclusion of different types of tenure. 
Neal (1995) using the Displaced Workers Survey for the period of 1984-90 is the 
first to document the difference in postdisplacement log wage returns to predisplacement 
firm tenure and potential total experience between  workers who switched industry after 
displacement and those who didn’t. His main finding suggests that wage losses of male 
industry-switchers increase with experience at rates twice higher than for industry-
stayers. For instance, the wage loss of an industry-switcher displaced male worker with 
10 years tenure for the same employer is 0.27 log point higher than for a similar male 
worker who however was displaced in his first year of employment; whereas the wage 
loss of an industry-stayer displaced male worker with 10 years of firm seniority is 0.13 
log points higher than for his counterpart that was however displaced within the first year 
of tenure. 
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Parent (2000) using both the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth for the 1979-
96 period and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the 1981-92 period finds that the 
return to firm tenure is substantially reduced or virtually disappears when industry tenure 
is controlled. For instance, using the NLSY data and the GLS method the return to 10 
years firm tenure is around 0.15, however it falls to between 0.02 and 0.07 when industry 
tenure is included and becomes insignificant; and in the case of IV-GLS from 0.02 it falls 
below zero and becomes insignificant. Using the PSID and GLS the return to 10 year 
employer tenure falls from 0.10 to between 0.03 and 0.05 after the industry experience is 
controlled and becomes insignificant; and in the case of IV-GLs it falls from 0.05 to 
between -0.03 and 0.03 and also becomes insignificant. The linear term of industry tenure 
is significant and indicates between 2 to 4% marginal return using the NLSY and 
between 1.5% and 2.3% with the PSID data. 
Kamburov and Manovskii (2009) using the PSID for the 1968-93 period show 
that occupational tenure plays the most important role in wage determination. They find 
that occupation switchers experience 18% reduction in their weekly earnings, while 
occupation stayers only 6%. They include various combinations of employer, industry 
and occupation tenure in the regressions to see how the coefficients are affected. 
Consistently with Parent (2000) when they include industry tenure together with 
employer tenure the coefficients on the latter drops by half. However when all three types 
of tenure are included simultaneously, the coefficients on both employer and industry 
tenure become smaller and insignificant, whereas the coefficients on the occupation 
tenure are substantially bigger and always significant. For instance, the coefficient on the 
linear term of the occupation tenure is between 2% and 3%. Overall, the marginal effects 
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suggest that the total returns to 5 years occupation tenure is 8% to 20% depending on the 
definition of variables and are significant and estimation method, while the returns to 5 
years firm or industry tenure usually are at least twice smaller and often insignificant. 
Poletaev and Robinson (2008) using the Displaced Worker Survey for 1984-2000 
and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) for 1992 construct skill portfolios and 
find that greater wage losses of workers after displacement are associated with switching 
skill-portfolios more than switching industry or occupation. The mean log wage losses 
for industry and occupation are all approximately the same and range between 11% and 
12% for switchers and between 5% and 6.3% for stayers. However, the losses for skill-
portfolio switchers and stayers are still greater and account for about 15% for switchers 
and about 7% for stayers.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA 
This chapter presents data used in the research as well as descriptive statistics of 
some key variables and characteristics. We begin with a description of the main sample 
of interest in section 4.1 and then proceed to sub-samples of wave 3 in section 4.2. Data 
on occupational characteristics is presented in section 4.3.  
4.1 Main sample of interest 
The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada consists of three waves. The 
target population consists of immigrants that applied from abroad and landed between 
October 1st, 2000 and September 30th, 2001 and were ages 15 and older at the time of 
landing. In total, the target population accounts for 169,400 that constitutes around 67% 
of the immigrant cohort. The corresponding interviews were conducted in 2001, 2003 and 
2005 approximately 6 months, 2 years and 4 years after landing respectively. The 
response rate is around 60% in the first wave and around 65% of them continued to 
respond through the 3rd wave. As a result, 7,716 immigrants are followed through the 3rd 
wave, which accounts for approximately 39% of those interviewed in the 1st wave.  
The sample of interest taken for the analysis in this research has the following 
restrictions: (i) immigrants aged between 25 and 59 at the time of immigration; (ii) those 
who reported their last occupation prior to immigration and current occupation; (iii) those 
who receive positive earnings from wage and salaries. Consistently with previous studies, 
we apply the age restriction to capture population that is most likely to be in the labor 
force: likely to have completed full-time schooling as well as not to be retired. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine whether an immigrant indeed worked in 
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his/her last pre-immigration occupation or the length of time he/she worked in it. 
Goldmann et al. (2009) use the “Have you ever worked prior to immigrating to Canada?” 
question to sort out respondents who indicated their last pre-immigration occupation, but 
reported they had never worked. Similarly to Goldmann et al. (2009), we exclude former 
temporary foreign workers and former international students in Canada for clearer 
estimates of foreign work experience and schooling. For the same reason, we exclude 
respondents who reported they ever had refugee status, “Visitor” visa or “Other” reasons 
for living in Canada prior to immigrating as most of them lived in Canada for more than 
1 year and may have different knowledge about Canadian labor market. 
We use the natural logarithm weekly wages (log weekly wages) as a dependent 
variable in our regression analysis. In order for log weekly wages to be comparable 
across waves we adjust them to 1992 constant dollars using the core Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). Similarly to Goldmann et al. (2009), we use a moving average of the 
monthly CPI for each immigrant regarding his entry date and interview date. For 
instance, for an immigrant who immigrated in January 2001 and was interviewed in June 
2001, we use an average CPI for the reference period of his/her 6 months.  
The original occupational codes in the LSIC are coded under the Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC). A measurement error often associated with the 
process of occupation coding in surveys is likely to be reduced due to the LSIC survey 
structure as the codes are derived from three open-ended questions. We use concordance 
tables from Human Resources and Skills Development Canada to translate these SOC 
codes into the National Occupational Classification (NOC) codes. 
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The LSIC is a sample survey with a complex longitudinal design. The final (post-
stratification) probability weights must be used to ensure consistency between the 
estimates produced from the survey and population estimates. The variance is important 
for hypothesis tests in order to determine statistical significance of estimated coefficients. 
Due to its complex sample design and stratification stages it is hard to calculate the true 
variance for the LSIC. The bootstrap replication method is the one of the best ways to 
approximate the true variance for the survey and 1,000 bootstrap weights are provided 
with the survey by Statistics Canada. In brief, the “bootstrapping” consists of calculating 
the variance for each of 1,000 weights followed by calculating the variance of these 1,000 
estimates.  
A common issue when working with survey data is inability to track the exact 
same sample of immigrants over time either due to their changing employment status or 
due to missing observations for different reasons. Therefore, we start our analysis from 
comparison of means of economic and demographic characteristics across three waves. 
Descriptive statistics give a sense of the picture in general and may help to prevent some 
issues before using the data in regression analysis. We present means and standard errors 
of key variables. In order to make any inferences when comparing the means we use the 
test for equality of means with unequal variances. The null hypothesis of the test states 
that means are equal and the two-sided alternative hypothesis states that two means are 
not equal. Three common levels for rejection regions we use are the 1%, the 5% and the 
10% significance level. 
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In table 4-1-1 we present means of key variables for male and female immigrants 
in each wave. The means of other variables can be found in Appendix A5. It is worth 
noting that while immigrant response rate falls over time the sample sizes used in our 
analysis increase dramatically due to increasing share of immigrants employed in each 
consequent wave.  The sample size of male immigrants almost doubles in each wave 
compared to its previous wave. Female sample size almost triples in wave 2 compared to 
wave 1, and then doubles in wave 3 compared to wave 2. 
Means of key variables for males are presented on the left hand side of Table 4-1. 
In general, means for males differ in several variables. Differences in age are expected as 
they are direct functions of time. Mean log weekly wage also grows over time, but we 
test the equality of its means across waves to have a sense of how big these changes are 
statistically. As a result, we reject the equality of mean log of weekly wages between 
wave 3 and both wave 2 and wave 1, but we cannot reject equality of means between 
wave 2 and wave 1. At the same time the number of years of foreign experience increases 
and number of years of foreign schooling decreases, however the null of equality cannot 
be rejected for these variables for all pair of waves. There is a tendency of decreasing 
average English score and increasing average French score over time. Using the mean 
equality test, we cannot reject the equality for these variables for wave 2 versus wave 1 at 
the 5% and the 1% level of significance.  
Means of key characteristics for females are presented on the right hand side of 
Table 4-1. The means of the same variables for females have slightly different patterns 
than for men. Compared to men, women have lower average log weekly wages, age, 
  
         Table 4-1. Cross-sectional means of key variables 
Note: All continuous variables have bootstrap standard errors in brackets. 
 Males  Females 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3  Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
Log weekly wages 6.35 6.38 6.44  6.00 6.01 6.04 
 (0.030) (0.019) (0.014)  (0.043) (0.030) (0.019) 
Age 36.17 37.73 39.58  34.87 36.82 38.32 
 (0.344) (0.219) (0.135)  (0.509) (0.266) (0.162) 
Experience 14.62 14.51 14.27  13.52 13.88 13.54 
 (0.401) (0.254) (0.155)  (0.548) (0.299) (0.184) 
School years 15.55 15.57 15.77  15.34 15.28 15.26 
 (0.154) (0.097) (0.065)  (0.220) (0.125) (0.077) 
English  0.79 0.76 0.75  0.79 0.73 0.71 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.005)  (0.016) (0.010) (0.007) 
French  0.11 0.13 0.16  0.11 0.13 0.14 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.006)  (0.017) (0.011) (0.007) 
N-weighted 10,244 22,290 42,122  5,045 14,920 30,237 
44 
 45 
 
foreign experience and schooling. Although female mean log weekly wage increases over 
time, the equality of means cannot be rejected across waves. Similarly to males, we 
cannot reject the equality of mean years of foreign experience and schooling. The average 
English score falls in wave 2 compared to wave 1, but the equality cannot be rejected in 
wave 3 compared to wave 2. The mean French score seems to rise over time, however we 
can only reject the equality at the 10% significance level in wave 3 compared to wave 1. 
4.2 Sub-samples in wave 3 
We then expand our analysis to sub-samples in wave 3. The third wave is chosen 
for the following two reasons: (1) wave 3 has the biggest sample size; (2) foreign born 
newcomers are most likely to return to their source-countries within the first year of 
immigration (Aydemir and Robinson, 2008), therefore wave 3 is also the most 
representative of immigrant population that is more likely to stay in Canada. Sub-samples 
considered are: (i) Skilled Worker principal applicants versus other immigration 
categories; (ii) regulated versus unregulated occupations; (iii) professional versus non-
professional occupations; (iv) university educated immigrants versus other education 
levels; (v) visible minorities versus not visible minorities.  
The first pair includes the Skilled Workers principal applicant sub-sample. The 
Skilled Worker is a federal immigration program7. Regarding that the target population of 
the LSIC are immigrants who arrived between in 2000/01, for that period an immigrant 
had to pass a minimum of 67 points and was assessed using the following criteria: age, 
education, length of work experience, job offer in Canada, knowledge of official 
languages and other. Its sample-mate includes the following immigration categories: 
Skilled Workers who were not principal applicants, all immigrants applied through 
                                                 
7 For a review of immigration categories see Green and Green (1999). 
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Family class, Provincial Nominees, Business immigrants, Refugees and categories 
defined as “other”.  
We use information provided in the HRSDC’s Career Handbook to classify 
immigrants’ main post-immigration occupations as regulated. Regulated requirements 
include licensing, certification and/or association membership (Career Handbook, 2001). 
The NOC Matrix 2001 provides occupational classification structure based on 
Skill Levels and Skill types, which usually require a university degree. Using the matrix 
we include the following major groups in “Professionals” sub-sample: professional 
occupations in business and finance, professional occupations in natural and applied 
sciences, professional occupations in health, professional occupations in social science, 
education, government services and religion, professional occupations in art and culture.  
We construct a sub-sample of university educated immigrants using information 
on their pre-immigration level of education that was obtained outside Canada. In this sub-
sample we include immigrants who hold at least B.A. degree. 
The survey contains information on immigrant visible minority status, which is 
used to construct a corresponding sub-sample. Initially we also constructed a sub-sample 
of immigrants on the basis of their country of origin into “Western” and “non-Western” 
region of origin. However, most immigrants who had visible minority status were sorted 
into “non-Western” sub-sample. The results for both “Visible minorities” and “non-
Western” sub-samples were almost identical. We kept the “Visible minorities” sub-
sample for the analysis regarding it had lower variance inflation factors. 
In Table 4-2 the shares of sub-samples in wave 3 are presented for both genders. 
Information on shares for key sub-samples of the analysis is important for two reasons.  
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Firstly, in cross-sectional analysis it useful to have an idea of what immigrant groups 
represent the samples and how the representation of these groups changes over time.  
Second, in within-wave analysis it is useful to understand whether some immigrant 
groups sort into other groups. For instance, most of immigrants from non-Western 
countries sort into visible minorities group, which makes two groups almost identical, 
one of them is redundant in the analysis and not included thereof. 
Table 4-2. Sub-sample shares across waves 
  Males    Females  
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
 
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
Skilled 0.67 0.66 0.67 
 
0.37 0.29 0.27 
Workers PA        
Regulated 0.53 0.54 0.56 
 
0.40 0.43 0.43 
occupation        
Professional 0.23 0.21 0.22 
 
0.20 0.23 0.22 
        
University 0.71 0.69 0.72 
 
0.68 0.65 0.66 
degree        
Visible 0.76 0.79 0.79 
 
0.72 0.74 0.77 
minority        
N-weighted 10,244 22,290 42,122 
 
5,045 14,920 30,237 
 
The left hand side of Table 4-2 contains shares of key sub-samples of male 
immigrants across waves. The equality cannot be rejected for all these shares across 
waves. Skilled Worker principal applicants, immigrants employed in regulated 
occupations, employed in professional occupations, immigrants who have university 
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education, and visible minorities are each almost equally represented in full male samples 
across waves. 
Similarly, we cannot reject equality of shares across waves for most of the sub-
samples for females (the right hand side of Table 4-2). The exception is the sub-sample of 
female Skilled Worker principal applicants, for which the equality of shares is rejected 
between wave 2 and wave 1 at the 1% significance level; and between wave 3 and wave 
1 at all of the significance levels. The share of female Skilled Worker principal applicants 
is half the share of those for males. It is also worth noting that although females on 
average have a lower share of Skilled Worker principal applicants compared to males, the 
shares of females and males employed in Professional occupations are almost identical. 
Means of key characteristics by sub-sample are presented in table 4-3 for males 
and table 4-4 for females. An overview of means across sub-samples is important for two 
main reasons. First, it gives us preliminary understanding of differences in sub-samples 
compared to the full samples of males and females in wave 3. Second, it allows us to see 
some potential dependence patterns prior to the regression analysis.  Appendix A6 and 
Appendix A7 contain means for the rest of variables and sample-mates. 
Table 4-3. Means of key characteristics by sub-samples in wave 3, males    
 Skilled 
Worker 
PA’s 
Regulated Professional University 
educated 
Visible 
minority 
Log weekly  6.54  6.50  6.76  6.51  6.39  
 (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.032)  (0.017)  (0.015)  
Age 38.75  39.22  37.29  39.07  39.59  
 (0.135)  (0.193)  (0.262)  (0.157)  (0.156)  
Experience 12.58  13.72  10.72  12.65  14.44  
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 (0.142)  (0.216)  (0.276)  (0.160)  (0.180)  
Schooling 16.63  15.95  17.02  16.86  15.60  
 (0.066)  (0.083)  (0.126)  (0.061)  (0.075)  
English  0.78  0.76  0.79  0.77  0.76  
 (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
French  0.17  0.17  0.18  0.15  0.12  
 (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.016)  (0.008)  (0.007)  
Share of full 
sample 0.67  0.56  0.22  0.72  0.79  
N-weighted 28,387  23,739  9,329  30,341  33,377  
Note: Experience stands for years of foreign work experience and schooling stands for 
years of foreign schooling. Bootstrap standard errors in brackets.  
Table 4-4. Means of key characteristics by sub-samples in wave 3, females    
 Skilled 
Worker 
PA’s 
Regulated Professional University 
educated 
Visible 
minority 
Log weekly  6.26  6.08  6.33  6.15  6.02  
 (0.037)  (0.032)  (0.05)  (0.026)  (0.021)  
Age 38.17  38.10  37.32  37.85  38.16  
 (0.3)  (0.272)  (0.35)  (0.202)  (0.188)  
Experience 12.51  13.07  11.32  11.93  13.55  
 (0.321)  (0.293)  (0.345)  (0.205)  (0.216)  
Schooling 16.18  15.51  16.49  16.4  15.09  
 (0.137)  (0.102)  (0.147)  (0.075)  (0.081)  
English  0.78  0.72  0.75  0.76  0.71  
 (0.011)  (0.01)  (0.013)  (0.007)  (0.008)  
French  0.18  0.14  0.20  0.12  0.10  
 (0.017)  (0.013)  (0.02)  (0.009)  (0.008)  
Share of full 
sample 0.27  0.43  0.22  0.66  0.77  
N-weighted 8,235  13,082  6,694  19,943  23,239  
See notes for table 4-2-1. 
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4.3 Occupational characteristics 
The HRSDC’s Career Handbook is used to obtain occupation characteristics for 
the National Occupational Classification 2001 using 4-digit codes. Ingram and Neumann 
(2006) note that “these characteristics’ measure is a snapshot and cannot capture any 
skill-upgrading within jobs”. The NOC that used in this research is dated as 2001, while 
the data used in the research cover 2001-2005 year. The original data in the Career 
Handbook contains a maximum of 26 indicators for five sets of characteristics: nine for 
aptitudes, five for interests, three for tasks related to working with data/people/things, six 
for physical activities, and three for environmental conditions. Poletaev and Robinson 
(2008) use the Dictionary of Occupational Titles in their study on US data. The authors 
exclude environmental conditions suggesting that they have the least to do with skills. 
We also exclude the set of environmental condition indicators and are left with a total of 
23 indicators for four sets of characteristics. These 23 indicators represent 44 
occupational characteristics. Similarly to Ingram and Neumann (2006), who employ the 
DOT, we presume that these job characteristics for the NOC potentially represent some 
dimensions of skill heterogeneity among workers. 
Characteristic variables for some occupations were derived using guidelines on 
occupational coding provided in concordance tables. In most cases, means of 
characteristic scores were calculated if an original SOC occupation was classified into 
several occupations in the NOC. Although rare, if several SOC occupations had only one 
NOC code then the same characteristic scores were used for all of original codes. 
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4.3.1 Aptitudes 
Each occupation is assigned scores, numerical or alpha codes for each set of 
characteristics. The first set of nine aptitudes consists of: “general learning ability”, 
“verbal ability”, “numerical ability”, “spatial perception”, “form perception”, “clerical 
perception”, “motor coordination”, “finger dexterity” and “manual dexterity”. An 
individual's overall capacity to learn the skills needed to perform job duties is based on 
his or her specific aptitudes for acquiring information and transforming it into action 
(Statistics Canada, retrieved on Jan 14, 2001). It is quite likely that “motor coordination”, 
“finger dexterity” and “manual dexterity” are highly correlated and represent a similar 
skill dimension. The aptitudes are initially assigned an integer score between 5 and 1.  
The scale of the scores is based on the normal curve representing the Canadian labour 
force (Statistics Canada, retrieved on Jan 14, 2001). The scores “5” and “1” represents 
the lowest and the highest 10% of population respectively, “4” and “2” represent the 
lower and the upper third of population exclusive of the lowest and highest 10% 
respectively, and the score “3” represents the middle third of the population. For instance, 
“Economists and Economic Policy Researchers and Analysts” (further “Economists”) 
occupation originally has the following nine scores for each corresponding aptitude:  
“121443444”. Hence, the score “1” indicates that “Economists” have the level of both 
“general learning ability” and “numerical ability” that applies to the top 10 percent of the 
working population; “2” indicates that “Economists” have the level of “verbal ability” 
that applies to the upper third of the working population exclusive of the highest 10 
percent etc. For simplicity of interpretation in this research the scores are reversed so that 
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the score “1” is the lowest and the score “5” is the highest. In total, we have five variables 
for “Aptitudes” set. 
4.3.2. Interests 
The second set of characteristic indicators consists of five occupational interests: 
“Directive”, “Innovative”, “Methodological”, “Objective” and “Social”. Unlike the 
aptitudes that are all assigned a specific score, the interests have a more complicated code 
system. Each job is assigned a three-letter alpha-code in order of predominance (Career 
Handbook, 2001). Each letter in the code is the first letter of a specific interest. However, 
these letters also can be either capital of lower case. The lower case indicates a lower 
representation of a corresponding interest (Career Handbook, 2001). Hence, both “D” and 
“d” stand for “Directive”, but their representation in an occupation is different. For 
instance, the “Economists” occupation is assigned an alpha-code “IDM”, while “Letter 
Carriers” is assigned an alpha-code “Mos”. In order to be able to use the letter-codes in 
the factor analysis we develop a scoring system to represent relevance of each interest 
regarding presence, order and the (upper/lower) case of each letter. The scores range 
between 0 and 1 with an interval of 0.2 for the following possibilities: (1) if a letter is in 
the first order (always capital) then the score for a corresponding interest is 1; (2) if a 
letter is in the second place and is either capital or lower case then the assigned score is 
0.8 or 0.6 respectively; (3) if a letter is in the third place and is either capital or lower 
case then it is assigned a score of 0.4 or 0.2 respectively; (4) if a letter is not present in 
the three-letter alpha-code then it is assigned a score of 0. For instance, the “Economists” 
occupation, which originally has the alpha-code “IDM”, in this analysis is assigned a 
score of “1” for “Innovative” interest, “0.8” for “Directive” interest and “0.4” for 
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“Methodological” interest; while “0” is assigned for both “Objective” and “Social” 
interests. Altogether, this leaves us with five variables for the “Interests” set.  
4.3.3. Data-people-things 
The third set of “Data-People-Things” characteristic indicators consists of three 
sub-sets of job tasks related to data, people and things. Each occupation is assigned a 
three-digit code using only one digit from each subset to represent relevant to a job 
characteristics. The first sub-set contains eight digits assigned to different types of data-
related job tasks: “0” for synthesizing, “1” for coordinating, “2” for analyzing, “3” for 
compiling, “4” for computing, “5” for copying, “6” for comparing, and “8” for “Not 
significant” 8.  However we drop “8” due to zero observations. The second sub-set 
contains job tasks related to dealing with human beings and/or animals and contains nine 
types of tasks: “0” for mentoring, “1” for negotiating, “2” for instructing-consulting 
(including animals), “3” for supervising, “4” for diverting, “5” for persuading, “6” for 
speaking-signaling, “7” for serving-assisting and “8” for “not significant”. And the third 
subset contains nine types of tasks related to working with things and objects: “0” for 
setting up, “1” for precision working, “2” for controlling, “3” for driving/operating, “4” 
for operating/manipulating, “5” for tending, “6” for feeding/off-bearing, “7” for handling 
and “8” for “not significant”. For instance, the “Economists” occupation has a 
corresponding “Data-People-Things” three-digit code of “128”. This indicates, that 
workers employed in “Economists” occupation perform such tasks as “Data co-
ordination” (1), “Instructing-consulting” people (2), while things-related tasks are “not 
significant“ (8). In our Analysis we separate each task into a dummy variable, which 
                                                 
8 “7” is not used for coding. 
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leaves accounts for a total of 25 separate dummy variables related to “Data-People-
Things”.  
4.3.4. Physical activities 
And the last set of occupational characteristics used in this analysis is related to 
physical activities. Each occupation is assigned a six-digit code related to the “Physical 
activities” set of occupational characteristics. Each digit in the code indicates a type or 
level of complexity of a specific physical activity:   integers “1” through “4” for levels of 
visual field, “0” or “1” for color discrimination, integers “1” through “3” for hearing 
complexity including verbal interaction, integers “1” through “4” for body positions, 
integers “0” through “2” for levels of limb coordination, and “1” through “4” for strength 
levels. For instance, “Economists” is assigned a six-digit code “202101”. Hence, the first 
digit “2” indicates that workers employed in “Economists” occupation perform work 
activities that involve “near vision”; the second digit “0” indicates that color 
discrimination is irrelevant; the third digit “2” indicates that activities of this occupation 
involve “verbal interaction”; the fourth digit “1” indicates that work activities mostly 
involve “sitting” body position; the fifth digit “0” indicates that limb coordination is 
irrelevant in this occupation; and the last digit “1” indicates that “Economists” occupation 
work activities involve the lowest strength level.  
All of these characteristics, except for strength and color discrimination, are 
separated into dummy variables. For instance, the visual field is separated into close 
visual acuity, near vision, near and far vision, total field of vision. The ‘hearing’ is 
divided into limited, verbal and other sound discrimination; the body position is separated 
into sitting, standing and/or walking, sitting-standing-walking, and other body position; 
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limb-coordination into ‘not relevant’, upper-limb coordination, and multiple limb 
coordination. Color discrimination is originally dichotomous, where it takes a value of 
one if color discrimination is relevant and zero if otherwise. As a result, we have 16 
variables related to “Physical activities”. Altogether, we have 55 variables from all sets of 
23 occupational characteristics for factor analysis.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DEFINITIONS OF SKILLS AND SKILL MATCHES 
In this chapter we present methodology used to obtain a set of potential skills 
specific to each of the NOC 2001 occupations and then we define skill matches. We also 
provide some descriptive statistics in order to have sense of whether the skill factors that 
we produced are plausible.  Section 5.1 presents the methodology. Section 5.2 provides 
definitions of skills and summary statistics following with a discussion of potential 
variation in skill factors produced. Section 5.3 provides definitions of matches between 
pre- and post-immigration skills. Cross-sectional means of skill factor scores and means 
of skill factor scores for immigrant sub-samples in wave 3 are presented in section 5.4 
and section 5.5 respectively. And section 5.6 presents matching patterns of pre- and post-
immigration skill factors across waves and across sub-samples in wave 3.  
5.1 Factor analysis 
Each of the 23 characteristics described in section 4.3 is unlikely to represent a 
unique worker skill trait (Ingram & Neumann, 2006). Therefore both the exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses are employed to determine and construct broader skills for 
NOC occupations. The exploratory factor analysis is used to determine the number of 
common factors from given 23 characteristics and the strength of their relationship. For 
instance, “finger dexterity” and “manual dexterity” could be combined into a broader 
“motor coordination” skill etc. Then the confirmatory factor analysis is used to determine 
the ability of the factor model proposed after the exploratory factor analysis to fit an 
observed set of data. 
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After transformation of SOC occupations into NOC occupation the set contains 
513 occupational units. Each unit is assigned a set of 51 characteristic variables on the 
basis of the Career Handbook profile summaries. From investigation of the correlation 
matrices for all characteristics we found that some of the characteristics had little or no 
correlation9. These were such components as computing data, diverting people, setting-up 
things, driving-operating things, tending things. These characteristics are still used in the 
factor analysis of this research; however their high “uniqueness” suggests potential 
independent sources of skills.  
The original confirmatory factor analysis rests on several important assumptions. 
Firstly, the factors have to be orthogonal. And second, the factors should explain most of 
the covariance among given set of characteristics. The linear structural factor model of 
the following form is estimated for each job j א [1;513]: 
 
ܥଵ ൌ ߤଵ ൅ ߣଵଵ ଵ݂ ൅ ڮ൅ ߣଵ௄ ௄݂ ൅ ߝଵ, 
ܥଶ ൌ ߤଶ ൅ ߣଶଵ ଵ݂ ൅ ڮ൅ ߣଶ௄ ௄݂ ൅ ߝଶ, 
ڭ 
ܥ௅ ൌ ߤ௅ ൅ ߣ௅ଵ ଵ݂ ൅ ڮ൅ ߣ௅௄ ௄݂ ൅ ߝ௅, 
 
 
 
 
(5.1) 
where ܥ௟ is the observable rating for a characteristic ݈ on job j; ߤ is a 55ൈ1 vector of 
means, ௞݂ is the amount of underlying skill ݇ used in job j, ߣ௟௞ is the factor (skill) loading 
of a characteristic ݈ on skill k. The model assumes that L characteristics are reflections of  
ܭ ൏ ܮ broader underlying factors (e.g. ݂ ݅ݏ ܽ 3 ൈ1 vector of broader factors or basic 
skills with Εሾ݂ሿ ൌ 0; ߝ௟~ܰሺ0; Σሻ, Λ  is a 55 ൈ ݇ matrix of coefficients (factor loadings),  
                                                 
9 The following levels of correlation are considered: 1-0.9 – high, 0.89-0.6-reasonably high, 0.59-0.4-
moderate, 0.39-0.2-low, 0.19-0 –no correlation. 
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ߝ is a 51 ൈ 1 vector of random variables that are uncorrelated with the factors. The 
assumption that matrix Σ is diagonal implies that all the correlations among 
characteristics are explained by the common basic factors f ሺ݇ ൑ 55ሻ. Let Εሾ݂݂ᇱሿ ൌ Φ, 
where Φ is ݇ ൈ ݇, then the following is true: 
 ΕሺC െ μሻሺC െ μሻᇱ ൌ ΛΦΛᇱ ൅ Σ (5.2) 
The underlying assumption of the model is that L characteristics can be explained 
by ܭ ൏ ܮ underlying basic skill factors. Note that the matrices Λ and Φ can be replaced 
by any other Λכ and Φכ such that ΛΦΛᇱ ൌ ΛכΦכ Λכᇱ without loss of generality. As 
elements of Λ and Φ are not separately identifiable usually the matrix Φ is restricted to be 
diagonal; hence its elements (factors) to be orthogonal. Furthermore, the diagonal 
elements of ΛΦΛᇱ as well as diagonal elements of Σ  are not separately identifiable. In 
order to resolve this indeterminacy the factors are normalized to have a zero mean and a 
standard deviation of one. The first factor is estimated to explain maximum amount of 
covariance among the characteristics; while the next one is estimated to explain the 
maximum amount of residual covariance among the characteristics conditional on the 
first factor etc. Hence, in our case up to 54 skill factors could be estimated. However, as 
long as most of the covariance among characteristics is explained by the first several 
factors all other factors have little explanatory power. One of the common rules of thumb 
to choose the number of broader factors is the Scree test.  It consists of plotting the 
eigenvalues of the correlation matrix in descending order and then use a number of 
factors equal to the number of the eigenvalues that occur to the last major drop in 
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eigenvalue magnitude10. Orthogonal rotation has to be performed to produce uncorrelated 
factors. After the rotation a factor solution is the same solution as an original but is 
supposed to have the simplest interpretation.  
Initially factor analysis was employed for all 55 variables (representing 23 
characteristics) simultaneously. Using the “Scree test” we retained five factors; these 
factors explained 47.36% of covariance among characteristics11. Then the orthogonal 
rotation was performed. In order to verify the robustness of factor analysis in this 
research a variety of orthogonal and oblique rotations were tested: varimax, orthomax, 
promax, and oblimin etc. All of the rotations produced similar results and suggested 
similar three to five factors. Eventually, we used a varimax rotation as it is widely 
believed to be the best option for orthogonal rotation. Thus, the first factor was highly 
correlated with “general learning ability”, “verbal ability”, “numerical ability”, “clerical 
perception”, “Directive” and “Social” interests, and had a high negative correlation with 
the “strength” variable. The second factor was highly correlated with “spatial perception” 
and “form perception”, “motor coordination”, “finger dexterity” and “manual dexterity”, 
with “Innovative” interest and “Precision working” things-related task. However the rest 
of factors were hard to interpret. Specifically, often found in the literature of factor 
analysis for the DOT characteristics, “strength” does not appear as an independent factor 
in our analysis. In addition, it is often the case that several characteristics load on 
different factors.  
                                                 
10 Poletaev & Robinson (2008) chose a number of factors that equals a number of eigenvalues that are 
above two. Cain & Treiman (1981) suggested Kaiser criterion. The criterion consists of choosing a number 
of factors that equals a number of eigenvalues that are greater than one. In this analysis, in general, the 
Scree test solution coincides with the rule used in Poletaev & Robinson (2008). 
11 Adding more than five factors increases the amount of total explained variance by very little. For 
instance, to explain 100% of the variance among characteristics we would need to add around 25 more 
factors. This can be due to high uniqueness of some occupational characteristics, which do not load on our 
factors.   
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Cain and Treiman (1981) using confirmatory factor analysis for the DOT suggest 
that the “assumption of orthogonality in specifying the factor-analytic model is untenable 
and should be relaxed in future work” (p. 268). Following their suggestion we employ a 
method proposed by Ingram and Neumann (2006). In their analysis of the DOT they 
require only three factors (out of four) to be orthogonal. In this analysis the 
characteristics are split into two sub-samples and each sub-sample is required to produce 
orthogonal factors separately. Hence the upper left-hand two-by-two submatrix of  Φ is 
diagonal and thus is the lower right-hand submatrix.  Second, assume the matrix Λ has 
the following structure: 
 
Λ ൌ ൥
Λଵଵ ڮ 0ଵଶڭ ڰ ڭ
0ଶଵ ڮ Λଶଶ
൩ 
 
 
(5.3) 
Here 0ଵଶ  is a 39 ൈ 2 vector of zeros and 0ଶଵ ݅ݏ ܽ 22 ൈ 1 vector of zeros12.  
Thus the first two factors are required to be orthogonal. However the third factor is not 
necessarily orthogonal to the first two factors and may have some common factor 
loadings. This implies that some characteristics contributing to factor 3 also load on 
factor 1 and factor 2.  
 In the factor analysis the occupations are weighted according to employment 
statistics by occupational grouping reported in the Labour Force Survey using a midpoint 
of the LSIC collection period for wave 3 (Appendix A). The employment statistics for 
both genders by NOC-S occupational grouping was adjusted for the NOC 2001. 
However, the employment statistics differs for males and females the aggregate is used as 
all three produce similar estimates. The weighting is important because some of 
                                                 
12 These two sub-sets have six characteristics in common. 
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occupations may have plenty of labour employed while some may have few (Ingram and 
Neumann, 2006; Poletaev and Robinson, 2008). In this analysis we investigate 
immigrants’ movement across occupational distribution of the Canadian labour market; 
therefore, the corresponding frequency weights are applied. The employment frequencies 
in the LFS are transformed for 3-digit NOC groupings and are equally distributed within 
each 3-digit group among 4-digit occupations. For instance, if there are five 4-digit 
occupations within a 3-digit occupational group, then each of the 4-digit unit group will 
receive a one-fifth of employment frequency of its corresponding 3-digit employment 
frequency.  
5.2 Definition of skills 
Following Ingram and Neumann (2006) we first perform factor analysis for a 
subset of characteristics including all aptitudes, interests (except for “objective”), data-
related (except for “not significant”), people-related (except for “not significant”), one 
things-related (”precision work”), as well as some physical activities characteristics 
(“color discrimination”, “visual field” and “hearing”). When we employ factor analysis 
the “Scree test” suggests three factors. Factor one and two explain 25% and 17% of the 
covariance respectively. Similarly to economic studies that use the DOT (Ingram and 
Neumann, 2006; Poletaev and Robinson, 2008), in our analysis of the NOC the first and 
the second factors are related to “intelligence” and “motor skills” respectively. However 
the third factor (8%) is difficult to interpret. It picks up such characteristics as 
“persuading” people together with “compiling” and ”computing data” and negatively 
associated with “supervising” people and “coordinating” data. We therefore only retain 
the first two factors and proceed to the analysis of the second subset of characteristics. 
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Interestingly, from factor loadings in Table 5-1 it can be noticed that “people-
related” tasks individually are not extremely useful in production of either “intelligence” 
or “motor skills” factor. Although, jointly they are important for “intelligence” factor 
production as suggested by a negation of the people-related characteristic called “not 
significant”, which has a loading coefficient of -0.55 on the “intelligence” factor. 
Table 5-1. Factor loadings for the first subset of characteristics, rotated 
Characteristics F1, 
intelligence 
F2, 
motor skills 
Uniqueness 
Aptitudes     
General learning ability 0.84 0.27 0.22 
Verbal ability 0.87 0.13 0.22 
Numerical ability 0.78 0.19 0.36 
Spatial ability 0.15 0.79 0.35 
Form perception 0.15 0.80 0.34 
Clerical perception 0.61 -0.13 0.60 
Motor coordination -0.38 0.65 0.44 
Finger dexterity -0.15 0.67 0.53 
Manual dexterity -0.44 0.67 0.36 
Interests    
Directive interest 0.65 -0.24 0.52 
Innovative interest 0.43 0.54 0.52 
Methodological interest -0.47 -0.37 0.64 
Social interest 0.19 -0.40 0.80 
Data related 
   
Data synthesis 0.29 0.36 0.79 
Data coordination 0.64 -0.26 0.52 
Data analysis 0.08 0.36 0.86 
Data compilation -0.13 0.10 0.97 
Data computation -0.10 -0.16 0.96 
Data copying -0.38 -0.10 0.85 
Data comparison -0.56 -0.14 0.67 
People related    
Mentoring 0.20 0.13 0.94 
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Negotiating 0.44 -0.24 0.75 
Instructing/consulting 0.38 0.10 0.85 
Supervising 0.26 0.00 0.93 
Diverting 0.01 0.08 0.99 
Persuading 0.00 -0.22 0.95 
Speaking/signaling -0.19 0.09 0.96 
Serving/assisting -0.35 -0.19 0.85 
"People-related" is not significant -0.55 0.20 0.66 
Things related    
Precision working 0.03 0.71 0.49 
"Things-related" is not significant 0.69 -0.44 0.33 
Physical activities    
Close vision only -0.05 0.32 0.90 
Near vision only 0.30 -0.07 0.91 
Color discrimination -0.15 0.41 0.81 
Verbal interaction 0.56 -0.34 0.57 
Sitting position only 0.48 -0.12 0.76 
Standing/walking only -0.26 -0.09 0.93 
Limbs irrelevant 0.70 -0.32 0.41 
Multiple limbs use -0.36 0.08 0.86 
When we employed factor analysis for the rest of characteristics, mostly related to 
tasks with “things” and to physical activities, the “Scree test” suggested two factors. The 
first factor explains 36% of covariance among given characteristics. This factor is 
strongly positively related to the level of “strength” and to body positions “other than 
sitting, standing and walking”, “people-related is not significant”, while negatively 
related to “verbal interaction” and “things not significant”. This factor seems to pick up 
“strength” skills. The second factor explains another 15% of the covariance in the second 
subset of characteristics, however is difficult to interpret. Therefore, we only retain one 
factor from this subset.   
From factor loadings in Table 5-2 it can be noticed that “things-related” tasks 
individually are not very useful in production of the “strength” factor. Although, jointly 
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they are important for “strength” factor production as suggested by a negation of the 
characteristic called “things-related is not significant”, which has a loading coefficient of 
-0.71. 
Table 5-2. Factor loadings for the second subset of characteristics, rotated 
Characteristics F3, 
strength 
Uniqueness 
Interests   
Objective interest 0.73 0.47 
People related   
“People-related” is not significant 0.63 0.60 
Things-related   
Setting up things 0.12 0.99 
Controlling things 0.12 0.98 
Driving/operating 0.25 0.94 
Operating/manipulating 0.31 0.90 
Tending 0.04 1.00 
Feeding equipment 0.16 0.97 
Handling 0.08 0.99 
“Things-related” is not significant -0.71 0.50 
Physical activities   
Near-far vision only 0.12 0.99 
Total visual field 0.31 0.91 
Limited hearing 0.78 0.38 
Verbal interaction -0.85 0.28 
Other sound discrimination 0.22 0.95 
Sitting position only -0.46 0.79 
Standing and/or walking 0.10 0.99 
Sitting, standing, walking -0.33 0.89 
Other body positions 0.80 0.37 
Upper limb coordination only 0.34 0.88 
Multiple limb coordination 0.46 0.78 
Strength 0.83 0.32 
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In our analysis we restricted only the first two factors to be orthogonal. Therefore, 
a correlation between them and the third factor is not exclusive. Indeed, from the 
correlation matrix in Table 5-3 it can be noticed that there is no correlation between 
factor one and two, but there is a fairly high negative correlation between “intelligence” 
and “strength”, and a relatively low positive correlation between “motor skills” and 
“strength”.  The magnitude and the direction of the correlations is intuitive suggesting 
that we have chosen plausible factor loadings among all characteristics. As well the 
factors found in this analysis are consistent with factors found in studies that used the 
DOT (Ingram and Neumann, 2006; Poletaev and Robinson, 2008). However, while we 
produce three factors, economic studies using the DOT produce four factors and explain 
more variance among factors.  
Table 5-3. Factors’ correlation matrix 
 F1, 
intelligence 
F2, 
motor skills 
F3, 
strength 
F1,  
intelligence 
1   
F2,  
motor skills 
0.00 1  
F3,  
strength 
-0.78 0.37 1 
Factor summary (Table 5-4) confirms that all factors have zero mean and a 
standard deviation of one. Notably, the distributions of the factors are not normal and 
differ from each other. The “motor skills” factor score has the greatest maximum, while 
“intelligence” factor score has the biggest minimum. Moreover, while maximum and 
minimum of the “intelligence” factor are close in their magnitudes, magnitudes of “motor 
skills” and “strength” factors  maximums are around four and two times bigger 
respectively than the corresponding magnitudes of their minimums.  
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Table 5-4. Factor summary 
 Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
F1, 
intelligence 
16098 0.00 0.99 -1.87 1.92 
F2,  
motor skills 
16098 0.00 0.98 -1.22 4.00 
F3,  
strength 
16098 0.00 0.99 -1.02 2.24 
Note: the observation number is in thousands 
 The following is the discussion of factor means by aggregate occupations 
presented in Table 5-5. The distributions of means factor scores across occupational 
groups indicate we produced plausible factors using occupational characteristics. It can 
be noticed that “intelligence” factor score declines almost monotonically across 
occupational groups, which are ordered from highest skill level to the lowest (except for 
“Managers” group). The exception is a shift up and a positive “intelligence” mean score 
of “Skilled primary industry” occupational group. “Managers” and “Professionals” group 
have very high “intelligence” factor scores relative to the mean of zero as well as to the 
maximum score value of 1.92. The mean “intelligence” factor scores for these two groups 
are the highest with a great lead compared to other groups. There is a symmetrical 
(opposite direction) pattern of mean scores for occupational groups within the “strength” 
factor. Its symmetry can be explained by its strong negative correlation to the 
“intelligence” factor. Hence, “Laborers” and “Operators” group has the highest mean 
“strength” scores with a great lead, while “Managers” group has the lowest. The “motor 
skills” factor has the most variation across occupational groups. Its highest mean score, 
with a great lead, is the score of “Skilled craft” group. Interestingly, while the “motor 
skills” factor has the greatest maximum value (Table 4-4), its biggest mean score across 
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group means (1.01) is the lowest maximum among three factors compared to two other 
maximums of 1.34 and 1.69 for “intelligence” and “strength” factors respectively.  
Interestingly, most of occupational groups have at least one factor with a positive 
mean factor score. This suggests that we produced enough factors to describe 
occupational “skill-profiles”, although we were not able to explain all covariance among 
occupational characteristics. 
Table 5-5. Factors’ summary by occupational groups, for the LFS 
 
N F1, 
intelligence 
F2, 
motor skills 
F3, 
strength 
Managers 1459 1.34 -0.73 -.96 
  (0.32) (0.35) (0.29) 
Professionals 2715 1.14 0.58 -0.55 
  (0.38) (1.13) (0.57) 
Technicians 2623 0.15 0.36 -0.26 
  (0.53) (1.17) (0.74) 
Intermediate sales  2920 -0.11 -0.70 -0.40 
and service  (0.64) (0.58) (0.64) 
Elementary sales  2302 -0.71 -0.39 0.16 
and service  (0.55) (0.43) (0.71) 
Skilled primary  521 0.23 0.04 -0.13 
industry  (0.56) (0.45) (0.92) 
Skilled craft 1523 -0.50 1.01 0.95 
  (0.58) (0.71) (0.96) 
Operators 1488 -1.31 0.12 1.40 
  (0.28) (0.40) (0.59) 
Laborers 547 -1.63 -0.50 1.69 
  (0.13) (0.31) (0.10) 
Total 16098    
Note: number of observations is the LFS midpoint total number of employed workers in 
thousands period of November, 2004 to November, 2005  
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The following tables (Table 5-6 to Table 5-9) present a potential variation in the 
factor. From the Table 5-6 it can be noticed that “Managers” group occupations have 
only positive “intelligence” scores, while occupations within “Operators” or “Laborers” 
group have only negative scores. All other occupational groups seem to have enough of 
variation in the “intelligence” factor.  
Table 5-6. Variation in Factor 1 (“Intelligence”) by occupational group 
 Min Occupation title Max Occupation title 
Managers 0.28 Commissioned 
Officers, Armed 
Forces   
1.85 Engineering, Science 
and Architecture 
Managers 
Professionals -0.25 Painters, Sculptors 
and Other Visual 
Artists   
1.92 University Professors 
Technical, associate 
professionals 
-1.04 Nurse Aides and 
Orderlies 
1.10 Administrative 
Officers 
Intermediate sales 
and service 
-1.41 Pet Groomers and 
Animal Care 
Workers 
1.03 Funeral Directors and 
Embalmers 
 
Elementary sales and 
service 
-1.68 Dry Cleaning and 
Laundry 
Occupations 
0.34 Production Clerks 
Skilled primary 
industry 
-1.58 Logging Machinery 
Operators 
0.75 Landscaping and 
Grounds Maintenance 
Contractors and 
Managers 
Skilled craft -1.46 Plasterers, Drywall 
Installers and 
Finishers, and 
Lathers   
0.70 Supervisors, Motor 
Transport and Other 
Ground Transit 
Operators   
Operators -1.79 Chain-saw and 
Skidder Operators 
-0.31 Water and Waste 
Plant Operators 
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Laborers -1.87 Landscaping and 
Grounds 
Maintenance 
Laborers 
-1.43 Construction Trades 
Helpers and Laborers 
Score intervals of the “motor skills” factor across occupational groups (Table 5-7) 
suggest all groups seem to have enough of variation in this factor, except for “Laborers” 
group, which only contains occupations with negative “motor skills” scores. Although 
not shown, “Dentists” occupation is an outlier in the “Professionals” group with 4.00 
“motor skills” score, while the closest occupations with the second and third highest 
scores in this group are “Veterinarians” (3.16) and “Chemists” (3.14) respectively.  
Table 5-7. Variation in Factor 2 (“Motor skills”) by occupational group 
 Min Occupation title Max Occupation title 
Managers -1.22 Accommodation 
Service Managers 
0.25 Information Systems 
and Data Processing 
Managers 
Professionals -0.77 Probation and Parole 
Officers and Related 
Occupations 
4.00 Dentists 
Technical, associate 
professionals 
-1.08 Supervisors, Library, 
Correspondence and 
Related Information 
Clerks   
3.21 Artisans and 
Craftspersons 
Intermediate sales 
and service 
-1.19 Insurance Agents and 
Brokers 
1.08 Other Ranks, Armed 
Forces   
Elementary sales 
and service 
-1.22 Other Elemental Sales 
Occupations 
0.96 Typesetters and 
Related Occupations 
Skilled primary 
industry 
-0.76 Supervisors, 
Landscape and 
Horticulture   
1.26 Petroleum, Gas and 
Chemical Process 
Operators   
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Skilled craft -0.70 Railway Conductors 
and Brakemen/women 
3.44 Jewelers, Watch 
Repairers and 
Related Occupations  
Operators -0.51 Automotive 
Mechanical Installers 
and Servicers 
2.52  Electronics 
Assemblers, 
Fabricators, 
Inspectors and 
Testers   
Laborers -0.98 Railway and Motor 
Transport Laborers 
-0.02 Harvesting Laborers 
Similarly to “motor skills” factor, variation in “strength” factor (Table 5-8) is 
fairly big, except for “Laborers” group, which, unlike “motor skills” factor, only contains 
occupations with positive “strength” factor scores. Although not shown, many 
occupations have exactly the same predicted “strength” scores, especially those with 
negative values, which are mostly occupations with high “intelligence” scores (e.g. 
managerial occupations). We only report one occupation title for each minimum or 
maximum score as an example to have some sense of how plausible the predicted factors 
are. 
Table 5-8. Variation in Factor 3 (“Strength”) by occupational group 
 Min Occupation title Max Occupation title 
Managers -1.02 Facility Operation 
and Maintenance 
Managers 
1.07 Commissioned 
Officers, Armed 
Forces   
Professionals -1.02 Financial and 
Investment 
Analysts 
1.16 Registered Nurses 
Technical, associate 
professionals 
-1.02 Purchasing Agents 
and Officers 
1.66 Landscape and 
Horticultural 
Technicians and 
Specialists 
 71 
 
Intermediate sales 
and service 
-1.02 Image, Social and 
Other Personal 
Consultants   
1.61 Other Ranks, Armed 
Forces   
Elementary sales and 
service 
-0.97 Customer Service, 
Information and 
Related Clerks   
1.67 Couriers and 
Messengers 
Skilled primary 
industry 
-0.92 Supervisors, Motor 
Vehicle Assembling  
2.24 Logging Machinery 
Operators 
Skilled craft -0.97 Supervisors, Motor 
Transport and Other 
Ground Transit 
Operators   
1.95 Drillers and Blasters - 
Surface Mining, 
Quarrying and 
Construction   
Operators -0.18 Lock and Cable 
Ferry Operators and 
Related 
Occupations 
2.24 Chain-saw and 
Skidder Operators 
Laborers 1.50 Railway and Motor 
Transport Laborers 
1.89 Laborers in Fish 
Processing 
5.3 Definition of matches 
We define a skill match following guidelines of Poletaev and Robinson (2008) for 
their Skill Portfolio match (SP1) in analysis of displaced workers. However, we apply 
some modifications for our research purposes. Firstly, instead of grouping all skill 
matches, we construct a separate match variable for each skill to be able to separate 
effects of matching different skills on returns to foreign human capital. Secondly, we 
define “matchers”, however we do not define skill “switchers”. Hence, “switchers” and 
“indeterminate” cases are all classified as “non-matchers”. This modification is used in 
order to maximize the sample size for the regression analysis. This is crucial for two 
reasons. Firstly, sample size is important when using dummy variables and their 
interactions with other variables to minimize chances of multicollinearity. Secondly, we 
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are interested in returns to foreign human capital “specific” to skills, but not the 
differences in returns between “matchers” and “switchers”.   
A skill factor score initially cannot be too small, and a change in a skill factor 
score cannot be too big (Poletaev and Robinson, 2008). The following two conditions 
have to be satisfied in order to obtain a match in each skill factor in this analysis: (1) the 
score of a pre-immigration occupation skill factor has to be at least a half of a standard 
deviation above the mean, (2) a difference between pre- and post-immigration occupation 
factor scores cannot exceed a half of a standard deviations in absolute value13. The first 
condition serves as an assumption that a pre-immigration skill level has to be big enough 
for a skill to be developed. The second condition assumes that a post-immigration skill 
level cannot be too far from its pre-immigration skill level. Both of these conditions 
imply that post-immigration factor score cannot be under the mean of zero to be 
considered for a match. Hence, each skill-match is a dichotomous variable that equals to 
one if a match in a specific skill occurs and equals zero otherwise. 
Importantly, as the lower limit for a skill to be developed is a half of a standard 
deviation above the mean, all immigrants whose pre-immigration score of a specific 
factor is lower than the threshold are automatically classified as non-matchers within this 
specific skill factor. We do not remove this sub-set of immigrants from the analysis in 
order to keep our sample as big as possible. This implies that we compare immigrants 
who are able to match either of their skills to the rest of immigrants and not only to non-
matchers.  For simplicity, all immigrants other than matchers are called non-matchers. In 
                                                 
13 Poletaev and Robinson (2008) in their analysis of displaced workers used 0.5/0.5 and 0.6/0.3 for the 
lowest predisplacement score/absolute difference in pre- and post-displacement scores and showed that 
their findings were robust. They also suggested that other values, as long as they are not extreme, produce 
similar results. In our analysis the following combination were verified and produced broadly similar 
results: 0.6/0.3, 0.0/0.3, and 0.0/0.5. 
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the following section (4.2.2) we provide information on matching patterns within each 
skill dimension.   
 5.4 Cross-sectional factor scores 
The means of pre- and post-immigration factor scores for males are presented on 
the left hand side of Table 5-1-3. Comparing means of factors scores within each wave 
suggest that on average male immigrants worked in their (last) source country occupation 
with high “intelligence” and “motor skills” requirements, having skill factor score more 
than a half of a standard deviation above zero. The score of pre-immigration “strength” 
on average is lower than zero. This implies that on average male immigrants have lower 
likelihood to match their pre- and post-immigration “strength” factor regarding that we 
require the pre-immigration score level to be at least a half of a standard deviation.  
In contrast, the patterns of post-immigration skill factor scores differ dramatically 
compared to those of pre-immigration skill factor scores. First, none of the post-
immigration factor scores is above a half of a standard deviation on average. Moreover 
the post-immigration “intelligence” factor scores are on average below zero across all 
waves, while the “strength” factor scores are above. 
The means of pre- and post-immigration factor scores for females are presented 
on the right hand side of Table 5-9. Similarly to males, prior to immigration females on 
average also worked in occupations with high requirements for “intelligence” factor and 
fairly high “motor skills” factor, while quite low “strength” factor requirements. All 
average pre-immigration factor scores for females are substantially lower than for males.  
The patterns of post-immigration skill factor scores have the same direction as for 
males, but magnitudes for females are substantially lower, especially for “motors skills” 
and “strength”. All post-immigration factor scores are small or negative on average. 
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Table 5-9. Mean pre- and post-immigration factor scores    
  Males    Females  
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
 
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
Pre-immigration 
scores: 
   
    
Intelligence (F1) 0.66 0.64 0.70 
 
0.55 0.63 0.62 
 (0.044) (0.029) (0.020)  (0.059) (0.034) (0.023) 
Motor skills (F2) 0.67 0.63 0.70 
 
0.32 0.37 0.34 
 (0.054) (0.036) (0.027)  (0.076) (0.046) (0.032) 
Strength (F3) -0.13 -0.15 -0.18 
 
-0.27 -0.29 -0.29 
 (0.040) (0.026) (0.019)  (0.050) (0.028) (0.019) 
Post-immigration 
scores: 
   
 
   
Intelligence (F1) -0.17 -0.16 -0.10 
 
-0.18 -0.23 -0.23 
 (0.054) (0.034) (0.026)  (0.064) (0.038) (0.027) 
Motor skills (F2) 0.44 0.40 0.42 
 
0.01 0.03 0.00 
 (0.053) (0.035) (0.025)  (0.66) (0.040) (0.026) 
Strength (F3) 0.50 0.44 0.39 
 
0.10 0.18 0.19 
 (0.050) (0.032) (0.025)  (0.059) (0.035) (0.025) 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors in brackets. 
5.5 Factor scores by sub-samples in wave 3 
5.5.1 Skilled Workers principal applicants 
The scores of pre-immigration “intelligence” and “motor skills” factor of Skilled 
Worker principal applicants have are all higher than a half of standard deviation, unlike 
other immigrants whose scores are positive, but lower than a half of a standard deviation 
(Table 5-10).  In contrast, pre-immigration “strength” factor scores are quite low for both 
groups, and are negative for Skilled Worker principal applicants. Post-immigration factor 
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scores are all positive for Skilled Worker principal applicants, however only “motor 
skills” factor score is higher than a half of a standard deviation. Post-immigration 
“intelligence” factor score for other immigrants is negative and big in magnitude, while 
“motor skills” and “strength” factor scores are both positive, and the last one is higher 
than a half of a standard deviation.  
Table 5-10. Mean pre- and post-immigration factor scores, Skilled Worker PA’s    
 Males  Females 
 Skilled Worker 
PA’s 
Other 
categories 
 Skilled Worker 
PA’s 
Other  
categories 
Pre-immigration 
Intelligence 0.92 0.24 
 
0.88 0.53 
 (0.022) (0.038)  (0.044) (0.028) 
Motor Skills 0.88 0.34 
 
0.57 0.25 
 (0.032) (0.045)  (0.065) (0.035) 
Strength -0.29 0.05 
 
-0.37 -0.25 
 (0.021) (0.036)  (0.031) (0.024) 
Post-immigration  
Intelligence 0.16 -0.62 
 
0.13 -0.37 
 (0.031) (0.037)  (0.053) (0.03) 
Motor Skills 0.56 0.14 
 
0.17 -0.06 
 (0.032) (0.036)  (0.058) (0.03) 
Strength 0.20 0.77 
 
-0.04 0.28 
 (0.030) (0.037)  (0.047) (0.029) 
N 28,387 13,735  8,235 22,002 
Both female sub-samples (Table 5-10) have higher than a half of a standard 
deviation pre-immigration “intelligence” scores and high “motor skills” factor scores, 
which is above a half of a standard deviation for Skilled Worker principal applicants; and 
both sub-samples have substantially negative pre-immigration “strength” score. None of 
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the sub-samples have higher than a half of a standard deviation post-immigration factor 
scores.  
5.5.2 Regulated occupations 
Both male immigrants employed in regulated and unregulated occupations have 
pre-immigration “intelligence” and “motors skills” factor scores higher than a half of a 
standard deviation and slightly negative “strength” factor scores (Table 5-11). However, 
post-immigration factor scores differ dramatically for these two male sub-samples. Thus, 
on average both sub-samples have low post-immigration factor scores within 
“intelligence”. Male immigrants in regulated occupations in wave 3 on average have high 
requirements for “motor skills”. This is not true for male immigrants employed in 
unregulated occupations. Both sub-samples have higher than zero post-immigration 
“strength” factor scores.  
Table 5-11. Mean pre- and post-immigration factor scores, Regulated occupations 
 Males  Females 
 Regulated Unregulated  Regulated Unregulated 
Pre-immigration 
Intelligence 0.74 0.65 
 
0.70 0.57 
 (0.026) (0.032)  (0.033) (0.032) 
Motor Skills 0.80 0.58 
 
0.44 0.26 
 (0.035) (0.040)  (0.046) (0.042) 
Strength -0.17 -0.19 
 
-0.29 -0.28 
 (0.025) (0.028)  (0.03) (0.025) 
Post-immigration  
Intelligence 0.06 -0.30 
 
0.03 -0.44 
 (0.032) (0.040)  (0.04) (0.035) 
Motor Skills 0.78 -0.05 
 
0.31 -0.24 
 (0.037) (0.028)  (0.048) (0.025) 
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Strength 0.39 0.39 
 
0.11 0.25 
 (0.030) (0.040)  (0.033) (0.036) 
N 23,739 18,383  13,082 17,155 
All post-immigration factor scores are positive for females employed in regulated 
occupations, and only post-immigration “strength” factor score is positive for females in 
unregulated occupations (Table 5-11). None of post-immigration factor scores on average 
exceeds a half of a standard deviation. 
 5.5.3 Professional occupations 
Both male sub-samples have higher than a half of a standard deviation pre-
immigration scores for “intelligence” and “motor skills” factors and negative pre-
immigration factor scores for “strength” (Table 5-12). However, post-immigration scores 
differ dramatically. For males immigrants employed in professional occupations in 
Canada, post-immigration scores for “intelligence” and “motor skills” factors are still 
higher than a half of a standard deviation, and even higher than corresponding pre-
immigration scores. Male immigrants employed in non-professional occupations have 
negative post-immigration  “intelligence” factor score and twice lower post-immigration, 
compared to pre-immigration, “motor skills” factor score. In contrast, average post-
immigration “strength” factor score is negative for “professional” male immigrants, but it 
is higher than a half of a standard deviation for “non-professional” male immigrants. 
Both female sub-samples have higher than a half of a standard deviation pre-
immigration “intelligence” scores, positive “motor skills” scores and negative “strength” 
scores (Table 5-12). Female immigrants employed in professional occupations have high 
post-immigration “intelligence” scores on average, while female immigrants employed in 
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unregulated occupations have negative.  Neither female sub-sample on average has post-
immigration “motor skills” or “strength” that exceed a half of a standard deviation. 
Table 5-12. Mean pre- and post-immigration factor scores, Professional occupations 
 Males  Females 
 Professional Non-
Professional 
 Professional Non-
Professional 
Pre-immigration 
Intelligence 1.1 0.59 
 
0.94 0.54 
 (0.032) (0.024)  (0.037) (0.028) 
Motor Skills 0.88 0.65 
 
0.47 0.30 
 (0.051) (0.031)  (0.06) (0.037) 
Strength -0.41 -0.11 
 
-0.39 -0.26 
 (0.026) (0.022)  (0.039) (0.022) 
Post-immigration  
Intelligence 1.25 -0.48 
 
0.86 -0.54 
 (0.016) (0.024)  (0.04) (0.025) 
Motor Skills 1.00 0.26 
 
0.33 -0.09 
 (0.049) (0.027)  (0.059) (0.029) 
Strength -0.46 0.63 
 
-0.30 0.33 
 (0.020) (0.028)  (0.042) (0.029) 
N 9,329 32,794  6,694 23,543 
5.5.4 University educated 
From Table 5-13, the average pre-immigration “intelligence” and “motor skills” 
score is respectively 0.98 and 0.82 for the “university educated” group compared to -0.01 
and 0.41 for other education levels; while the pre-immigration “strength” factor score is -
0.39 for “university educated” compared to 0.29 for other education levels. Interestingly, 
the post immigration factor scores for “university educated” immigrants are all higher 
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than zero, however none is higher than a half of a standard deviation. The post 
immigration “intelligence” factor score for immigrant with lower than BA degree is 
substantially low, while the “strength” factor score is substantially high.  
Table 5-13. Mean pre- and post-immigration factor scores, University educated 
 Males  Females 
 University Other  University  Other 
Pre-immigration 
Intelligence 0.98 -0.01 
 
0.86 0.17 
 (0.019) (0.040)  (0.026) (0.042) 
Motor Skills 0.82 0.41 
 
0.48 0.07 
 (0.032) (0.047)  (0.041) (0.045) 
Strength -0.36 0.29 
 
-0.41 -0.05 
 (0.018) (0.043)  (0.022) (0.036) 
Post-immigration  
Intelligence 0.15 -0.72 
 
-0.01 -0.66 
 (0.030) (0.036)  (0.035) (0.035) 
Motor Skills 0.49 0.24 
 
0.11 -0.21 
 (0.031) (0.039)  (0.035) (0.036) 
Strength 0.20 0.88 
 
0.07 0.43 
 (0.029) (0.040)  (0.031) (0.039) 
N 30,341 11,781  19,943 10,294 
Both female sub-samples (Table 5-13) have positive pre-immigration 
“intelligence” and “motor skills” factor scores and negative pre-immigration “strength” 
factor scores. The means of post-immigration “intelligence” and “motor skills” factor 
scores are substantially lower for both sub-samples compared to pre-immigration; 
however average post-immigration “strength” factor score is higher. 
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5.5.5 Visible minorities 
From Table 5-14, while both sub-samples have higher than a half of a standard 
deviation pre-immigration “intelligence” and “motor skills” factor scores, visible 
minorities have negative and non-visible minorities have positive post-immigration score 
for this factor. On the other hand, both sub-samples have negative pre-immigration 
“strength” factor scores; however after immigration both sub-samples have positive 
scores of this factor, and visible minorities have twice as large as non-visible minorities 
do. 
Table 5-14. Mean pre- and post-immigration factor scores, Visible minorities 
 Males  Females 
 Visible 
minorities 
Other  Visible 
minorities 
Other 
Pre-immigration 
Intelligence 0.70 0.69 
 
0.61 0.67 
 (0.023) (0.039)  (0.027) (0.043) 
Motor Skills 0.68 0.78 
 
0.34 0.34 
 (0.031) (0.052)  (0.036) (0.062) 
Strength -0.19 -0.13 
 
-0.28 -0.32 
 (0.021) (0.039)  (0.022) (0.036) 
Post-immigration  
Intelligence -0.16 0.16 
 
-0.29 -0.04 
 (0.030) (0.047)  (0.031) (0.051) 
Motor Skills 0.38 0.58 
 
0.01 -0.03 
 (0.029) (0.050)  (0.032) (0.05) 
Strength 0.44 0.19 
 
0.24 0.02 
 (0.028) (0.045)  (0.029) (0.043) 
N 33,377 8,705  23,239 6,981 
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We reject the null of equality for current “intelligence” and “strength” factor 
scores for females (Table 5-14). While both sub-samples have high and almost identical 
pre-immigration “intelligence” and “motor skills” factor scores and negative and similar 
“strength” factor scores, the patterns are more diverse after immigration. Both sub-
samples have negative post-immigration “intelligence” factor score, which is bigger in 
magnitude for visible minorities. Average post-immigration “motor skills” factor score is 
close to zero for both sub-samples; and “strength” factor scores are positive, but much 
bigger for visible minorities. 
5.6 Matching patterns 
From results presented in Table 5-15 it can be noticed that matching patterns 
differ across skills. Regarding that we required a pre-immigration skill level to be at least 
a half of a standard deviation above the mean, among immigrants who match pre- and 
post-immigration occupation on the basis of 4-digit coding (12% of total male sample in 
wave 3) the shares of immigrants who match their (developed) skills are lower than that. 
Table 5-15. Male immigrants’ matching patterns by skill factors within 4-digit 
occupational match, wave 3  
4-digit occupation 
 
Matched 
(12%) 
  
Not Matched 
(88%) 
   
Intelligence  Intelligence 
Matched Not matched  Matched Not matched 
62% 38%  16% 84% 
Motor Skills  Motor Skills 
Matched Not matched  Matched Not matched 
76% 24%  13% 87% 
Strength  Strength 
Matched Not matched  Matched Not matched 
21% 79%  9% 91% 
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Among 4-digit occupation matchers the share of “intelligence” and “motor skills” 
matchers is respectively 62% and 76%, while the share of “strength” factor matchers is 
only 21%. These shares can be explained by the fact that most of male immigrants prior 
to immigration worked in occupations with high “intelligence” and/or “motor skills” 
factor, however low “strength” factor. Also, among male immigrants who do not match 
pre- and post-immigration 4-digit occupation (88%) the share of immigrants who still 
match their pre- and post-immigration “intelligence”, “motor skills” and “strength” factor 
is 16%, 13% and 9% respectively. Matching patterns for females are similar, but 
matching occurs less frequently. 
Matching patterns across waves for both genders are presented in Table 5-16. It 
can be noted, that the shares of immigrants who match either of their skill factors slightly 
decreases overtime (across waves). The share of male immigrants that match their pre- 
and post-immigration “intelligence” factor or motor skills factor drops in wave 2 
compared to wave 1, although the wave 3 and wave 2 shares for these types of match are 
almost identical, both within skills and across skills. The share of male immigrants who 
match their pre- and post-immigration “strength” factor in wave 1 is twice smaller than 
the first two types of matches, it stays the same in wave 2 and drops slightly in wave 3. 
The shares of female immigrants who match their pre- and post-immigration 
“intelligence” or “motor skills” factor are substantially smaller than for males. 
Interestingly, the share of female immigrants who match their pre- and post-immigration 
“intelligence” factor does not change overtime, while there is a slight decline in the share 
of female immigrants who match shares of female immigrants who match their pre- and 
post-immigration “motor skills” or “strength” factor. In all cases the absolute number of 
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both male and female immigrants who match their pre- and post-immigration skill factors 
increases overtime. 
Table 5-16. Cross-sectional immigrant matching patterns  
Matching patterns for sub-samples of wave 3 are presented in Table 5-17 for 
males and in Table 5-18 for females. For both genders, the share of immigrants who 
match their pre- and post-immigration “intelligence” as well as “motor skills” factor is 
the biggest for those employed in professional occupations and the smallest for visible 
minorities. 
Table 5-17. Matching patterns by key sub-samples of wave 3, males 
  Skilled 
Worker 
PA’s 
Regulated Professional University 
educated 
Visible 
minority 
“Intelligence” 
match 
 0.27  0.24  0.70  0.27  0.21 
“Motor skills” 
match 
 0.25  0.27  0.45  0.24  0.19 
“Strength”   
match 
 0.07  0.11  .  0.04  0.10 
Note: “.” means that the number could not be disclosed due to Statistics Canada 
regulations. 
  Males    Females  
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3  Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
“Intelligence” match  0.26 0.22 0.21  0.16 0.16 0.16 
“Motor skills” match  0.27 0.21 0.21  0.15 0.12 0.10 
“Strength” match  0.13 0.13 0.11  0.12 0.10 0.09 
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The shares of both male and female immigrants who match their pre- and post-
immigration “strength” factor are quite low compared to the first two factors. The share 
of male “strength” matchers is the highest for those employed in regulated occupations in 
wave 3 as well as visible minorities (Table 5-17). The share of female “strength” 
matchers is the highest for visible minorities (Table 5-18). 
Table 5-18. Matching patterns by key sub-samples of wave 3, females 
  Skilled 
Worker 
PA’s 
Regulated Professional University 
educated 
Visible 
minority 
“Intelligence” 
match 
 0.25  0.23  0.53  0.23  0.15 
“Motor skills” 
match 
 0.14  0.16  0.27  0.12  0.09 
“Strength”   
match 
 0.05  0.08  0.08  0.06  0.10 
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CHAPTER 6 
ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATIONS 
We use regression specifications proposed in Goldmann et al. (2011). The base of 
the model is the Mincerian log-wage equation. However, specifications of the model have 
some important features. The main features are the following multiple-way interaction 
terms: (1) skill-match variables interacted with foreign human capital variables; (2) 
language scores interacted with foreign human capital variables; (3) skill-match variables 
interacted with interaction of language scores and human capital variables. This section 
introduces and explains model specifications and construction of variables used for the 
regression analysis.  
6.1 Specification 1   
Specification 1 is a standard model in the literature that includes human capital 
variables and controls for demographic characteristics. 
 ݈ܹ݊ܽ݃݁ݏ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௧ ൅ ߚଵ௧ܧݔ݌௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ ߚଶ௧݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜௧ி௢௥൅ߛ௧ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ݁௜௧ (6.1) 
where lnܹܽ݃݁ݏ௜௧ is a natural logarithm of weekly wage of the ݅௧௛ immigrant interviewed 
in wave ݐ earned in his/her main job; ܧݔ݌௜௧ி௢௥ is years of potential foreign experience 
calculated as (age at immigration - years of schooling – 6); ݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜௧ி௢௥ is years of 
successfully completed schooling prior to immigration as reported by a respondent. For 
consistency with Goldmann et al. (2009, 2011), ௜ܺ௧ includes the following set of control 
variables: months since immigration measured as number of months between landing and 
interview date; immigration class (Family (default); Skilled (PA); Skilled (not PA); 
Bus/Nom/Ref/Other); birth region (US/W Europe/ UK/ Other Northern Europe/ Oceania 
(default); C & S America/Caribbean & Bermuda; E Europe; S Europe; Africa; WC Asia 
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& M East; E Asia; SE Asia; S Asia); residence region (Toronto (default); Montreal; QB; 
ON; AB; BC; Other); number of children in household under age 18; marital status 
(single (default); married/common law).  
We do not include a square term of foreign experience variable for two reasons. 
First, similarly to Goldmann et al (2009; 2011), we find that foreign experience squared 
is irrelevant in most specifications: its magnitude is zero and it is (strongly) statistically 
insignificant. Second, the squared term interactions with match variables and language 
scores are highly correlated with other variables.  
 6.2 Specification 2 
The variables for immigrants’ English and French language abilities are added in 
Specification 2: 
 ݈ܹ݊ܽ݃݁ݏ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௧ ൅ ߚଵ௧ܧݔ݌௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ ߚଶ௧݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜௧ி௢௥ ൅  
൅ߚଷா௡௚௧ܧ݊ ௜݃௧ ൅ ߚଷி௥௘௧ܨݎ݁௜௧൅ߛ௧ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ݁௜௧ 
 
(6.2) 
where ܧ݊ ௜݃௧ and ܨݎ݁௜௧ are language scores for immigrant ݅ in wave ݐ, normalized to vary 
between 0 and 1. These scores capture effects of immigrant’s language ability on his/her 
wages as literature on immigrant economic assimilation suggests that knowledge of 
official languages is important determinant of immigrant assimilation in a host-country 
(Ferrer et al., 2008). See section 6.1 for the description of other parameters. 
6.3 Specification 3 
Specification 3 expands the previous model by adding factor match dummy 
variables. 
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 ݈ܹ݊ܽ݃݁ݏ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௧ ൅ ߚଵ௧ܧݔ݌௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ ߚଶ௧݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ 
൅ߚଷா௡௚௧ܧ݊ ௜݃௧ ൅ ߚଷி௥௘௧ܨݎ݁௜௧ ൅ ߚସ௝௧݉ܨ௜௧௝൅ߛ௧ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ݁௜௧ 
 
(6.3) 
where a dummy variable ݉ܨ௜௧௝ ௜௧ equals to 1 if the ݅௧௛ immigrant in ݐ௧௛ wave matched pre- 
and post-immigration ݆௧௛ skill factor, where ݆ ߳ ሾ1; 3ሿ for “intelligence”, “motor skills” 
and “strength” respectively; and equals to zero otherwise (see section 5.3 for a definition 
of match). The role of these match variables is to capture the differences in intercept of 
immigrants’ earnings function compared to baseline intercept for earnings of immigrants 
who do not match any of these factors. See section 6.1 and 6.2 for the description of other 
parameters. 
 6.4 Specification 4 
 Specification 4 builds on the previous model by introduction of interaction terms 
between match variables and foreign human capital variables as well as match variables 
and language scores. 
 ݈ܹ݊ܽ݃݁ݏ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௧ ൅ ߚଵ௧ܧݔ݌௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ ߚଶ௧݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ 
൅ߚଷா௡௚௜௧ܧ݊ ௜݃௧ ൅ ߚଷி௥௘௜௧ܨݎ݁௜௧ ൅ ߚସ௝௜௧݉ܨ௜௧௝ ൅ 
൅ߚହ௞௝ ௧݉ܨ௜௧௝ሺܧݔ݌௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ ݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ ܧ݊ ௜݃௧ ൅ ܨݎ݁௜௧ሻ ൅ ߛ௧ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ݁௜௧ 
 
 
(6.4) 
where ݇  א ሾ1; 4ሿ for each interaction of the ݆௧௛ (݆ ߳ ሾ1; 3ሿ) factor match variable and 
foreign experience, foreign schooling, English score and French score. For instance, for 
݇ ൌ 1 (for foreign experience variable) and ݆ ൌ 1 (for “intelligence” factor match 
dummy) the interaction coefficient is ߚହଵଵ ௜௧. This coefficient shows the return to foreign 
experience for immigrant ݅ in wave  ݐ who matched his pre- and post-immigration 
“intelligence” factor. Hence, interacting match variables with foreign human capital 
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variables as well as with language scores is introduced to capture log wage returns to this 
variables for immigrants who match their pre- and post-immigration factors (each 
separately) in addition to baseline returns to foreign human capital and language ability 
for immigrants who do not match any of their factors. See section 6.1-6.3 for the 
description of other parameters. 
 6.5 Specification 5 
 In addition to variables of the previous model interactions of language scores and 
foreign human capital variables are included in Specification 5. 
 ݈ܹ݊ܽ݃݁ݏ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௧ ൅ ߚଵ௧ܧݔ݌௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ ߚଶ௧݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ 
൅ߚଷா௡௚௧ܧ݊ ௜݃௧ ൅ ߚଷி௥௘௧ܨݎ݁௜௧ ൅ ߚସ௝௧݉ܨ௜௧௝ ൅ 
൅ߚହ௞௝ ௧݉ܨ௜௧௝ሺܧݔ݌௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ ݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ ܧ݊ ௜݃௧ ൅ ܨݎ݁௜௧ሻ ൅ 
൅ߚ଺௠௧ܧ݊݃ሺܧݔ݌௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ ݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜௧ி௢௥ሻ ൅ 
൅ߚ଻௠௧ܨݎ݁ሺܧݔ݌௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ ݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜௧ி௢௥ሻ ൅ ߛ௧ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ݁௜௧ 
 
 
(6.5) 
where ݉  א ሾ1; 2ሿ for foreign experience and foreign schooling variables respectively. 
The interaction of language scores and foreign human capital variables are included to 
capture effects of language ability of the ݅௧௛ immigrant in wave ݐ on his/her returns to 
foreign experience and foreign schooling. Regarding that literature finds knowledge of 
official languages to have a large impact on labour market outcomes (Ferrer et al., 2008), 
this interaction variables show if English and/or French proficiency can mediate the 
transferability of immigrant foreign human capital into Canadian labour market. See 
section 6.1-6.4 for description of other parameters.   
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6.6 Specification 6 
 Finally, Specification 6 also includes three-term interactions of match dummy 
variables, language scores and foreign human capital variables in addition to the variables 
introduced in previous models. 
  ݈ܹ݊ܽ݃݁ݏ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௧ ൅ ߚଵ௧ܧݔ݌௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ ߚଶ௧݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ 
൅ߚଷ௧ா௡௚ܧ݊ ௜݃௧ ൅ ߚଷ௧ி௥௘ܨݎ݁௜௧ ൅ ߚସ௝௧݉ܨ௜௧௝ ൅ 
൅ߚହ௞௝ ௧݉ܨ௜௧௝ሺܧݔ݌௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ ݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ ܧ݊ ௜݃௧ ൅ ܨݎ݁௜௧ሻ ൅ 
൅ߚ଺௠௧ܧ݊ ௜݃௧ሺܧݔ݌௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ ݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜௧ி௢௥ሻ ൅ 
൅ߚ଻௠௧ܨݎ݁௜௧ሺܧݔ݌௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ ݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜௧ி௢௥ሻ 
ߚ଼௠௝ ௧݉ܨ௝ ൈ ܧ݊ ௜݃௧ ൈ ሺܧݔ݌௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ ݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜௧ி௢௥ሻ ൅ 
ߚଽ௠௝ ௧݉ܨ௝ ൈ ܨݎ݁௜௧ ൈ ሺܧݔ݌௜௧ி௢௥ ൅ ݄ܵܿ݋݋݈௜௧ி௢௥ሻ ൅ ߛ௧ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ݁௜௧ 
 
 
(6.6) 
where ݉  א ሾ1; 2ሿ for foreign experience and foreign schooling variables respectively. 
The three-term interactions are assumed to capture whether English or French language 
ability of the ݅௧௛ immigrant in wave ݐ who match a pre- and post-immigration ݆௧௛ skill 
factor in wave ݐ, where ݆ ߳ ሾ1; 3ሿ for “intelligence”, “motor skills” and “strength” 
respectively. See section 6.1-6.5 for description of other parameters. 
6.7 Error term 
 The error term, ݁௜௧, is a deviation of the dependent variable, ݈ܹ݊ܽ݃݁ݏ௜௧, from its 
mean value given all explanatory variables. It is important for the error term to be 
independently identically distributed with zero mean and finite variance in order for 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to be best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE).  
 90 
 
Another important assumption is that the error term has to be uncorrelated with 
explanatory variables. It is plausible that the error term in our analysis contains 
immigrants’ unobserved characteristics, e.g. motivation. Usually longitudinal data are 
suitable for controlling individual unobserved characteristics, which are assumed to be 
constant over time. However, individual fixed effects are perfectly collinear with foreign 
experience and foreign schooling variables, which are also constant over time after 
immigration; while Hausman test rejects random effects.  
6.8 Multicollinearity 
When working with dichotomous variables in regressions and their interactions 
with other variables, it is likely that some of these variables will be near perfectly 
correlated. The first step is to detect the source of collinearity. This can be done by 
investigation of correlation matrices of independent variables. However, in case of larger 
sets of variables and higher number of model specifications investigating correlation 
matrices can be not the best choice. In this research, we use variance inflation factors 
(VIF’s) in order to determine effects of correlation on estimation of standard errors. 
Under conditions of high collinearity of variables standard errors are magnified and the 
corresponding estimated coefficients are often insignificant. When collinearity is too high 
it may not only cause false inferences on significance of coefficients, but also flip signs 
of collinear coefficients. A common rule of thumb is that the VIF’s should not exceed 10 
(Kutner et al., 2004).    
When original regressions were run, the VIF’s suggested high multicollinearity. 
The remedies for multicollinearity include: (i) obtaining more data; (ii) dropping some of 
collinear variables; (iii) grouping dummy variables; (iv) centering or demeaning of 
collinear variables. We first dropped age variable as it is highly collinear to foreign 
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experience variable, which is in fact a linear transformation of age variable. However, 
other variables, such as foreign experience, foreign schooling, English and French scores, 
could not be dropped from the regression analysis as they are of a great interest in this 
research. Therefore, we employ the centering14 method.  
The method of centering data (i.e. Kromney et al, 1998) consists of subtracting its 
own mean from a collinear variable before its transformation (i.e. obtaining a square or a 
cube) or its interaction with a dummy variable. This procedure minimizes the 
multicollinearity as transformed or interacted centered variables are then not correlated 
with initially collinear variables, but still are highly correlated with their corresponding 
original (non-centered) variables. Echambadi and Hess (2007) suggest that mean-
centering data does not remove collinearity itself; however, it may be employed for 
interpretive purposes. 
We employed centering over several stages. First, we center foreign experience, 
schooling and language scores for the two-term interactions. Then, for the three-term 
interactions, their previous two-term interactions are also centered. For instance, in order 
to reduce collinearity between ܧݔ݌ி௢௥ variable and a two-term interaction ܧݔ݌ி௢௥ כ
݉ܨ௝, the foreign experience is centered before interacting it with a skill match variable. 
Hence, the corresponding regressions will include ܧݔ݌ி௢௥ and  ܿ݁݊ݐ݁ݎ݁݀ሺܧݔ݌ி௢௥ሻ כ
݉ܨ௝. Furthermore, in order to treat collinearity between the two-term interaction 
ܿ݁݊ݐ݁ݎ݁݀ሺܧݔ݌ி௢௥ሻ כ ݉ܨ௝ and the three-term interactions  ܿ݁݊ݐ݁ݎ݁݀ሺܧ݊݃ሻ כ
ܿ݁݊ݐ݁ݎ݁݀ሺܧݔ݌ி௢௥ሻ כ ݉ܨ௝, the mean of the two-term interaction is subtracted from it just 
before interacting it with a skill match variable. As a result, the following variables will 
                                                 
14 Also called “demeaning” 
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be included in corresponding regressions:  ܧݔ݌ி௢௥,  ܿ݁݊ݐ݁ݎ݁݀ሺܧݔ݌ி௢௥ሻ כ ݉ܨ௝, 
and ܿ݁݊ݐ݁ݎ݁݀ሺܿ݁݊ݐ݁ݎ݁݀ሺܧ݊݃ሻ כ ܿ݁݊ݐ݁ݎ݁݀ሺܧݔ݌ி௢௥ሻሻ כ ݉ܨ௝. 
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CHAPTER 7 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
 In this chapter we present and discuss regression results of log wage equations for 
different specifications for both genders. We start with cross-sectional analysis and then 
follow with detailed analysis of immigrant sub-samples of wave 3. The cross-sectional 
analysis is done for the full sample of each wave. The analysis for wave 3 is expanded for 
five pairs of sub-samples, sometimes endogenous: (i) Skilled Worker principal applicants 
versus other immigration classes; (ii) regulated occupations versus unregulated; (iii) 
professional occupations versus non-professional; (iv) university educated immigrants 
versus other education levels; (v) visible minorities versus not visible minorities.      
7.1 Cross-sectional analysis 
This section mainly discusses results from regression specifications (1) and (4). 
The discussion includes the returns to foreign human capital as well as direct and indirect 
effects of matching pre- and post-immigration skill factors on immigrant entry earnings. 
We leave the results for other variables and regression specifications (2), (3), (5) and (6) 
in Appendix B1 and B2. Section 7.1.1 discusses the log wage returns to foreign 
experience and section 7.1.2 discusses the results for the log wage returns to foreign 
schooling; direct effect of matching skills are discussed in section 7.1.3; and a discussion 
of results’ sensitivity to the inclusion of additional controls (i.e. specifications (5) and 
(6)) can be found in section 7.1.4.  
7.1.1 Returns to foreign experience 
 The baseline return to foreign experience for males is negligible in all waves 
(Table 7-1-1-1). In fact, the coefficient is slightly negative and significant across waves 
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regardless of regression specification. The coefficients on the returns to foreign 
experience conditional on any type of skill-match differ across waves. The return to 
foreign experience for male immigrants who match their pre- and post-immigration 
“intelligence” factor is positive, but insignificant in wave 1 and 2. In wave 3, the return to 
foreign work experience interacted with the “intelligence”-match dummy becomes 
statistically significant at the 10% level. Its magnitude, however, is very moderate. The 
total effect of baseline foreign experience and foreign experience conditional on 
matching the “intelligence” factor still suggests (െ0.013 ൅ 0.011 ൌ െ0.002) zero return 
to foreign work experience. Neither matching the “motor skills” nor the “strength” factor 
is beneficial for male immigrant returns to foreign experience in any of the waves. 
Interestingly, even the negative and significant coefficient on the return to foreign 
experience conditional on “motor skills” factor match (specification (4), wave 1 in Table 
7-1-1-1) is not helpful in explaining the negative return to the baseline foreign work 
experience. 
 Similarly to males, the baseline return to foreign experience for females is 
negligible regardless of regression specification and wave (Table 7-1-1-2), but is slightly 
smaller in magnitude. Only female immigrants who match their pre- and post-
immigration “strength” factor in wave 2 receive a fairly substantial and statistically 
significant return to years of experience acquired abroad, which allows them to overcome 
the negative effect of baseline foreign experience (െ0.009 ൅ 0.043 ൌ 0.034). However, 
this advantage disappears completely in wave 3. The return to foreign experience for 
females who match pre- and post-immigration “intelligence” factor is initially positive 
and insignificant in wave 1, then it is twice smaller in wave 2 and insignificant, and
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Table 7-1-1-1. Cross-sectional log wage returns to foreign experience, males 
  Wave 1  Wave 2  Wave 3  
  (1)  (4)  (1)  (4)  (1)  (4)  
Experience  -0.011**  -0.007*  -0.012**  -0.011**  -0.012**  -0.013** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
Experience ൈ “Intelligence” match    0.016    0.008    0.011+  
    (0.011)    (0.007)    (0.005)  
Experience ൈ “Motor skills” match    -0.030**    -0.004    0.005  
    (0.009)    (0.006)    (0.005)  
Experience ൈ “Strength” match    0.007    0.009    0.004  
    (0.008)    (0.006)    (0.005)  
              
School  +  +  +  +  +  +  
Language scores    +    +    +  
Match dummies    +    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ school    +    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ language scores    +    +    +  
ܴଶ  0.24  0.43  0.23  0.36  0.17  0.26  
N-weighted  10,244  10,244  22,291  22,291  42,122  42,122  
Note: All samples restricted to age-at-immigration between 25 and 59. Experience and School stand for years of foreign experience and schooling. 
Match dummies (e.g. “Intelligence” match) equal to 1 if there is a match and zero otherwise. All regressions control for months since immigration 
(msm), immigration category (Family (default); Skilled Workers principal applicants (PA’s); Skilled Workers not PA’s; 
Business/Nominees/Refugees/Others); birth region  (US/Western Europe/ UK/ Other Northern Europe/ Oceania (default); Central & South 
America/Caribbean & Bermuda; Eastern Europe; Southern Europe; Africa; West Central Asia & Middle East; Eastern Asia; Southeastern Asia; 
Southern Asia); residence region (Toronto (default); Montreal; QB; ON; AB; BC; Other); number of children in a household under the age of 18; 
marital status (single (default); married/common law). Bootstrap standard errors in brackets. **-significant and 1%; *-significant at 5%; +-
significant at 10%. 
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Table 7-1-1-2. Cross-sectional log wage returns to foreign experience, females 
  Wave 1  Wave 2  Wave 3  
  (1)  (4)  (1)  (4)  (1)  (4)  
Experience  -0.007  -0.001  -0.007+  -0.009*  -0.010**  -0.007* 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
Experience ൈ “Intelligence” match    0.025    0.013    0.000  
    (0.024)    (0.015)    (0.008)  
Experience ൈ “Motor skills” match    -0.039    -0.032    0.012  
    (0.029)    (0.021)    (0.009)  
Experience ൈ “Strength” match    -0.008    0.043+    0.000  
    (0.025)    (0.022)    (0.006)  
              
School  +  +  +  +  +  +  
Language scores    +    +    +  
Match dummies    +    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ school    +    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ language scores    +    +    +  
ܴଶ  0.26  0.51  0.15  0.30  0.11  0.22  
N-weighted  5,045  5,045  14,920  14,920  30,237  30,237  
See notes for Table 7-1-1-1.  
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disappears in wave 3 completely.  The sign of the coefficient on the interaction of foreign 
experience and “motor skills” factor match is negative in wave 1 and 2, but not 
significant; then it becomes positive in wave 3, but is still small and remains 
insignificant. 
7.1.2 Returns to foreign schooling 
The baseline return to foreign schooling is mostly negligible and insignificant for 
male immigrants across waves (Table 7-1-2-1). While Canadian studies in the literature 
on immigration usually find a substantial return to foreign schooling for males, in our 
analysis even in the standard model (specification (1) in each wave, Table 7-1-2-1) the 
return is negligible in all waves and is only statistically significant at the 10% level in 
wave 3. Goldmann et al. (2009, 2011) use the same data (LSIC) and also find a very 
moderate return to foreign schooling. Goldmann et al. (2009) suggest that studies that use 
other data (e.g. Census) do not have a direct measure of foreign schooling; that is, 
potential years of foreign schooling in those studies may contain some years of schooling 
received in Canada prior to immigrating to Canada.  
From Table 7-1-2-1, male immigrants who match their pre- and post-immigration 
“intelligence” factor on average receive a positive return to foreign schooling, but the 
return is only significant in wave 2 and only at the 10% level. The return to foreign 
schooling for “motor skills” male matchers is initially negative and insignificant in wave 
1, then it grows in wave 2, but still is insignificant, and becomes significant at the 1% 
level in wave 3. The return to foreign schooling for male immigrants who match their 
pre- and post-immigration “strength” factor is statistically insignificant across waves; 
moreover, its coefficient drops in wave 2 and becomes slightly negative in wave 3. Note,  
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Table 7-1-2-1. Cross-sectional log wage returns to foreign schooling, males 
  Wave 1  Wave 2  Wave 3  
  (1)  (4)  (1)  (4)  (1)  (4)  
Schooling  0.016  0.013  0.008  -0.003  0.008+  0.000 
  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.006)  
Schooling  ൈ “Intelligence” match    0.009    0.028+    0.009  
    (0.025)    (0.015)    (0.012)  
Schooling  ൈ “Motor skills” match    -0.016    0.014    0.030**  
    (0.025)    (0.016)    (0.011)  
Schooling  ൈ “Strength” match    0.019    0.006    -0.014  
    (0.026)    (0.016)    (0.012)  
              
Experience  +  +  +  +  +  +  
Language scores    +    +    +  
Match dummies    +    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ experience    +    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ language scores    +    +    +  
ܴଶ  0.24  0.43  0.23  0.36  0.17  0.26  
N-weighted  10,244  10,244  22,291  22,291  42,122  42,122  
See notes for Table 7-1-1-1. 
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Table 7-1-2-2. Cross-sectional log wage returns to foreign schooling, females 
  Wave 1  Wave 2  Wave 3  
  (1)  (4)  (1)  (4)  (1)  (4)  
Schooling  0.048*  0.009  0.037**  0.002  0.019*  0.002 
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.011)  
Schooling  ൈ “Intelligence” match    0.122    0.035    -0.023  
    (0.077)    (0.039)    (0.025)  
Schooling  ൈ “Motor skills” match    -0.063    0.030    0.059*  
    (0.082)    (0.040)    (0.025)  
Schooling  ൈ “Strength” match    -0.049    0.029    -0.004  
    (0.079)    (0.064)    (0.023)  
              
Experience  +  +  +  +  +  +  
Language scores    +    +    +  
Match dummies    +    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ experience    +    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ language scores    +    +    +  
ܴଶ  0.26  0.51  0.15  0.30  0.11  0.22  
N-weighted  5,045  5,045  14,920  14,920  30,237  30,237  
See notes for Table 7-1-1-1. 
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the magnitude of the baseline return to foreign schooling for males in wave 2 and 3 first 
decreases with the inclusion of language scores (specification (2), Appendix B1) and then 
decreases again with the inclusion of the two-term interactions of match variables and 
foreign human capital variables (specification (4), Table 7-1-2-1 or Appendix B1). 
Surprisingly, for females the baseline return to foreign schooling is bigger than 
for males in the standard model waves (specification (1)) and is statistically significant in 
all, but its coefficient decreases towards wave 3 (Table 7-1-2-2). Goldmann et al. (2009) 
also find an advantage in the returns to foreign schooling for women. Unlike male 
immigrants, for females the coefficient is sensitive to the inclusion of skill-match 
dummies in each wave (specification (3), Appendix B2). It drops almost twice and 
becomes insignificant once the match variables are included and then drops even more 
and is insignificant once interactions of match variables and human capital are included 
(specification (4), Table 7-1-2-2 or Appendix B2). The return to foreign schooling for 
female immigrants who are able to match their pre- and post-immigration “intelligence” 
factor is insignificant in all waves and specifications; moreover its coefficient is initially 
positive in wave 1, but drops in wave 2 and becomes negative in wave 3. In contrast, the 
coefficient on the interaction of foreign schooling and “motor skills” match is initially 
negative and insignificant in wave 1; then it turns positive, but is still insignificant in 
wave 2, and finally becomes substantially positive and significant at the 5% level in wave 
3. The return to foreign schooling for “strength” matchers is never statistically 
significant. Its coefficient is initially negative in wave 1, then becomes positive in wave 
2, but drops again in wave 3. 
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7.1.3 Direct effect of skill-match  
Male immigrants who match their pre- and post-immigration “intelligence” or 
“motor skills” factor receive substantially higher earnings than those who do not obtain 
any match (Table 7-1-3-1). The effect of matching “strength” factor is smaller and 
usually is statistically insignificant. 
Matching “intelligence” or “motor skills” factor usually has a large and 
statistically significant effect on earnings for females (Table 7-1-3-1); the effect is also 
bigger for females than for males, especially in wave 2. Also, in wave 3 females who are 
able to match their “strength” factor receive higher earnings than those who do not match 
any skill, but the effect is around three times smaller than matching the other two skill 
factors. 
7.1.4 Controlling for higher order interactions 
In the specification (5) we also include interactions of language scores and foreign 
experience and interactions of language scores and foreign schooling; and in the 
specification (6) we add the three-term interactions of match variables, language scores 
and foreign human capital variables. The cross-sectional regression results for the 
specifications (5) and (6) are presented in Appendix B1 and B2. The corresponding VIF’s 
for cross-sectional regressions are provided in Appendix C1 and C2. Usually the VIF’s 
for these specifications are higher than for the specifications (1) through (4). In the 
specification (6) many of the VIF’s for both males and females in wave 1 are higher than 
the threshold of 10. Therefore, we must be careful when interpreting the results as the 
standard errors of the regression coefficients that have high VIF’s are magnified.    
The results for males are presented in Appendix B1. For males, the inclusion of 
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Table 7-1-3-1. Direct effect of skill-match on earnings, males 
  Wave 1  Wave 2  Wave 3  
  (4)  (4)  (4)  
“Intelligence” match  0.235**  0.139*  0.241**  
  (0.078)  (0.055)  (0.040)  
“Motor skills” match  0.260**  0.246**  0.262**  
  (0.064)  (0.044)  (0.031)  
“Strength” match  0.052  0.046  0.032  
  (0.094)  (0.051)  (0.038)  
Experience and School (HC)  +  +  +  
Language scores  +  +  +  
Match dummies  +  +  +  
Match dummies ൈ HC  +  +  +  
Match dummies ൈ language scores  +  +  +  
ܴଶ  0.43  0.36  0.26  
N-weighted  10,244  22,291  42,122  
See notes for Table 7-1-1-1. 
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Table 7-1-3-2. Direct effect of skill-match on earnings, females 
  Wave 1  Wave 2  Wave 3  
  (4)  (4)  (4)  
“Intelligence” match  0.563**  0.211+  0.349**  
  (0.162)  (0.117)  (0.062)  
“Motor skills” match  0.111  0.502**  0.388**  
  (0.208)  (0.103)  (0.056)  
“Strength” match  -0.032  0.055  0.123+  
  (0.201)  (0.167)  (0.072)  
Experience and School (HC)  +  +  +  
Language scores  +  +  +  
Match dummies  +  +  +  
Match dummies ൈ HC  +  +  +  
Match dummies ൈ language scores  +  +  +  
ܴଶ  0.51  0.30  0.22  
N-weighted  5,045  14,920  30,237  
See notes for Table 7-1-1-1. 
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additional interactions in the specifications (5) and (6) affects neither the baseline return 
to foreign experience nor the baseline return to foreign schooling. The returns to foreign 
experience and foreign schooling conditional on skill-match variables are more sensitive 
to the inclusion of the new interactions. The coefficient on the interaction of foreign 
experience and “intelligence” match in wave 3 becomes insignificant in the specification 
(6); and the coefficient on the interaction of foreign schooling and “intelligence” match in 
wave 2 becomes insignificant in the specifications (5) and (6). Other interaction 
coefficients of foreign schooling or foreign experience with match variables can change 
in magnitude but their significance does not change. It is also worth noting that in wave 1 
and 3 in the specification (5) and (6) male immigrants receive a substantial positive and 
statistically significant return to foreign schooling with higher proficiency in English. 
While male immigrants who are able to match their pre- and post-immigration 
“intelligence” factor also receive a substantial positive and statistically significant return 
to foreign schooling with higher proficiency in French. 
The results for females are presented in Appendix B2. Similarly to males, the 
inclusion of additional interactions in the specifications (5) and (6) does not affect either 
the females' baseline return to foreign experience or the baseline return to foreign 
schooling. Most of the effects of interactions between the skill-match variables and 
foreign human capital variables remain unchanged. In wave 2, the coefficient on the 
interaction of foreign experience and the “strength” match variables becomes smaller and 
statistically not significant in wave 2. We do not find any statistically significant 
coefficients among additional interaction terms in specifications (5) and (6) for females. 
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7.1.5 Months since immigration effect 
The cross-sectional regression results for the months since immigration variable 
are presented in Appendix B1 and B2. Interestingly, for males, the effect of months since 
migration is positive, but not statistically significant across all specifications in wave 1.  
In wave 2 and wave 3, it drops to zero and is statistically not significant. In contrast, for 
females, the coefficient for months since migration is negative in wave 1 and wave 2, but 
statistically insignificant. In wave 3, however, the coefficient becomes positive and 
statistically significant across all specifications. For females in wave 3, the effect of 
months since migration is also economically significant and suggests about 4.6% to 5.2% 
increase in weekly wages with each additional month lived in Canada after immigration. 
This implies that in a year and a half after immigration earnings for females almost 
double. 
7.2 Returns to foreign experience of sub-samples 
We expand our analysis and present regression results for sub-samples within 
wave 3. We focus our discussion on the returns to foreign experience while full tables 
with results from log wage regressions are provided in Appendix B3 to B12. The sample 
of wave 3 has the most observations and the most reliable coefficients regarding the 
corresponding VIF’s (Appendix C3 to C12). Also Aydemir and Robinson (2008) find 
that new immigrants are most likely to leave in their first year (80% of all immigrants 
who leave within first five years), therefore wave 3 is also the most representative and 
informative of immigrant population that is more likely to stay in Canada. We subdivide 
the sample of immigrants of each gender in wave 3 into five main sub-samples and 
compare them with the corresponding rest of immigrants. These sub-samples are: (i) 
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Skilled Worker principal applicants (PA’s) versus other immigration classes; (ii) 
regulated versus unregulated occupations; (iii) professional versus non-professional 
occupations; (iv) university educated immigrants versus other education levels; (v) 
visible minorities versus non-visible minorities. 
7.2.1 Skilled Worker PA’s vs. other immigration categories 
Both male sub-samples, Skilled Worker principal applicants and other immigration 
categories, receive a negative and statistically significant return to foreign experience 
(Table 7-2-1-A). However the return to foreign experience for male Skilled Worker 
principal applicants who matched their pre- and post-immigration “intelligence” or 
“strength” factor is positive and statistically significant. The total effect from general 
foreign experience and foreign experience conditional on either “intelligence” factor 
match (െ0.017 ൅ 0.016 ൌ െ0.001) or “strength” factor match (െ0.017 ൅ 0.023 ൌ
0.006) is still negligible for male Skilled Worker principal applicants. Immigrants from 
other immigration categories who match their pre- and post-immigration “motor skills” 
factor receive a positive and significant return to foreign work experience, however this 
return only covers the negative baseline effect (െ0.013 ൅ 0.016 ൌ 0.003), and together 
they result into zero return. Interestingly, while the inclusion of language scores 
(specification (2), Appendix B3) and skill-match variables (specification (3), Appendix 
B3) slightly reduces the baseline return to foreign experience in magnitude for male 
Skilled Worker principal applicants, the inclusion of interactions between foreign work 
experience and match variables (specification (4), Table 7-2-1-A or Appendix B3) 
increases the magnitude of this return again. 
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Table 7-2-1-A. Return to foreign experience for Skilled Worker principal applicants vs. Other immigration categories, males, wave 3 
  Skilled Worker principal applicants  Other immigration categories  
  (1)  (4)  (1)  (4)  
Experience  -0.015***  -0.017***  -0.014***  -0.013***  
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
Experience ൈ “Intelligence” match    0.016**    -0.001  
    (0.007)    (0.010)  
Experience ൈ “Motor skills” match    0.002    0.016**  
    (0.006)    (0.008)  
Experience ൈ “Strength” match    0.023**    -0.008  
    (0.009)    (0.006)  
          
School  +  +  +  +  
Language scores    +    +  
Match dummies    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ school    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ language scores    +    +  
ܴଶ  0.10  0.22  0.20  0.29  
N-weighted  28,387  28,387  13,735  13,735  
Note: All samples restricted to age-at-immigration between 25 and 59. Experience and School stand for years of foreign experience and schooling. 
Match dummies (e.g. “Intelligence” match) equal to 1 if there is a match and zero otherwise. All regressions control for months since immigration 
(msm), birth region  (US/Western Europe/ UK/ Other Northern Europe/ Oceania (default); Central & South America/Caribbean & Bermuda; 
Eastern Europe; Southern Europe; Africa; West Central Asia & Middle East; Eastern Asia; Southeastern Asia; Southern Asia); residence region 
(Toronto (default); Montreal; QB; ON; AB; BC; Other); number of children in a household under the age of 18; marital status (single (default); 
married/common law). Bootstrap standard errors in brackets.***-significant and 1%; **-significant at 5%; *-significant at 10%. 
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Table 7-2-1-B. Return to foreign experience for Skilled Worker principal applicants vs. Other immigration categories, females, wave 3 
  Skilled Worker principal applicants  Other immigration categories  
  (1)  (4)  (1)  (4)  
Experience  -0.010*  -0.011*  -0.011***  -0.006**  
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
Experience ൈ “Intelligence” match    0.014    -0.007  
    (0.013)    (0.011)  
Experience ൈ “Motor skills” match    -0.007    0.020*  
    (0.019)    (0.012)  
Experience ൈ “Strength” match    -0.023    -0.005  
    (0.062)    (0.006)  
          
School  +  +  +  +  
Language scores    +    +  
Match dummies    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ school    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ language scores    +    +  
ܴଶ  0.09  0.31  0.09  0.18  
N-weighted  8,235  8,235  22,002  22,002  
See notes for Table 7-2-1-A. 
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Similarly, both female sub-samples (Skilled Worker principal applicants and other 
immigration categories) receive a negative and mostly statistically significant return to 
foreign work experience (Table 7-2-1-B). Unlike males, female Skilled Worker principal 
applicants do not receive any statistically significant return to foreign work experience 
conditional on any type of skill-match. Although, females from other immigration 
categories who match their pre- and post-immigration “motor skills” receive positive and 
statistically significant return to experience acquired abroad. The total effect of the 
baseline return and the return conditional on matching “motor skills” is quite moderate 
(െ0.006 ൅ 0.020 ൌ 0.014), but it still suggests a positive influence on earnings.  
Interestingly, in the most expanded specifications (i.e. (5) and (6)), we find that 
the return to foreign work experience interacted with French score is between 0.026 and 
0.029 for male immigrants who immigrated through categories other than Skilled Worker 
principal applicants (Appendix B3). In these model specifications, the return to foreign 
experience for different types of skill-match are robust in magnitude, but sometimes 
become statistically insignificant. That is, in specification (6) for male Skilled Worker 
principal applicants the return to foreign experience lowers from 0.016 to 0.013 among 
“intelligence” matchers and becomes statistically insignificant.  
7.2.2 Regulated versus unregulated occupations 
The baseline return to foreign experience for both male immigrant sub-samples is 
negative and statistically significant across all waves and all specifications (Table 7-2-2-
A). Male immigrants employed in regulated occupations who obtain a match in their pre- 
and post-immigration “intelligence” factor receive a positive and significant return to 
foreign work experience that slightly overcomes the baseline negative return. But the 
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Table 7-2-2-A. Return to foreign experience for Regulated vs. Unregulated occupations, males, wave 3 
  Regulated occupations  Unregulated occupations  
  (1)  (4)  (1)  (4)  
Experience  -0.010***  -0.013***  -0.015***  -0.012***  
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
Experience ൈ “Intelligence” match    0.020***    -0.001  
    (0.007)    (0.009)  
Experience ൈ “Motor skills” match    0.003    0.008  
    (0.006)    (0.010)  
Experience ൈ “Strength” match    0.007    -0.001  
    (0.007)    (0.007)  
          
School  +  +  +  +  
Language scores    +    +  
Match dummies    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ school    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ language scores    +    +  
ܴଶ  0.13  0.21  0.23  0.37  
N-weighted  23,739  23,739  18,383  18,383  
Note: Immigrants 25 to 59 at the time of immigration. Experience and School stand for years of foreign experience and schooling. Match dummies (e.g. “Intelligence” 
match) equal to 1 if there is a match and zero otherwise. All regressions control for months since immigration (msm), immigration category (Family (default); Skilled 
Workers principal applicants (PA’s); Skilled Workers not PA’s; Business/Nominees/Refugees/Others); birth region  (US/Western Europe/ UK/ Other Northern Europe/ 
Oceania (default); Central & South America/Caribbean & Bermuda; Eastern Europe; Southern Europe; Africa; West Central Asia & Middle East; Eastern Asia; 
Southeastern Asia; Southern Asia); residence region (Toronto (default); Montreal; QB; ON; AB; BC; Other); number of children in a household under the age of 18; 
marital status (single (default); married/common law). Bootstrap standard errors in brackets.  ***-significant and 1%; **-significant at 5%; *-significant at 10%. 
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Table 7-2-2-B. Return to foreign experience for Regulated vs. Unregulated occupations, females, wave 3 
  Regulated occupations  Unregulated occupations  
  (1)  (4)  (1)  (4)  
Experience  -0.009**  -0.005  -0.010***  -0.007*  
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
Experience ൈ “Intelligence” match    0.001    -0.008  
    (0.013)    (0.011)  
Experience ൈ “Motor skills” match    0.016    0.005  
    (0.014)    (0.016)  
Experience ൈ “Strength” match    -0.011    0.003  
    (0.016)    (0.008)  
          
School  +  +  +  +  
Language scores    +    +  
Match dummies    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ school    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ language scores    +    +  
ܴଶ  0.13  0.24  0.11  0.25  
N-weighted  13,082  13,082  17,155  17,155  
See notes for Table 7-2-2-A. 
 112 
 
total effect is still close to zero. 
Similarly, female immigrants from both sub-samples receive a slightly negative 
and usually significant return to general foreign experience (Table 7-2-2-B). Moreover, 
matching any of the skill factors does not help in transferring their foreign work 
experience to Canada either for immigrant women employed in regulated or in 
unregulated occupations. 
In the most expanded specification (i.e. (6), Appendix B5) male immigrants 
employed in unregulated occupations who match their “strength” factor also receive a 
positive and significant return to foreign experience interacted with English score. This 
three-term interaction affects neither the baseline return to foreign experience nor returns 
to foreign experience conditional on any type of skill-match.  
7.2.3 Professional versus non-professional occupations 
Male immigrants employed in professional occupations in Canada receive zero return to 
their general foreign work experience, while male immigrants employed in non-
professional occupations have a negative and statistically significant return (Table 7-2-3-
A). Matching pre- and post-immigration skills do not help in transferability of foreign 
work experience for either male sub-sample. 
In Table 7-2-3-B, the baseline return to foreign experience for female immigrants 
employed in professional occupations is slightly negative, but statistically insignificant in 
the standard model (i.e. (1)), and even when we control for language scores (specification 
(2), Appendix B8) and add skill-match variables (specification (3), Appendix B8). 
However, when we add the interaction terms between foreign experience and skill-match 
variables (specification (4), Table 7-2-3-B) the return to foreign experience becomes 
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Table 7-2-3-A. Returns to foreign experience for Professional vs. Non-professional occupations, males, wave 3 
  Professional occupations  Non-professional occupations  
  (1)  (4)  (1)  (4)  
Experience  0.000  -0.003  -0.012***  -0.012***  
  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
Experience ൈ “Intelligence” match    -0.002    0.011  
    (0.012)    (0.009)  
Experience ൈ “Motor skills” match    0.010    0.002  
    (0.011)    (0.005)  
Experience ൈ “Strength” match    -0.049    0.003  
    (0.320)    (0.005)  
          
School  +  +  +  +  
Language scores    +    +  
Match dummies    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ school    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ language scores    +    +  
ܴଶ  0.11  0.19  0.17  0.24  
N-weighted  9,329  9,329  32,794  32,794  
See notes for Table 7-2-2-A. 
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Table 7-2-3-B. Returns to foreign experience for Professional vs. Non-professional occupations, females, wave 3 
  Professional occupations  Non-professional occupations  
  (1)  (4)  (1)  (4)  
Experience  -0.013  -0.021*  -0.008***  -0.006*  
  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
Experience ൈ “Intelligence” match    0.023    -0.015  
    (0.017)    (0.011)  
Experience ൈ “Motor skills” match    0.003    0.020  
    (0.023)    (0.017)  
Experience ൈ “Strength” match    0.008    0.001  
    (0.031)    (0.006)  
          
School  +  +  +  +  
Language scores    +    +  
Match dummies    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ school    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ language scores    +    +  
ܴଶ  0.17  0.29  0.10  0.16  
N-weighted  6,694  6,694  23,543  23,543  
See notes for Table 7-2-2-A. 
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more negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. Interestingly, although none of 
the coefficients on the interactions of foreign experience and skill-match dummies is 
significant for females employed in professional occupations, the return to foreign work 
experience for immigrant women employed in professional occupations who match their 
pre- and post-immigration “intelligence” factor is positive and has approximately the 
same magnitude as the baseline coefficient. If the return to foreign experience for the 
“intelligence” factor for female matchers employed in professional occupations was 
significant15 it would cover (െ0.021 ൅ 0.023 ൎ 0) the negative return to general foreign 
work experience. Moreover, it suggests that the baseline effect of foreign work 
experience on earnings is sensitive to the inclusion of the two-term interactions as its 
magnitude changes in specification (4) compared to previous specifications (Appendix 
B8). Interestingly, in the most expanded specification (i.e. (6), Appendix B8) the return to 
foreign experience interacted with French score for female immigrants in non-
professional occupations who match their “intelligence” factor is negative and 
significant. However, it still does not help in explaining the negative baseline return to 
foreign work experience as well as it does not affect the returns to foreign experience 
interacted with match variables alone.  
 7.2.4 University degree versus other education levels  
 Both male immigrant sub-samples receive slightly negative and statistically 
significant return to general foreign work experience (Table 7-2-4-A). Although, male 
immigrants with university degrees who obtain a match in the “intelligence” factor 
receive a moderate positive and statistically significant return to experience acquired 
abroad. The total effect of general foreign experience and the interaction of foreign 
                                                 
15 It is quite close to the significance level of 10%. 
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experience and “intelligence” match for immigrant men with university degree is still 
negligible (െ0.016 ൅ 0.011 ൌ െ0.005). The returns to foreign experience for immigrant 
men without university degrees who match any of the skill factors are not statistically 
significant. However, the effect of the foreign experience interacted with “intelligence” 
match is positive and fairly close to the significance region of 10%. 
 The baseline return to foreign experience for female immigrants with either type 
of education is slightly negative and mostly significant (Table 7-2-4-B). The return to 
general foreign work experience for immigrant women with a university degree slightly 
goes up and becomes statistically insignificant when we add the skill-match dummies 
(specification (3), Appendix B10) and also when we add their interactions with the 
foreign human capital variables (specification (4), Appendix B10). Immigrant women 
with a university degree who match their pre- and post-immigration “motor skills” factor 
obtain a positive and statistically significant return to pre-immigration work experience. 
Moreover, this return is big enough to overcome the negative baseline return. The total 
effect is moderate (െ0.007 ൅ 0.026 ൎ 0.020), but still suggests that female immigrants 
with a university degree obtained prior to immigration who match their “motor skills” 
factor are able to transfer some portion of their foreign work experience after 
immigration to Canada. We do not find any benefits for the returns to foreign experience 
from matching any type of skill factors for female immigrants without a university 
degree. 
In the most expended specification (i.e. (6)) we find that male immigrants with 
university education who match their “intelligence” skill factor receive a positive and
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Table 7-2-4-A. Returns to foreign experience for University educated vs. Other education levels, males, wave 3 
  University educated  Other education levels  
  (1)  (4)  (1)  (4)  
Experience  -0.015***  -0.016***  -0.009***  -0.009***  
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  
Experience ൈ “Intelligence” match    0.011*    0.020  
    (0.006)    (0.013)  
Experience ൈ “Motor skills” match    0.008    0.008  
    (0.006)    (0.009)  
Experience ൈ “Strength” match    0.014    -0.005  
    (0.012)    (0.005)  
          
School  +  +  +  +  
Language scores    +    +  
Match dummies    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ school    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ language scores    +    +  
ܴଶ  0.12  0.23  0.28  0.33  
N-weighted  30,341  30,341  11,781  11,781  
See notes for Table 7-2-2-A. 
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Table 7-2-4-B. Returns to foreign experience for University educated vs. Other education levels, females, wave 3 
  University educated  Other education levels  
  (1)  (4)  (1)  (4)  
Experience  -0.012***  -0.007  -0.009***  -0.007*  
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  
Experience ൈ “Intelligence” match    0.002    -0.027  
    (0.009)    (0.052)  
Experience ൈ “Motor skills” match    0.026*    0.001  
    (0.015)    (0.016)  
Experience ൈ “Strength” match    -0.007    -0.001  
    (0.016)    (0.007)  
          
School  +  +  +  +  
Language scores    +    +  
Match dummies    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ school    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ language scores    +    +  
ܴଶ  0.09  0.21  0.12  0.19  
N-weighted  19,943  19,943  10,294  10,294  
See notes for Table 7-2-2-A. 
 119 
 
statistically significant return to foreign experience interacted with French score 
(Appendix B9). From the same specification for females with university education who 
match their “motor skills” the return to foreign experience interacted with French score is 
negative and significant (Appendix B10). However, this three-term interaction does not 
affect the baseline return to foreign experience. Moreover, in the specification (6) the 
effect of matching “motor skills” on the return to foreign experience alone becomes 
smaller and insignificant compared to the specifications (4) and (5) (Appendix B10). 
 7.2.5 Visible minorities versus non-visible minorities 
 Both visible-minority and non-visible minority male and female immigrants 
receive a negligible return to general foreign work experience (Table 7-2-5-A and Table 
7-2-5-B). However, while the baseline return to foreign experience for male/female 
visible minorities is negative and significant, for immigrants who are not visible 
minorities it is closer to zero and is statistically insignificant. Neither of the male/female  
sub-samples receives any additional return to foreign work experience conditional on 
skill-match. 
From the most expanded specification (i.e. (6)) we also find that visible minority 
female immigrants receive a positive and significant return to foreign work experience 
interacted with French score (Appendix 12). This two-term interaction does not affect 
other coefficients for this sub-sample discussed earlier in the sub-section. 
7.2.6 Other possible sub-samples 
 From the descriptive statistics for males (Table 5-2-1) and females (Table 
5-2-2) in section 5.2 it can be noticed that source countries sorting into 
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Table 7-2-5-A. Returns to foreign experience for Visible minorities vs. Non-visible minorities, males, wave 3 
  Visible minorities  Non-visible minorities  
  (1)  (4)  (1)  (4)  
Experience  -0.014***  -0.015***  -0.004  -0.004  
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.005)  
Experience ൈ “Intelligence” match    0.008    0.010  
    (0.006)    (0.009)  
Experience ൈ “Motor skills” match    0.009    -0.004  
    (0.006)    (0.008)  
Experience ൈ “Strength” match    0.005    0.005  
    (0.006)    (0.011)  
          
School  +  +  +  +  
Language scores    +    +  
Match dummies    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ school    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ language scores    +    +  
ܴଶ  0.13  0.23  0.16  0.32  
N-weighted  33,377  33,377  8,705  8,705  
Note: All samples restricted to age-at-immigration between 25 and 59. Experience and School stand for years of foreign experience and schooling. Match 
dummies (e.g. “Intelligence” match) equal to 1 if there is a match and zero otherwise. All regressions control for months since immigration (msm), immigration 
category (Family (default); Skilled Workers principal applicants (PA’s); Skilled Workers not PA’s; Business/Nominees/Refugees/Others); residence region 
(Toronto (default); Montreal; QB; ON; AB; BC; Other); number of children in a household under the age of 18; marital status (single (default); married/common 
law). Bootstrap standard errors in brackets.  ***-significant and 1%; **-significant at 5%; *-significant at 10%. 
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Table 7-2-5-B. Returns to foreign experience for Visible minorities vs. Non-visible minorities, females, wave 3 
  Visible minorities  Non-visible minorities  
  (1)  (4)  (1)  (4)  
Experience  -0.010***  -0.009***  -0.008  -0.007  
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.007)  
Experience ൈ “Intelligence” match    0.000    0.006  
    (0.010)    (0.019)  
Experience ൈ “Motor skills” match    0.012    0.014  
    (0.013)    (0.022)  
Experience ൈ “Strength” match    0.000    0.010  
    (0.007)    (0.030)  
          
School  +  +  +  +  
Language scores    +    +  
Match dummies    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ school    +    +  
Match dummies ൈ language scores    +    +  
ܴଶ  0.09  0.24  0.12  0.19  
N-weighted  23,239  23,239  6,981  6,981  
See notes for Table 7-2-5-A.  
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non-visible minorities are the US, the UK, Australia, New Zealand and the like (so called 
“traditional” source-countries). We also ran regressions for regions within the “non-
traditional” region and found that results were broadly similar to those of visible minority 
sub-sample. Splitting the regions into countries produced unreliable coefficients 
regarding high VIF’s for many variables of interest, which suggested high collinearity. 
Similarly, splitting the samples by Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA’s) produced 
unreliable coefficients regarding high VIF’s. A sub-sample that only includes immigrants 
living in large CMA’s or a sub-sample that excludes immigrants living in Quebec 
produces results broadly similar to those of the full sample.  
 7.2.7 Months since immigration 
 The returns to months since immigration can be useful in understanding 
differences in assimilation processes of immigrant sub-samples  in Canada. Interestingly, 
the returns to months since immigration for males are usually weaker than for males 
across all sub-samples and all specifications. For instance, the returns to months since 
immigration are not statistically significant for either male Skilled Worker principal 
applicants or for males from other immigration categories (Appendix 3). However, the 
returns are statistically significant for females from other immigration categories and are 
between 4% and 4.6% across specifications, while the returns to months since 
immigration for females from other immigration categories are only statistically 
significant in the standard model (specification (1)) (Appendix 4). 
 Similarly, the return to months since immigration for both males employed either 
in regulated or unregulated occupations are not statistically significant (Appendix 5); 
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whereas, female immigrants employed in regulated occupations in wave 3 receive 
between 7.3% and 8% marginal return (Appendix 6). 
 Both males employed in professional and males employed in non-professional 
occupations receive statistically insignificant returns to months since immigration 
(Appendix 7). For females, the returns are sensitive to the inclusion of skill match 
dichotomous variables (Appendix 8). Thus, in specifications (1) and (2) our data suggest 
that females immigrants employed in professional occupations receive around 10% 
marginal return, while the magnitude is three times smaller and statistically insignificant 
for females employed in non-professional occupations. In specifications (3) though (6), 
the magnitudes are similar for these two female sub-samples, but the significance 
disappears for professionals and the coefficients become statistically significant to non-
professionals. 
 The returns to months since immigration are not statistically significant for male 
immigrants both with and without a university degree (Appendix 9). In contrast, both 
female sub-samples receive substantial and statistically significant returns to months 
since immigration across all specifications (Appendix 10). The returns range between 4% 
and 5.2% for females with a university degree and between 6% and 6.9% for females 
without university degree. 
 The sub-division into visible minorities and not visible minorities provides some 
interesting insight in assimilation differences (Appendix 11). The data suggest that only 
males who are not visible minorities receive substantial and statistically highly significant 
return to months since immigration that ranges between 7.5% and 9.9% across 
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specifications. In contrast, only female immigrants who are visible minorities receive 6% 
to 7.1% marginal return to months since immigration (Appendix 12). 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 Using longitudinal survey data on immigrants in Canada for 2001-2005 years and 
data on occupational characteristics from the Career Handbook, we construct 
occupational skill factors and explore direct and indirect effects of pre- and post-
immigration skill matching on immigrant earnings. We focus on how successful 
matching of immigrant pre- and post-immigration “intelligence”, “motors skills” or 
“strength” factor affects immigrant log wage returns to foreign experience. 
 Consistently with the previous literature we find that the return to foreign work 
experience for recent immigrants is negligible. In fact, our data suggest that it is mostly 
slightly negative. The exception  is the (endogenous) sub-sample of male immigrants 
employed in professional occupations and the sub-sample of males who are not visible 
minorities. For them, the return to foreign experience is zero return, instead of being 
negative. 
 Although immigrants receive some moderate returns to foreign experience when 
matching their pre- and post-immigration skill factors, the total effect with the baseline 
return to foreign experience is still negligible. First we employ a cross-sectional analysis 
and then follow with an analysis of sub-samples in wave 3. In the cross-sectional analysis 
we find that male immigrants who match their “intelligence” factor receive significant, 
but moderate return to foreign experience. For them, the return to foreign experience 
conditional on “intelligence” factor match of 1.1% still does not completely compensate 
the negative baseline return to foreign experience of -1.4%. We also find that in wave 1 
males who match their “motor skills” factor receive substantially negative return to 
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foreign experience of -3%. However, even substantially negative return to “motor skills”-
specific foreign experience does not explain negative baseline return to foreign 
experience 0f -0.7%.  Females who match their “strength” factor in wave 2 also receive a 
substantial positive return to foreign experience; moreover, it overcomes the baseline 
return, although the effect is lost in wave 3. 
We find that males receive negligible baseline return to foreign schooling. 
Moreover, the return to foreign schooling for males is only statistically significant in the 
standard model in wave 3. Goldmann et al. (2009) also find a negligible return to foreign 
schooling for male immigrants; they suggest that the LSIC, unlike other data sets used in 
most other studies on immigrants, allows sorting out immigrants who had ever received 
any of their schooling in Canada prior to immigrating to Canada. Similarly to Goldmann 
et al. (2009), we find that the return to foreign schooling in the standard model is bigger 
for females. Interestingly, it decreases over time. However, in more expanded models, the 
return to foreign schooling for females becomes smaller and eventually statistically 
insignificant with the inclusion of language scores, skill-match variables as well as the 
interactions of skill-matches and foreign human capital variables. Goldmann et al. (2009) 
also find that the return to foreign schooling for females is sensitive to language scores, 
occupational match dummies and their interactions with foreign human capital variables. 
We find evidence that males who match “intelligence” factor in wave 2 and males 
who match “motor skills” factor in wave 3 receive significant positive return to foreign 
schooling of around 3%.  Female immigrants who match “motor skills” factor in wave 3 
also receive substantial positive return to foreign schooling. 
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We then proceed to the analysis of sub-samples in wave 3. For many male and 
female sub-samples we find significant positive, but mostly moderate, returns to foreign 
experience conditional on matching different skills.  We find a significant positive return 
to potential foreign work experience for “intelligence” factor matchers within the sub-
sample of males who immigrated through Skilled Worker principal applicant category 
(0.016), the sub-sample of males who are employed in regulated occupations (0.020) and 
the sub-sample of males who received university education prior to immigrating (0.011). 
We also find a moderate return to foreign work experience for both male and female 
“motor skills” matchers who immigrated through categories other than Skilled Worker 
principal applicant (0.016 and 0.020 respectively), and university educated females 
(0.026). In the case of the third skill factor, only the sub-sample of male Skilled Worker 
principal applicants who match their “strength” factor receives a significant positive, but 
moderate, return to foreign experience (0.023). Notably, most of the returns to foreign 
experience conditional on skill-match together with (slightly negative) baseline return to 
foreign work experience result in zero total return. The only exception is the sub-sample 
of university educated females. For them, the total effect from baseline return and the 
return to foreign work experience conditional on matching their “motor skills” is around 
2%. 
It can be concluded that controlling for foreign experience conditional on skill 
matching does not help in explaining poor transferability of general foreign experience of 
recent immigrants in Canada. Moreover, in most cases, even a moderate positive return to 
foreign experience conditional on matching different skills together with the baseline 
return to foreign experience result in zero total effect.   
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Appendix A1. Average LFS employment, November, 2004 to November, 2005 
NOC group (3-digit grouping) Total Males Females Ratio 
Senior management occupations 91.82 70.23 21.59 3.25 
Other management occupations 1352.12 857.77 494.35 1.74 
Professional occupations in business 
and finance 
474.22 224.99 249.22 0.90 
Financial, secretarial and 
administrative occupations 
796.08 129.37 666.71 0.19 
Clerical occupations, including 
supervisors 
1611.83 464.90 1146.93 0.41 
Natural and applied sciences and 
related occupations 
1097.65 869.62 228.02 3.81 
Professional occupations in health, 
nurse supervisors and registered 
nurses 
448.21 98.18 350.03 0.28 
Technical, assisting and related 
occupations in health 
500.50 77.52 422.98 0.18 
Occupations in social science, 
government service and religion 
692.71 201.55 491.15 0.41 
Teachers and professors 633.45 222.11 411.34 0.54 
Occupations in art, culture, 
recreation and sport 
490.32 227.46 262.85 0.87 
Wholesale, technical, insurance, real 
estate sales specialists, and retail, 
wholesale and grain buyers 
526.19 343.22 182.98 1.88 
Retail salespersons, sales clerks, 
cashiers, including retail trade 
supervisors 
1027.62 322.45 705.17 0.46 
Chefs and cooks, and occupations in 
food and beverage service, including 
supervisors 
501.41 190.01 311.40 0.61 
Occupation in protective services 227.07 182.25 44.82 4.07 
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Childcare and home support 
workers 
189.19 15.48 173.72 0.09 
Sales and service occupations not 
elsewhere classified, including 
occupations in travel and 
accommodation, attendants in 
recreation and sport as well as 
supervisors 
1377.93 623.30 754.63 0.83 
Contractors and supervisors in 
trades and transportation 
245.35 232.72 12.64 18.41 
Construction trades 340.15 327.18 12.97 25.23 
Other trades occupations 885.86 836.39 49.47 16.91 
Transport and equipment operators 590.10 545.66 44.44 12.28 
Trades helpers, construction, and 
transportation laborers and related 
occupations 
330.11 290.85 39.26 7.41 
Occupations unique to primary 
industry 
572.84 458.58 114.26 4.01 
Machine operators and assemblers 
in manufacturing, including 
supervisors 
885.63 632.63 253.00 2.50 
Laborers in processing, 
manufacturing and utilities 
209.40 129.22 80.18 1.61 
Total 16097.74 8573.63 7524.11 1.14 
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Appendix A2. Distribution of scores for “Intelligence” factor 
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Appendix A3. Distribution of scores for “Motor Skills” factor 
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Appendix A4. Distribution of scores for “Strength” factor 
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Appendix A5. Cross-sectional means of variables 
  Males    Females  
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3  Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
Dependent variable        
Log weekly wages 6.35 6.38 6.44  6.00 6.01 6.04 
 (0.030) (0.019) (0.014)  (0.043) (0.030) (0.019) 
Independent variables        
Experience 14.62 14.51 14.27  13.52 13.88 13.54 
 (0.401) (0.254) (0.155)  (0.548) (0.299) (0.184) 
School years 15.55 15.57 15.77  15.34 15.28 15.26 
 (0.154) (0.097) (0.065)  (0.220) (0.125) (0.077) 
English  0.79 0.76 0.75  0.79 0.73 0.71 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.005)  (0.016) (0.010) (0.007) 
French  0.11 0.13 0.16  0.11 0.13 0.14 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.006)  (0.017) (0.011) (0.007) 
“Intelligence” match = 1 0.26 0.22 0.21  0.16 0.16 0.16 
(mF1)        
        
“Motor skills” match = 1 0.27 0.21 0.21  0.15 0.12 0.10 
(mF2)        
“Strength” match = 1 0.13 0.13 0.11  0.12 0.10 0.09 
(mF3)        
Other key characteristics         
Age 36.17 37.73 39.58  34.87 36.82 38.32 
 (0.344) (0.219) (0.135)  (0.509) (0.266) (0.162) 
Months since landing 6.91 19.68 22.91  6.79 19.84 22.84 
 (0.051) (0.040) (0.022)  (0.076) (0.050) (0.026) 
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Note: All continuous variables have bootstrap standard errors in brackets. 
 
Married/common law = 1 0.85 0.88 0.90  0.80 0.89 0.90 
        
Children18 0.90 0.96 1.06  0.79 0.90 1.05 
 (0.048) (0.032) (0.023)  (0.068) (0.034) (0.025) 
“Traditional” origin = 1 0.19 0.18 0.17  0.25 0.23 0.20 
        
Eastern Canada = 1 0.75 0.72 0.73  0.78 0.74 0.74 
        
N-weighted 10,244 22,290 42,122  5,045 14,920 30,237 
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Appendix A6. Means of variables by sub-samples of wave 3, males 
 Full sample Skilled Worker PA’s Regulated Professional University educated Visible minority 
  1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Log weekly wages 6.44 6.54 6.25 6.50 6.36 6.76 6.35 6.51 6.27 6.39 6.65 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.032) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.015) (0.026) 
Age 39.58 38.75 41.30 39.22 40.05 37.29 40.23 39.07 40.91 39.59 39.56 
 (0.135) (0.135) (0.306) (0.193) (0.247) (0.262) (0.169) (0.157) (0.340) (0.156) (0.310) 
Experience 14.27 12.58 17.77 13.72 14.98 10.72 15.27 12.65 18.42 14.44 13.59 
 (0.155) (0.142) (0.348) (0.216) (0.285) (0.276) (0.191) (0.160) (0.389) (0.180) (0.330) 
Schooling 15.77 16.63 13.99 15.95 15.54 17.02 15.42 16.86 12.98 15.60 16.44 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.132) (0.083) (0.111) (0.126) (0.075) (0.061) (0.123) (0.075) (0.143) 
Months since landing 22.91 22.93 22.88 22.89 22.95 22.91 22.92 22.90 22.94 22.91 22.93 
 (0.022) (0.028) (0.036) (0.029) (0.032) (0.045) (0.024) (0.026) (0.037) (0.025) (0.041) 
English score 0.75 0.78 0.68 0.76 0.73 0.79 0.73 0.77 0.68 0.76 0.71 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) 
French score 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.30 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.019) 
mF1 = 1 0.21 0.27 0.11 0.24 0.19 0.70 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.21 0.24 
            
mF2 = 1 0.21 0.25 0.11 0.27 0.12 0.45 0.14 0.24 0.13 0.19 0.28 
            
mF3 = 1  0.11 0.07 0.19 0.11 0.11 . 0.13 0.04 0.27 0.10 0.11 
            
Skilled Worker PA’s = 1 0.67 1 0 0.72 0.62 0.85 0.62 0.82 0.30 0.66 0.71 
            
Regulated = 1 0.56 0.6 0.49 1 0 0.64 0.54 0.59 0.50 0.54 0.66 
            
Professional = 1 0.22 0.28 0.10 0.25 0.18 1 0 0.29 0.04 0.22 0.23 
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University = 1 0.72 0.87 0.40 0.75 0.68 0.94 0.66 1 0 0.72 0.71 
            
Visible minority = 1 0.79 0.78 0.82 0.76 0.84 0.79 0.8 0.80 0.79 1 0 
            
“Traditional” origin = 1 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.20 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.01 0.78 
            
Eastern Canada = 1 0.73 0.80 0.60 0.74 0.73 0.76 0.73 0.77 0.65 0.73 0.76 
            
Married/common law = 
1 
0.90 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.92 0.86 0.91 0.90 
            
Children18 1.06 1.11 0.96 1.09 1.03 1.00 1.08 1.09 0.99 1.09 0.95 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.037) (0.030) (0.035) (0.045) (0.027) (0.027) (0.043) (0.027) (0.043) 
pre-imm. F1 score 0.70 0.92 0.24 0.74 0.65 1.1 0.59 0.98 -0.01 0.70 0.69 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.038) (0.026) (0.032) (0.032) (0.024) (0.019) (0.040) (0.023) (0.039) 
pre-imm. F2 score 0.70 0.88 0.34 0.80 0.58 0.88 0.65 0.82 0.41 0.68 0.78 
 (0.027) (0.032) (0.045) (0.035) (0.040) (0.051) (0.031) (0.032) (0.047) (0.031) (0.052) 
pre-imm. F3 score -0.18 -0.29 0.05 -0.17 -0.19 -0.41 -0.11 -0.36 0.29 -0.19 -0.13 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.036) (0.025) (0.028) (0.026) (0.022) (0.018) (0.043) (0.021) (0.039) 
post-imm. F1 score -0.10 0.16 -0.62 0.06 -0.3 1.25 -0.48 0.15 -0.72 -0.16 0.16 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.037) (0.032) (0.040) (0.016) (0.024) (0.030) (0.036) (0.030) (0.047) 
post-imm. F2 score 0.42 0.56 0.14 0.78 -0.05 1.00 0.26 0.49 0.24 0.38 0.58 
 (0.025) (0.032) (0.036) (0.037) (0.028) (0.049) (0.027) (0.031) (0.039) (0.029) (0.050) 
post-imm. F3 score 0.39 0.20 0.77 0.39 0.39 -0.46 0.63 0.20 0.88 0.44 0.19 
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.037) (0.030) (0.040) (0.020) (0.028) (0.029) (0.040) (0.028) (0.045) 
N-weighted 42,122 28,387 13,735 23,739 18,383 9,329 32,794 30,341 11,781 33,377 8,705 
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Appendix A7. Means of variables by sub-samples of wave 3, females 
 Full sample Skilled Worker PA’s Regulated Professional University educated Visible minority 
  1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Log weekly wages 6.04 6.26 5.96 6.08 6.02 6.33 5.96 6.15 5.84 6.02 6.14 
 (0.019) (0.037) (0.022) (0.032) (0.023) (0.05) (0.019) (0.026) (0.025) (0.021) (0.039) 
Age 38.32 38.17 38.38 38.10 38.49 37.32 38.6 37.85 39.24 38.16 38.85 
 (0.162) (0.3) (0.201) (0.272) (0.233) (0.35) (0.198) (0.202) (0.337) (0.188) (0.354) 
Experience 13.54 12.51 13.92 13.07 13.89 11.32 14.17 11.93 16.65 13.55 13.49 
 (0.184) (0.321) (0.228) (0.293) (0.266) (0.345) (0.226) (0.205) (0.379) (0.216) (0.378) 
Schooling 15.26 16.18 14.92 15.51 15.07 16.49 14.91 16.4 13.07 15.09 15.84 
 (0.077) (0.137) (0.089) (0.102) (0.11) (0.147) (0.086) (0.075) (0.115) (0.081) (0.186) 
Months since landing 22.84 22.91 22.81 22.83 22.85 22.9 22.82 22.87 22.79 22.83 22.89 
 (0.026) (0.051) (0.03) (0.04) (0.033) (0.057) (0.029) (0.033) (0.043) (0.03) (0.05) 
English score 0.71 0.78 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.75 0.70 0.76 0.62 0.71 0.71 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.01) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.012) 
French score 0.14 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.20 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.25 
 (0.007) (0.017) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.02) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.02) 
mF1 = 1 0.16 0.25 0.12 0.23 0.10 0.53 0.05 0.23 0.03 0.15 0.18 
            
mF2 = 1 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.16 0.05 0.27 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.12 
            
mF3 = 1  0.09 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.15 0.1 0.06 
            
Skilled Worker PA’s = 1 0.27 1 0 0.26 0.28 0.37 0.24 0.35 0.12 0.27 0.29 
            
Regulated = 1 0.43 0.41 0.44 1 0 0.75 0.34 0.45 0.39 0.42 0.47 
            
Professional = 1 0.22 0.30 0.19 0.38 0.1 1 0 0.28 0.10 0.21 0.26 
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University = 1 0.66 0.85 0.59 0.69 0.63 0.85 0.61 1 0 0.66 0.65 
            
Visible minority = 1 0.77 0.75 0.78 0.75 0.78 0.73 0.78 0.77 0.76 1 0 
            
“Traditional” origin = 1 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.23 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.01 0.83 
            
Eastern Canada = 1 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.75 0.73 0.77 0.68 0.73 0.75 
            
Married/common law = 
1 
0.90 0.79 0.94 0.91 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.89 
            
Children18 1.05 0.91 1.11 1.07 1.05 1.01 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.09 0.94 
 (0.025) (0.052) (0.028) (0.037) (0.034) (0.055) (0.028) (0.031) (0.042) (0.029) (0.052) 
pre-imm. F1 score 0.62 0.88 0.53 0.7 0.57 0.94 0.54 0.86 0.17 0.61 0.67 
 (0.023) (0.044) (0.028) (0.033) (0.032) (0.037) (0.028) (0.026) (0.042) (0.027) (0.043) 
pre-imm. F2 score 0.34 0.57 0.25 0.44 0.26 0.47 0.3 0.48 0.07 0.34 0.34 
 (0.032) (0.065) (0.035) (0.046) (0.042) (0.06) (0.037) (0.041) (0.045) (0.036) (0.062) 
pre-imm. F3 score -0.29 -0.37 -0.25 -0.29 -0.28 -0.39 -0.26 -0.41 -0.05 -0.28 -0.32 
 (0.019) (0.031) (0.024) (0.03) (0.025) (0.039) (0.022) (0.022) (0.036) (0.022) (0.036) 
post-imm. F1 score -0.23 0.13 -0.37 0.03 -0.44 0.86 -0.54 -0.01 -0.66 -0.29 -0.04 
 (0.027) (0.053) (0.03) (0.04) (0.035) (0.04) (0.025) (0.035) (0.035) (0.031) (0.051) 
post-imm. F2 score 0 0.17 -0.06 0.31 -0.24 0.33 -0.09 0.11 -0.21 0.01 -0.03 
 (0.026) (0.058) (0.03) (0.048) (0.025) (0.059) (0.029) (0.035) (0.036) (0.032) (0.05) 
post-imm. F3 score 0.19 -0.04 0.28 0.11 0.25 -0.3 0.33 0.07 0.43 0.24 0.02 
 (0.025) (0.047) (0.029) (0.033) (0.036) (0.042) (0.029) (0.031) (0.039) (0.029) (0.043) 
N-weighted 30,237 8,235 22,002 13,082 17,155 6,694 23,543 19,943 10,294 23,239 6,981 
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Appendix B1. Cross-sectional results from log wage regressions, males 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp -0.011** -0.010** -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.008* -0.012** -0.010** -0.008** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.012** -0.011** -0.010** -0.013** -0.014** -0.014** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
School 0.016 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.008 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.008+ 0.004 0.005 0 0.001 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
msm 0.027 0.032 0.037 0.033 0.035 0.038 -0.007 -0.009 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.001 0 0.001 0 0 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Eng  0.450** 0.318** 0.242 0.363* 0.397*  0.359** 0.276** 0.178+ 0.252* 0.263*  0.307** 0.217** 0.181* 0.237** 0.240** 
  (0.126) (0.113) (0.155) (0.177) (0.189)  (0.080) (0.076) (0.093) (0.107) (0.112)  (0.065) (0.061) (0.075) (0.080) (0.082) 
Fre  0.182 0.24 0.277 0.324 0.331  -0.076 -0.032 -0.162 -0.139 -0.13  -0.108 -0.103 -0.14 -0.137 -0.141 
  (0.202) (0.202) (0.264) (0.273) (0.293)  (0.103) (0.097) (0.100) (0.102) (0.102)  (0.079) (0.075) (0.087) (0.088) (0.090) 
mF1  0.335** 0.235** 0.268** 0.141   0.272** 0.139* 0.152** 0.122   0.259** 0.241** 0.253** 0.265** 
   (0.064) (0.078) (0.082) (0.137)   (0.044) (0.055) (0.056) (0.091)   (0.035) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) 
mF2  0.309** 0.260** 0.260** 0.274** 0.275** 0.246** 0.255** 0.257** 0.260** 0.262** 0.268** 0.259** 
   (0.062) (0.064) (0.065) (0.077) (0.039) (0.044) (0.045) (0.058) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) 
mF3  0.074 0.052 0.065 0.071   0.055 0.046 0.049 0.049   0.060+ 0.032 0.046 0.055 
   (0.060) (0.094) (0.095) (0.654)   (0.042) (0.051) (0.052) (0.056)   (0.034) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) 
Exp×mF1   0.016 0.017 0.014    0.008 0.009 0.01    0.011+ 0.010+ 0.009 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.017)    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Exp×mF2   -0.030** -0.030** -0.030**    -0.004 -0.003 -0.003    0.005 0.005 0.004 
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Exp×mF3   0.007 0.008 0.006    0.009 0.008 0.007    0.004 0.004 0.007 
    (0.008) (0.008) (0.118)    (0.006) (0.006) (0.010)    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
School×mF1   0.009 0 0.022    0.028+ 0.025 0.034    0.009 0 -0.006 
    (0.025) (0.026) (0.057)    (0.015) (0.016) (0.027)    (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) 
School×mF2   -0.016 -0.018 -0.034    0.014 0.012 0.01    0.030** 0.029* 0.026* 
    (0.025) (0.029) (0.033)    (0.016) (0.016) (0.020)    (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
School×mF3   0.019 0.022 0.009    0.006 0.006 0.002    -0.014 -0.009 -0.003 
    (0.026) (0.026) (0.270) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) 
mF1×Eng   1.282** 1.075* 1.468* 1.115** 1.028** 1.111** 0.377+ 0.3 0.245 
    (0.394) (0.422) (0.577) (0.225) (0.233) (0.329) (0.194) (0.195) (0.199) 
mF2×Eng   0.049 -0.05 0.011    0.187 0.11 0.101    -0.119 -0.18 -0.148 
    (0.281) (0.302) (0.335)    (0.207) (0.216) (0.233)    (0.153) (0.152) (0.148) 
mF3×Eng   -0.187 -0.016 0.1    -0.07 0.003 -0.136    0.069 0.212 0.135 
    (0.237) (0.226) (0.308)    (0.169) (0.174) (0.231)    (0.134) (0.132) (0.169) 
mF1×Fre   0.509+ 0.487 0.759    0.384** 0.353* 0.359+    0.128 0.106 0.065 
    (0.291) (0.297) (0.503)    (0.140) (0.149) (0.210)    (0.125) (0.126) (0.151) 
mF2×Fre   -0.191 -0.157 -0.29    0.074 0.058 0.065    0.033 0.006 0.051 
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    (0.249) (0.258) (0.433)    (0.124) (0.125) (0.174)    (0.110) (0.109) (0.118) 
mF3×Fre   -0.633 -0.586 -0.316    -0.028 -0.002 0.029    0.012 0.059 0.081 
    (0.771) (0.772) (5.745)    (0.200) (0.203) (0.253)    (0.109) (0.111) (0.134) 
Exp×Eng    0.002 0.012     -0.008 -0.005     0.007 0.002 
     (0.012) (0.015)     (0.008) (0.009)     (0.006) (0.007) 
Exp×Fre    0.017 0.011     0.003 0.005     0 -0.008 
     (0.017) (0.024)     (0.008) (0.009)     (0.009) (0.012) 
School×Eng    0.067+ 0.100*     0.019 0.037     0.068** 0.054** 
     (0.038) (0.048)     (0.023) (0.026)     (0.017) (0.021) 
School×Fre    0.034 0.008     0.013 0.012     0.019 0.002 
     (0.041) (0.061)     (0.019) (0.024)     (0.016) (0.019) 
mF1×Exp×Eng     0.031      -0.008      0.012 
     (0.082)  (0.035) (0.029) 
mF1×Exp×Fre    0.028  -0.013 0.024 
      (0.076)      (0.027)      (0.021) 
mF1×School×Eng     -0.158      -0.078      0.065 
      (0.274)      (0.117)      (0.068) 
mF1× School ×Fre     -0.099      -0.03      0.077+ 
      (0.211)      (0.056)      (0.043) 
mF2×Exp×Eng     -0.015      -0.002      0.027 
      (0.045)      (0.032)      (0.021) 
mF2×Exp×Fre     -0.002      0.006      0.01 
      (0.061)      (0.021)      (0.018) 
mF2×School×Eng     -0.043      0.004      0.021 
      (0.138)      (0.101)      (0.049) 
mF2× School ×Fre     0.101      0.004      0 
      (0.138)      (0.061)      (0.041) 
mF3×Exp×Eng    -0.045  -0.009 0.008 
     (0.030)  (0.023) (0.016) 
mF3×Exp×Fre    0.033  -0.013 0.026 
      (1.050)      (0.064)      (0.020) 
mF3×School×Eng     -0.101      -0.065      0.01 
      (0.092)      (0.062)      (0.044) 
mF3× School ×Fre     0.012      0.023      0.053 
      (2.403)      (0.127)      (0.047) 
ܴଶ 0.24 0.26 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.23 0.24 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.17 0.18 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.27 
N 10,244 10,244 10,244 10,244 10,244 10,244 22,291 22,291 22,291 22,291 22,291 22,291 42,122 42,122 42,122 42,122 42,122 42,122 
Note: Immigrants’ age is 25 to 59. mF1, mF2, mF3 indicates a match between pre- and post-immigration “intelligence”, “motor skills” and “strength” factor respectively. All regressions control for months since immigration (msm). 
Additional controls: immigration category (Family (default); Skilled Workers principal applicants (PA’s); Skilled Workers not PA’s; Business/Nominees/Refugees/Others); birth region  (US/Western Europe/ UK/ Other Northern Europe/ 
Oceania (default); Central & S America/Caribbean & Bermuda; E Europe; S Europe; Africa; W Central Asia & Middle East; E Asia; Southeastern Asia; S Asia); residence region (Toronto (default); Montreal; QB; ON; AB; BC; Other); 
number of children in household under the age of 18; marital status (single (default); married/common law). Bootstrap standard errors in brackets. **-significant at 1%; *-significant at 5%; +-significant at 10%. 
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     Appendix B2. Cross-sectional results from log wage regressions, females 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp -0.007 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.007+ -0.005 -0.004 -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* -0.010** -0.008** -0.006* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
School 0.048* 0.044+ 0.019 0.009 0.014 0.014 0.037** 0.031* 0.017 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.019* 0.013 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.004 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.017) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
msm -0.042 -0.041 -0.045 -0.055 -0.052 -0.050 -0.020 -0.022 -0.022 -0.017 -0.018 -0.019 0.052** 0.050** 0.046** 0.048** 0.048** 0.047** 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) (0.044) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) 
Eng  0.561* 0.420+ 0.45 0.503 0.513  0.471** 0.417** 0.240+ 0.286+ 0.303*  0.453** 0.390** 0.337** 0.392** 0.380** 
  (0.260) (0.220) (0.276) (0.311) (0.357)  (0.165) (0.160) (0.143) (0.149) (0.153)  (0.090) (0.087) (0.094) (0.100) (0.103) 
Fre  -0.103 -0.12 -0.209 -0.17 -0.215  0.116 0.107 -0.116 -0.111 -0.073  0.167 0.166 0.151 0.155 0.135 
  (0.255) (0.206) (0.278) (0.297) (0.338)  (0.203) (0.193) (0.182) (0.184) (0.186)  (0.121) (0.115) (0.127) (0.125) (0.126) 
mF1  0.674** 0.563** 0.582** 0.613   0.334** 0.211+ 0.217+ 0.269   0.364** 0.349** 0.354** 0.407** 
   (0.106) (0.162) (0.165) (0.567)   (0.085) (0.117) (0.118) (0.205)   (0.056) (0.062) (0.064) (0.084) 
mF2  0.269* 0.111 0.122 0.068   0.558** 0.502** 0.508** 0.389*   0.403** 0.388** 0.396** 0.399** 
   (0.125) (0.208) (0.213) (4.381)   (0.109) (0.103) (0.106) (0.182)   (0.059) (0.056) (0.057) (0.069) 
mF3  -0.006 -0.032 -0.043 -0.004   0.056 0.055 0.048 -0.054   0.120+ 0.123+ 0.109 0.107 
   (0.120) (0.201) (0.221) (4.302)   (0.122) (0.167) (0.169) (0.212)   (0.062) (0.072) (0.074) (0.078) 
Exp×mF1   0.025 0.03 0.039    0.013 0.013 0.018    0 -0.001 0.003 
    (0.024) (0.025) (0.099)    (0.015) (0.015) (0.020)    (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Exp×mF2   -0.039 -0.038 -0.054    -0.032 -0.031 -0.044    0.012 0.015 0.012 
    (0.029) (0.030) (0.774)    (0.021) (0.021) (0.034)    (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
Exp×mF3   -0.008 -0.009 -0.008    0.043+ 0.043+ 0.027    0 -0.001 -0.002 
    (0.025) (0.027) (0.506)    (0.022) (0.023) (0.027)    (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
School×mF1   0.122 0.118 0.145    0.035 0.033 0.028    -0.023 -0.028 -0.031 
    (0.077) (0.079) (0.378)    (0.039) (0.039) (0.048)    (0.025) (0.027) (0.032) 
School×mF2   -0.063 -0.065 -0.083    0.03 0.023 0.038    0.059* 0.060* 0.053+ 
    (0.082) (0.083) (0.642)    (0.040) (0.040) (0.073)    (0.025) (0.026) (0.032) 
School×mF3   -0.049 -0.061 0.033    0.029 0.033 0.006    -0.004 0 0.005 
    (0.079) (0.086) (1.508)    (0.064) (0.064) (0.122)    (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
mF1×Eng   0.328 0.262 0.294    1.157* 1.056* 0.897    0.434 0.356 0.197 
    (0.812) (0.843) (1.592)    (0.520) (0.519) (0.788)    (0.285) (0.287) (0.347) 
mF2×Eng   -0.209 -0.329 0.239    -1.186* -1.166* -1.220*    -0.207 -0.245 -0.34 
    (1.025) (1.047) (1.994)    (0.514) (0.507) (0.568)    (0.241) (0.243) (0.269) 
mF3×Eng   0.191 0.324 -0.386    1.044 1.094+ 1.364    0.238 0.369 0.514 
    (0.634) (0.694) (10.234)    (0.652) (0.665) (0.943)    (0.244) (0.252) (0.327) 
mF1×Fre   0.489 0.578 -0.208    0.809** 0.819** 0.543    0.183 0.068 0.007 
    (0.573) (0.575) (6.119)    (0.286) (0.304) (0.497)    (0.210) (0.239) (0.346) 
mF2×Fre   -0.509 -0.388 -1.888    -0.51 -0.484 -0.638    -0.19 -0.193 -0.173 
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    (0.880) (0.910) (73.983)    (0.482) (0.491) (1.284)    (0.221) (0.228) (0.361) 
mF3×Fre   -0.098 -0.053 -0.617    0.306 0.332 -1.196    0.034 0.061 0.098 
    (1.056) (1.202) (22.481)    (0.733) (0.762) (1.513)    (0.266) (0.272) (0.337) 
Exp×Eng    -0.015 -0.015     0.002 -0.009     -0.011 -0.003 
     (0.025) (0.030)     (0.013) (0.012)     (0.007) (0.009) 
Exp×Fre    -0.006 0.004     0.001 -0.002     0.012 0.019 
     (0.032) (0.036)     (0.016) (0.018)     (0.014) (0.018) 
School×Eng    -0.003 0.007     0.04 0.028     0.031 0.035 
     (0.078) (0.106)     (0.040) (0.039)     (0.025) (0.029) 
School×Fre    -0.077 -0.045     -0.001 -0.009     0.067 0.081 
     (0.073) (0.088)     (0.051) (0.056)     (0.047) (0.058) 
mF1×Exp×Eng     -0.076      0.008      -0.036 
      (0.389)      (0.076)      (0.038) 
mF1×Exp×Fre     -0.196      0.01      -0.023 
      (0.655)      (0.048)      (0.031) 
mF1×School×Eng     -0.314      0.136      0.086 
      (1.191)      (0.331)      (0.159) 
mF1× School ×Fre     -0.213      0.144      0.01 
      (3.052)      (0.182)      (0.133) 
mF2×Exp×Eng     0.096      0.077      -0.016 
      (0.375)      (0.146)      (0.049) 
mF2×Exp×Fre     -0.161      0.069      -0.064 
      (6.668)      (0.144)      (0.040) 
mF2×School×Eng     -0.056      -0.079      -0.114 
      (1.306)      (0.198)      (0.095) 
mF2× School ×Fre     0.006      0.11      -0.174 
      (5.371)      (0.434)      (0.161) 
mF3×Exp×Eng     0.022      0.065      -0.019 
      (0.689)      (0.064)      (0.019) 
mF3×Exp×Fre     0.117      -0.196      0.002 
      (4.042)      (0.196)      (0.039) 
mF3×School×Eng     0.001      0.185      0.028 
      (2.674)      (0.186)      (0.061) 
mF3× School ×Fre     1.094      -0.485      -0.029 
      (10.419)      (0.828)      (0.108) 
ܴଶ 0.26 0.29 0.47 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.15 0.16 0.26 0.3 0.31 0.32 0.11 0.13 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.23 
N 5,045 5,045 5,045 5,045 5,045 5,045 14,920 14,920 14,920 14,920 14,920 14,920 30,237 30,237 30,237 30,237 30,237 30,237 
See notes for Appendix B1. 
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                            Appendix B3. Log wage regressions for Skilled Worker principal applicants vs. Other immigration categories, males, wave 3 
 Skilled Worker principal applicants  Other immigration categories 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016***  -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
School 0.009 0.008 0.008 0 -0.005 -0.002  0.004 0 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
msm -0.001 -0.003 -0.010 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009  0.014 0.012 0.022 0.026 0.028 0.029 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)  (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
Eng  0.498*** 0.351*** 0.296*** 0.219* 0.241*   0.186** 0.122 0.122 0.216* 0.237* 
  (0.102) (0.096) (0.113) (0.124) (0.124)   (0.092) (0.089) (0.111) (0.127) (0.126) 
Fre  -0.039 -0.054 -0.071 -0.118 -0.122   -0.151 -0.154 -0.209 -0.193 -0.203 
  (0.104) (0.098) (0.115) (0.121) (0.120)   (0.129) (0.120) (0.135) (0.133) (0.136) 
mF1   0.203*** 0.198*** 0.213*** 0.220***    0.421*** 0.385*** 0.382*** 0.374*** 
   (0.040) (0.053) (0.053) (0.075)    (0.067) (0.073) (0.072) (0.075) 
mF2   0.293*** 0.303*** 0.302*** 0.295***    0.176*** 0.212*** 0.196*** 0.219*** 
   (0.036) (0.041) (0.040) (0.061)    (0.056) (0.060) (0.061) (0.076) 
mF3   0.001 0 -0.003 0.006    0.106** 0.052 0.103 0.117 
   (0.048) (0.054) (0.053) (0.077)    (0.046) (0.068) (0.070) (0.088) 
Exp×mF1    0.016** 0.016** 0.013     -0.001 -0.004 -0.008 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)     (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) 
Exp×mF2    0.002 0.001 -0.001     0.016** 0.017** 0.015 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)     (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
Exp×mF3    0.023** 0.024*** 0.021*     -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)     (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
School×mF1    0.014 0.004 -0.004     0.009 -0.004 -0.015 
    (0.014) (0.015) (0.022)     (0.029) (0.029) (0.037) 
School×mF2    0.019 0.022 0.017     0.036* 0.034* 0.032 
    (0.015) (0.015) (0.019)     (0.019) (0.018) (0.025) 
School×mF3    0.01 0.014 0.017     -0.026 -0.013 -0.009 
    (0.022) (0.022) (0.028)     (0.017) (0.016) (0.026) 
mF1×Eng    0.416 0.391 0.355     0.385 0.262 0.282 
    (0.259) (0.260) (0.286)     (0.342) (0.332) (0.379) 
mF2×Eng    -0.311 -0.334* -0.295     -0.088 -0.076 -0.127 
    (0.201) (0.202) (0.231)     (0.253) (0.256) (0.327) 
mF3×Eng    0.375 0.479 0.365     -0.05 0.053 -0.037 
    (0.297) (0.300) (0.331)     (0.155) (0.157) (0.240) 
mF1×Fre    0.121 0.099 0.101     0.257 0.213 0.144 
    (0.154) (0.153) (0.187)     (0.240) (0.248) (0.325) 
mF2×Fre    -0.054 -0.082 0.02     0.089 0.018 0.102 
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Note: The sample is restricted to age between 25 and 59 at the time of immigration. mF1, mF2, mF3 indicates a match between pre- and post-immigration “intelligence”, “motor skills” and “strength” factor 
respectively. All regressions control for months since immigration (msm). Additional controls are:; birth region  (US/W Europe/ UK/ Other N Europe/ Oceania (default); Central & South America/Caribbean & 
Bermuda; E Europe; S Europe; Africa; West central Asia & Middle East; E Asia; Southeastern Asia; S Asia); residence region (Toronto (default); Montreal; QB; ON; AB; BC; Other); number of children in household 
under the age of 18; marital status (single (default); married/common law). Bootstrap standard errors in brackets. ***-significant at 1%; **-significant at 5%; *-significant at 10%. 
    (0.131) (0.129) (0.150)     (0.239) (0.239) (0.445) 
mF3×Fre    0.233 0.281 0.28     -0.156 -0.154 0.027 
    (0.170) (0.177) (0.215)     (0.176) (0.185) (0.354) 
Exp×Eng     0.008 -0.008      0.007 0.008 
     (0.015) (0.018)      (0.007) (0.008) 
Exp×Fre     -0.013 -0.027      0.026** 0.029** 
     (0.013) (0.017)      (0.011) (0.013) 
School×Eng     0.096** 0.051      0.064*** 0.077*** 
     (0.040) (0.056)      (0.021) (0.024) 
School×Fre     0.023 -0.003      0.023 0.013 
     (0.023) (0.028)      (0.027) (0.031) 
mF1×Exp×Eng      0.02       0.009 
      (0.047)       (0.051) 
mF1×Exp×Fre      0.018       0.015 
      (0.028)       (0.046) 
mF1×School×Eng      0.074       -0.067 
      (0.105)       (0.162) 
mF1×School×Fre      0.042       0.095 
      (0.054)       (0.142) 
mF2×Exp×Eng      0.041       0.036 
      (0.040)       (0.037) 
mF2×Exp×Fre      0.037       -0.056 
      (0.025)       (0.072) 
mF2×School×Eng      0.061       0 
      (0.096)       (0.097) 
mF2×School×Fre      0.047       -0.148 
      (0.060)       (0.149) 
mF3×Exp×Eng      0.031       -0.012 
      (0.060)       (0.019) 
mF3×Exp×Fre      0.035       0.009 
      (0.039)       (0.052) 
mF3×School×Eng      0.052       -0.048 
      (0.142)       (0.054) 
mF3×School×Fre      0.027       0.083 
      (0.092)       (0.136) 
ܴଶ 0.10 0.12 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.23  0.20 0.21 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.31 
N-weighted 28,387 28,387 28,387 28,387 28,387 28,387  13,735 13,735 13,735 13,735 13,735 13,735 
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                            Appendix B4. Log wage regressions for Skilled Worker principal applicants vs. Other immigration categories, females, wave 3 
 Skilled Worker principal applicants  Other immigration categories 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp -0.010* -0.01 -0.006 -0.011* -0.012 -0.012  -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006* -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
School 0.021 0.018 0.003 -0.013 -0.014 -0.02  0.023** 0.011 0.008 0.01 0.015 0.015 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.024) (0.030) (0.031)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
msm 0.078* 0.078* 0.050 0.045 0.047 0.044  0.040* 0.036 0.041* 0.045* 0.046** 0.044* 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040)  (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
Eng  0.483** 0.432* 0.485* 0.477* 0.470*   0.516*** 0.448*** 0.354*** 0.417*** 0.390*** 
  (0.240) (0.223) (0.254) (0.262) (0.270)   (0.096) (0.093) (0.102) (0.111) (0.114) 
Fre  -0.058 -0.005 -0.017 -0.022 -0.053   0.396** 0.352** 0.286* 0.272* 0.27 
  (0.183) (0.179) (0.183) (0.187) (0.192)   (0.159) (0.154) (0.172) (0.164) (0.168) 
mF1   0.350*** 0.418*** 0.427*** 0.268    0.346*** 0.342*** 0.364*** 0.411*** 
   (0.065) (0.092) (0.097) (0.173)    (0.080) (0.089) (0.089) (0.115) 
mF2   0.444*** 0.287** 0.296** 0.369    0.382*** 0.407*** 0.416*** 0.409*** 
   (0.080) (0.124) (0.127) (0.784)    (0.083) (0.079) (0.080) (0.100) 
mF3   0.102 -0.675 -0.67 -2.343    0.108 0.116 0.105 0.109 
   (0.202) (1.410) (1.415) (27.655)    (0.068) (0.080) (0.083) (0.087) 
Exp×mF1    0.014 0.016 0.021     -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 
    (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)     (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Exp×mF2    -0.007 -0.008 -0.011     0.020* 0.023* 0.018 
    (0.019) (0.019) (0.134)     (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) 
Exp×mF3    -0.023 -0.025 -0.005     -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
    (0.062) (0.062) (5.894)     (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
School×mF1    -0.008 -0.005 0.077     -0.052* -0.065** -0.071* 
    (0.062) (0.061) (0.071)     (0.030) (0.031) (0.040) 
School×mF2    0.073 0.066 0.012     0.052 0.05 0.037 
    (0.060) (0.061) (0.360)     (0.033) (0.034) (0.048) 
School×mF3    -0.07 -0.075 0.807     -0.003 0.003 0.006 
    (0.240) (0.236) (8.597)     (0.023) (0.024) (0.026) 
mF1×Eng    -0.495 -0.535 -0.176     0.786** 0.663* 0.508 
    (0.369) (0.399) (0.580)     (0.385) (0.382) (0.493) 
mF2×Eng    0.008 0.019 0.009     -0.082 -0.1 -0.265 
    (0.501) (0.510) (0.696)     (0.313) (0.323) (0.406) 
mF3×Eng    3.81 3.795 5.641     0.125 0.281 0.457 
    (4.924) (4.907) (63.865)     (0.248) (0.256) (0.344) 
mF1×Fre    -0.143 -0.106 0.469     0.395 0.253 -0.089 
    (0.254) (0.269) (0.500)     (0.295) (0.333) (0.792) 
mF2×Fre    -0.127 -0.106 -0.773     0.079 0.138 -0.11 
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    See notes for Appendix B3.
   (0.414) (0.424) (7.769)     (0.291) (0.307) (0.575) 
mF3×Fre    2.376 2.408 5.469     -0.183 -0.153 -0.112 
    (2.870) (2.840) (85.387)     (0.263) (0.301) (0.385) 
Exp×Eng     0.008 0.016      -0.01 0 
     (0.030) (0.037)      (0.008) (0.009) 
Exp×Fre     -0.006 0      0.022 0.03 
     (0.019) (0.025)      (0.016) (0.021) 
School×Eng     0.018 0.051      0.04 0.042 
     (0.111) (0.132)      (0.026) (0.031) 
School×Fre     -0.032 0.009      0.104* 0.117 
     (0.071) (0.081)      (0.063) (0.078) 
mF1×Exp×Eng      -0.041       -0.059 
      (0.082)       (0.054) 
mF1×Exp×Fre      -0.046       -0.028 
      (0.048)       (0.061) 
mF1×School×Eng      -0.62       0.042 
      (0.420)       (0.237) 
mF1×School×Fre      -0.505*       0.113 
      (0.262)       (0.211) 
mF2×Exp×Eng      -0.025       -0.027 
      (0.160)       (0.068) 
mF2×Exp×Fre      0.018       -0.087 
      (0.911)       (0.073) 
mF2×School×Eng      0.467       -0.126 
      (0.414)       (0.127) 
mF2×School×Fre      0.466       -0.195 
      (2.442)       (0.273) 
mF3×Exp×Eng      0.145       -0.025 
      (19.985)       (0.020) 
mF3×Exp×Fre      0.608       -0.01 
      (7.390)       (0.048) 
mF3×School×Eng      -4.71       0.025 
      (19.781)       (0.065) 
mF3×School×Fre      -2.638       -0.098 
      (57.737)       (0.127) 
ܴଶ 0.09 0.11 0.27 0.31 0.31 0.33  0.09 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.20 
N-weighted 8,235 8,235 8,235 8,235 8,235 8,235  22,002 22,002 22,002 22,002 22,002 22,002 
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                            Appendix B5. Log wage regressions for Regulated vs. Unregulated occupations, males, wave 3 
 Regulated  Unregulated 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.008** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.015***  -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
School 0.008 0.004 0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007  0.007 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.009 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
msm -0.012 -0.014 -0.010 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009  0.026 0.026 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.016 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)  (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Eng  0.384*** 0.308*** 0.247** 0.327*** 0.323***   0.224** 0.133 0.084 0.093 0.116 
  (0.097) (0.094) (0.118) (0.122) (0.124)   (0.090) (0.086) (0.097) (0.107) (0.111) 
Fre  -0.083 -0.084 -0.181 -0.197* -0.206*   -0.171 -0.147 -0.153 -0.129 -0.139 
  (0.099) (0.092) (0.116) (0.118) (0.125)   (0.139) (0.138) (0.143) (0.147) (0.151) 
mF1   0.208*** 0.191*** 0.201*** 0.245***    0.327*** 0.291*** 0.300*** 0.250*** 
   (0.047) (0.057) (0.056) (0.063)    (0.052) (0.062) (0.063) (0.083) 
mF2   0.214*** 0.202*** 0.213*** 0.191***    0.346*** 0.405*** 0.410*** 0.447*** 
   (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041)    (0.055) (0.070) (0.070) (0.122) 
mF3   0.046 0.054 0.059 0.084*    0.085* 0.011 0.018 -0.04 
   (0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049)    (0.050) (0.075) (0.076) (0.092) 
Exp×mF1    0.020*** 0.019** 0.023*     -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 
    (0.007) (0.008) (0.012)     (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
Exp×mF2    0.003 0.004 0.004     0.008 0.008 0.011 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)     (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) 
Exp×mF3    0.007 0.006 0.006     -0.001 0 0.013 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)     (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) 
School×mF1    0.012 0.009 0.01     0.009 0 0.004 
    (0.017) (0.018) (0.023)     (0.016) (0.018) (0.025) 
School×mF2    0.035** 0.033** 0.034**     0.016 0.013 0.002 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)     (0.022) (0.022) (0.036) 
School×mF3    -0.006 0 0.012     -0.033* -0.031* -0.026 
    (0.018) (0.018) (0.020)     (0.019) (0.018) (0.030) 
mF1×Eng    0.508* 0.392 0.294     0.369 0.328 0.467 
    (0.284) (0.282) (0.287)     (0.305) (0.312) (0.374) 
mF2×Eng    0.024 -0.089 -0.062     -0.616* -0.594* -0.723 
    (0.205) (0.203) (0.196)     (0.357) (0.358) (0.487) 
mF3×Eng    -0.157 0.035 0.096     0.264 0.350** -0.062 
    (0.249) (0.225) (0.247)     (0.164) (0.168) (0.270) 
mF1×Fre    0.245 0.208 0.157     -0.028 -0.006 -0.035 
    (0.173) (0.174) (0.206)     (0.196) (0.205) (0.335) 
mF2×Fre    0.08 0.023 0.093     -0.034 -0.04 0.161 
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Note: Immigrants’ age is 25 to 59. mF1, mF2, mF3 indicate a match between pre- and post-immigration “intelligence”, “motor skills” and “strength” factor respectively. All regressions control for months since 
immigration (msm). Additional controls: immigration category (Family (default); Skilled Workers principal applicants (PA’s); Skilled Workers not PA’s; Business/Nominees/Refugees/Others); birth region  (US/W 
Europe/ UK/ N Europe/ Oceania (default); C & S America/Caribbean & Bermuda; E Europe; S Europe; Africa; W C Asia & M East; E Asia; SE Asia; S Asia); residence region (Toronto (default); Montreal; QB; ON; 
AB; BC; Other); number of children in household under 18; marital status (single; married/common law). Bootstrap standard errors in brackets. ***-significant at 1%; **-significant at 5%; *-significant at 10%. 
    (0.141) (0.139) (0.150)     (0.242) (0.243) (0.442) 
mF3×Fre    -0.071 0.042 0.081     0.097 0.043 -0.176 
    (0.163) (0.155) (0.204)     (0.205) (0.210) (0.336) 
Exp×Eng     0.007 0.009      0.007 -0.004 
     (0.010) (0.012)      (0.007) (0.008) 
Exp×Fre     0 -0.005      -0.002 -0.01 
     (0.014) (0.022)      (0.013) (0.014) 
School×Eng     0.098*** 0.084**      0.038 0.028 
     (0.029) (0.038)      (0.024) (0.029) 
School×Fre     0.050** 0.04      -0.014 -0.031 
     (0.023) (0.030)      (0.022) (0.026) 
mF1×Exp×Eng      -0.038       0.048 
      (0.055)       (0.050) 
mF1×Exp×Fre      0.004       0.024 
      (0.037)       (0.039) 
mF1×School×Eng      0.052       -0.009 
      (0.117)       (0.102) 
mF1×School×Fre      0.08       0.067 
      (0.070)       (0.084) 
mF2×Exp×Eng      0.024       0.014 
      (0.026)       (0.076) 
mF2×Exp×Fre      0.004       0.06 
      (0.023)       (0.073) 
mF2×School×Eng      -0.063       0.172 
      (0.077)       (0.144) 
mF2×School×Fre      -0.062       0.101 
      (0.054)       (0.193) 
mF3×Exp×Eng      -0.004       0.036** 
      (0.027)       (0.018) 
mF3×Exp×Fre      0.024       0.072 
      (0.026)       (0.080) 
mF3×School×Eng      0.078       -0.007 
      (0.080)       (0.058) 
mF3×School×Fre      0.062       0.099 
      (0.066)       (0.165) 
ܴଶ 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.22  0.23 0.24 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 
N-weighted 23,739 23,739 23,739 23,739 23,739 23,739  18,383 18,383 18,383 18,383 18,383 18,383 
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                            Appendix B6. Log wage regressions for Regulated vs. Unregulated occupations, females, wave 3 
 Regulated occupations  Unregulated occupations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp -0.009** -0.007* -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006  -0.010*** -0.008** -0.007* -0.007* -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
School 0.030** 0.023* 0.018 0.027* 0.030* 0.028*  0.011 0.006 -0.004 -0.011 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
msm 0.080** 0.080** 0.073** 0.080** 0.083** 0.075**  0.038 0.035 0.035 0.032 0.030 0.031 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)  (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
Eng  0.584*** 0.524*** 0.365** 0.377** 0.378**   0.387*** 0.334*** 0.339*** 0.405*** 0.401*** 
  (0.159) (0.157) (0.177) (0.188) (0.190)   (0.119) (0.108) (0.122) (0.129) (0.133) 
Fre  0.074 0.16 0.038 0.04 -0.032   0.263 0.222 0.252 0.29 0.299 
  (0.195) (0.194) (0.213) (0.215) (0.226)   (0.171) (0.153) (0.169) (0.179) (0.190) 
mF1   0.248*** 0.266*** 0.275*** 0.525***    0.583*** 0.521*** 0.524*** 0.526*** 
   (0.081) (0.089) (0.089) (0.120)    (0.062) (0.081) (0.084) (0.129) 
mF2   0.459*** 0.457*** 0.464*** 0.472**    0.264*** 0.205** 0.209** 0.228 
   (0.088) (0.091) (0.094) (0.226)    (0.079) (0.091) (0.096) (0.143) 
mF3   0.145 0.183 0.166 0.142    0.107 0.096 0.078 0.089 
   (0.121) (0.146) (0.145) (0.453)    (0.067) (0.076) (0.086) (0.121) 
Exp×mF1    0.001 0.002 0.006     -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 
    (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)     (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) 
Exp×mF2    0.016 0.02 0.023     0.005 0.009 0.008 
    (0.014) (0.015) (0.028)     (0.016) (0.017) (0.025) 
Exp×mF3    -0.011 -0.013 -0.018     0.003 0.003 0.002 
    (0.016) (0.017) (0.081)     (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) 
School×mF1    -0.053 -0.06 -0.117**     0 -0.002 -0.008 
    (0.037) (0.039) (0.049)     (0.036) (0.038) (0.045) 
School×mF2    0.021 0.02 -0.006     0.067** 0.071** 0.073 
    (0.042) (0.043) (0.106)     (0.032) (0.034) (0.051) 
School×mF3    -0.01 -0.004 -0.002     0.002 0.005 0.016 
    (0.046) (0.048) (0.369)     (0.026) (0.028) (0.043) 
mF1×Eng    0.748* 0.690* -0.226     0.134 0.058 0.101 
    (0.412) (0.414) (0.493)     (0.308) (0.319) (0.471) 
mF2×Eng    -0.041 -0.065 -0.194     -0.282 -0.306 -0.263 
    (0.428) (0.432) (0.463)     (0.343) (0.358) (0.601) 
mF3×Eng    0.165 0.287 0.474     0.127 0.272 0.351 
    (0.651) (0.656) (0.810)     (0.230) (0.237) (0.318) 
mF1×Fre    0.318 0.285 0.069     -0.016 -0.169 -0.404 
    (0.293) (0.302) (0.502)     (0.245) (0.295) (0.545) 
mF2×Fre    -0.287 -0.259 0.278     -0.082 -0.132 -0.254 
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    See notes for Appendix B5.
   (0.403) (0.429) (1.631)     (0.292) (0.315) (0.612) 
mF3×Fre    0.617 0.603 0.718     -0.385 -0.326 -0.304 
    (0.425) (0.421) (3.819)     (0.274) (0.335) (0.728) 
Exp×Eng     -0.022 -0.006      -0.002 0.003 
     (0.016) (0.017)      (0.009) (0.011) 
Exp×Fre     0.013 0.014      0.016 0.027 
     (0.013) (0.014)      (0.027) (0.033) 
School×Eng     0.021 0.028      0.045 0.046 
     (0.052) (0.059)      (0.028) (0.034) 
School×Fre     0.027 0.03      0.094 0.114 
     (0.037) (0.040)      (0.083) (0.098) 
mF1×Exp×Eng      -0.038       -0.022 
      (0.062)       (0.049) 
mF1×Exp×Fre      -0.002       -0.058 
      (0.046)       (0.056) 
mF1×School×Eng      0.595**       -0.029 
      (0.265)       (0.183) 
mF1×School×Fre      0.155       -0.03 
      (0.174)       (0.178) 
mF2×Exp×Eng      -0.03       0.034 
      (0.094)       (0.116) 
mF2×Exp×Fre      -0.04       -0.06 
      (0.171)       (0.094) 
mF2×School×Eng      -0.18       0.029 
      (0.315)       (0.158) 
mF2×School×Fre      -0.508       -0.038 
      (0.595)       (0.246) 
mF3×Exp×Eng      -0.088       -0.021 
      (0.074)       (0.021) 
mF3×Exp×Fre      0.009       -0.025 
      (0.570)       (0.122) 
mF3×School×Eng      -0.143       0.007 
      (0.239)       (0.067) 
mF3×School×Fre      0.122       -0.127 
      (2.525)       (0.250) 
ܴଶ 0.13 0.15 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26  0.11 0.13 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 
N-weighted 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082 13,082  17,155 17,155 17,155 17,155 17,155 17,155 
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                            Appendix B7. Log wage regressions for Professional vs. Non-Professional occupations, males, wave 3 
 Professional  Non-Professional 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp 0 0 0 -0.003 -0.006 0.001  -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
School 0.005 0.006 0.011 0.008 0.002 0.01  0.003 -0.001 0 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
msm -0.023 -0.021 -0.042 -0.044 -0.049 -0.055  0.008 0.006 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.010 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.062) (0.064) (0.063)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Eng  0.016 -0.062 -0.104 -0.257 -0.458   0.299*** 0.256*** 0.243*** 0.295*** 0.304*** 
  (0.195) (0.193) (0.323) (0.401) (0.477)   (0.067) (0.065) (0.075) (0.085) (0.086) 
Fre  -0.166 -0.116 -0.067 -0.245 -0.369   -0.109 -0.133 -0.146 -0.137 -0.137 
  (0.168) (0.159) (0.261) (0.356) (0.442)   (0.089) (0.089) (0.095) (0.095) (0.098) 
mF1   0.092 0.072 0.09 0.014    0.274*** 0.161** 0.173** 0.176** 
   (0.061) (0.097) (0.100) (0.105)    (0.059) (0.068) (0.068) (0.077) 
mF2   0.275*** 0.326*** 0.321*** 0.351*    0.267*** 0.254*** 0.256*** 0.250*** 
   (0.053) (0.075) (0.079) (0.178)    (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036) 
mF3   0.26 0.411 0.553 -1.157    0.061* 0.024 0.035 0.044 
   (0.180) (7.413) (5.768) (0.985)    (0.034) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) 
Exp×mF1    -0.002 -0.002 -0.017     0.011 0.011 0.016 
    (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)     (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) 
Exp×mF2    0.01 0.01 0.014     0.002 0.002 0.001 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.016)     (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Exp×mF3    -0.049 -0.039 -0.228**     0.003 0.003 0.006 
    (0.320) (0.253) (0.092)     (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
School×mF1    0.007 -0.001 -0.017     0.026* 0.016 0.022 
    (0.024) (0.026) (0.025)     (0.015) (0.016) (0.031) 
School×mF2    0 0.003 0.002     0.050*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 
    (0.029) (0.030) (0.042)     (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) 
School×mF3    -0.082 -0.082 -0.078     -0.026** -0.022* -0.017 
    (1.468) (1.140) (0.061)     (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
mF1×Eng    0.102 0.128 0.388     0.835** 0.774** 0.780** 
    (0.361) (0.393) (0.522)     (0.339) (0.346) (0.392) 
mF2×Eng    -0.137 -0.136 -0.201     -0.075 -0.138 -0.085 
    (0.367) (0.368) (0.613)     (0.151) (0.152) (0.158) 
mF3×Eng    1.438 0.209 10.239*     0.081 0.183 0.042 
    (11.784) (9.380) (5.793)     (0.130) (0.130) (0.178) 
mF1×Fre    -0.202 -0.154 0.03     0.362* 0.344 0.462 
    (0.216) (0.241) (0.397)     (0.217) (0.220) (0.292) 
mF2×Fre    0.253 0.268 0.15     -0.168 -0.205* -0.101 
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Note: immigrants’ age is 25 to 59 at the time of immigration. mF1, mF2, mF3 indicate a match between pre- and post-immigration “intelligence”, “motor skills” and “strength” factor respectively. All regressions 
control for months since immigration. Additional controls: immigration category (Family (default); Skilled Workers (PA’s); Skilled Workers not PA’s; Bus/Nomin/Refug/Others); birth region  (US/W Europe/ UK/ 
Other N Europe/ Oceania (default); C& S America/Caribbean & Bermuda; E Europe; S Europe; Africa; W C Asia & M East; E Asia; SE Asia; S Asia); residence region (Toronto (default); Montreal; QB; ON; AB; 
BC; Other); No of children in household < 18 y.o.; marital status (single (default); married/common law). Bootstrap standard errors in brackets. ***-significant at 1%; **-significant at 5%; *-significant at 10%.
    (0.223) (0.223) (0.330)     (0.116) (0.119) (0.161) 
mF3×Fre    -0.279 -0.582 2.565     0.159 0.183 0.207 
    (13.096) (10.193) (1.737)     (0.119) (0.121) (0.148) 
Exp×Eng     0.012 -0.05      0.005 0.003 
     (0.032) (0.060)      (0.006) (0.007) 
Exp×Fre     0.004 -0.032      -0.006 -0.011 
     (0.019) (0.044)      (0.011) (0.013) 
School×Eng     0.130* 0.068      0.049*** 0.049** 
     (0.073) (0.134)      (0.018) (0.021) 
School×Fre     0.063 0.022      0.004 0.003 
     (0.044) (0.085)      (0.019) (0.022) 
mF1×Exp×Eng      0.119       -0.035 
      (0.082)       (0.050) 
mF1×Exp×Fre      0.083       0.018 
      (0.056)       (0.039) 
mF1×School×Eng      0.174       -0.05 
      (0.175)       (0.125) 
mF1×School×Fre      0.113       -0.021 
      (0.117)       (0.089) 
mF2×Exp×Eng      -0.03       0.032 
      (0.101)       (0.023) 
mF2×Exp×Fre      -0.036       0.018 
      (0.053)       (0.028) 
mF2×School×Eng      -0.057       0.05 
      (0.209)       (0.067) 
mF2×School×Fre      -0.031       -0.033 
      (0.113)       (0.061) 
mF3×Exp×Eng      0.867**       0.002 
      (0.352)       (0.017) 
mF3×Exp×Fre      -       0.025 
             (0.022) 
mF3×School×Eng      -       -0.024 
             (0.046) 
mF3×School×Fre      -       0.063 
             (0.057) 
ܴଶ 0.11 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21  0.17 0.18 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.25 
N-weighted 9,329 9,329 9,329 9,329 9,329 9,329  32,794 32,794 32,794 32,794 32,794 32,794 
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                            Appendix B8. Log wage regressions for Professional vs. Non-Professional occupations, females, wave 3 
 Professional occupations  Non-Professional occupations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp -0.013 -0.01 -0.006 -0.021* -0.025* -0.024  -0.008*** -0.007** -0.006** -0.006* -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
School 0.03 0.028 0.02 0.02 0.026 0.022  0.009 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.033) (0.039) (0.043)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
msm 0.099* 0.104* 0.084 0.087 0.094 0.083  0.031 0.028 0.035* 0.037* 0.038* 0.036* 
 (0.057) (0.056) (0.054) (0.060) (0.062) (0.064)  (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Eng  0.538* 0.476 0.386 0.294 0.254   0.415*** 0.379*** 0.368*** 0.424*** 0.401*** 
  (0.306) (0.297) (0.422) (0.448) (0.479)   (0.091) (0.089) (0.098) (0.107) (0.109) 
Fre  0.198 0.335 0.238 0.332 0.271   0.064 0.068 0.063 0.076 0.07 
  (0.243) (0.235) (0.324) (0.345) (0.368)   (0.142) (0.135) (0.138) (0.139) (0.141) 
mF1   0.217* 0.276** 0.274** 0.415**    0.493*** 0.477*** 0.481*** 0.521*** 
   (0.118) (0.139) (0.138) (0.199)    (0.066) (0.088) (0.087) (0.147) 
mF2   0.486*** 0.495*** 0.512*** 0.34    0.272*** 0.313*** 0.315*** 0.338 
   (0.127) (0.141) (0.147) (0.253)    (0.083) (0.079) (0.078) (0.702) 
mF3   0.162 0.349 0.32 -0.103    0.083 0.081 0.071 0.081 
   (0.191) (0.652) (0.675) (2.776)    (0.068) (0.081) (0.085) (0.094) 
Exp×mF1    0.023 0.024 0.024     -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.020)     (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) 
Exp×mF2    0.003 0.007 -0.001     0.02 0.022 0.026 
    (0.023) (0.024) (0.031)     (0.017) (0.017) (0.082) 
Exp×mF3    0.008 0.014 0.031     0.001 0 -0.001 
    (0.031) (0.032) (0.342)     (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) 
School×mF1    -0.028 -0.031 -0.065     -0.022 -0.025 -0.052 
    (0.074) (0.076) (0.089)     (0.034) (0.033) (0.050) 
School×mF2    0.042 0.04 0.06     0.078** 0.076** 0.088 
    (0.074) (0.076) (0.107)     (0.036) (0.035) (0.307) 
School×mF3    -0.117 -0.127 0.354     -0.003 0.001 0.007 
    (0.150) (0.157) (2.682)     (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) 
mF1×Eng    0.459 0.512 0.017     0.089 0.013 -0.164 
    (0.608) (0.618) (0.757)     (0.379) (0.374) (0.464) 
mF2×Eng    -0.855 -0.952 -0.166     -0.189 -0.214 -0.141 
    (0.686) (0.720) (1.051)     (0.298) (0.292) (0.372) 
mF3×Eng    0.207 0.433 0.061     0.186 0.319 0.493 
    (1.531) (1.575) (3.034)     (0.256) (0.269) (0.348) 
mF1×Fre    0.267 0.284 0.002     0.098 -0.018 -1.294 
    (0.389) (0.391) (0.540)     (0.287) (0.329) (0.816) 
mF2×Fre    -0.365 -0.323 0.225     0.05 0.031 -0.11 
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    See notes for Appendix B7.
   (0.421) (0.449) (0.938)     (0.312) (0.314) (6.183) 
mF3×Fre    0.214 0.057 -4.244     0.058 0.096 0.176 
    (3.774) (3.983) (23.811)     (0.314) (0.334) (0.500) 
Exp×Eng     -0.022 -0.008      -0.008 -0.003 
     (0.038) (0.056)      (0.008) (0.009) 
Exp×Fre     0.023 0.033      0.015 0.022 
     (0.024) (0.040)      (0.020) (0.023) 
School×Eng     -0.004 0.027      0.033 0.023 
     (0.125) (0.176)      (0.027) (0.031) 
School×Fre     -0.022 -0.002      0.086 0.096 
     (0.084) (0.114)      (0.065) (0.074) 
mF1×Exp×Eng      -0.044       -0.029 
      (0.087)       (0.051) 
mF1×Exp×Fre      -0.011       -0.138* 
      (0.058)       (0.076) 
mF1×School×Eng      0.233       0.354 
      (0.426)       (0.251) 
mF1×School×Fre      0.163       0.088 
      (0.224)       (0.271) 
mF2×Exp×Eng      0.167       -0.024 
      (0.176)       (0.076) 
mF2×Exp×Fre      -0.09       -0.034 
      (0.097)       (0.551) 
mF2×School×Eng      -0.245       0.051 
      (0.508)       (0.117) 
mF2×School×Fre      -0.422       0.134 
      (0.403)       (2.144) 
mF3×Exp×Eng      -0.1       -0.019 
      (0.673)       (0.020) 
mF3×Exp×Fre      0.21       -0.027 
      (1.952)       (0.069) 
mF3×School×Eng      -0.442       0.031 
      (3.860)       (0.065) 
mF3×School×Fre      2.839       -0.108 
      (16.405)       (0.141) 
ܴଶ 0.17 0.18 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.32  0.10 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.18 
N-weighted 6,694 6,694 6,694 6,694 6,694 6,694  23,543 23,543 23,543 23,543 23,543 23,543 
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                            Appendix B9. Log wage regressions for University educated vs. Other education levels, males, wave 3 
 University educated  Other education levels 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016***  -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
School 0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.006 -0.01 -0.007  -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.005 0.012 0.012 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
msm -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.011  0.022 0.018 0.02 0.017 0.023 0.023 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)  (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Eng  0.516*** 0.372*** 0.303*** 0.235** 0.241*   0.063 0.038 0.011 0.057 0.114 
  (0.098) (0.092) (0.104) (0.119) (0.124)   (0.087) (0.086) (0.111) (0.145) (0.144) 
Fre  -0.065 -0.057 -0.089 -0.142 -0.153   -0.209** -0.225** -0.212* -0.201* -0.201* 
  (0.109) (0.102) (0.118) (0.130) (0.133)   (0.103) (0.102) (0.112) (0.119) (0.118) 
mF1   0.237*** 0.223*** 0.230*** 0.251***    0.267*** 0.169* 0.168** 0.197 
   (0.038) (0.047) (0.048) (0.059)    (0.073) (0.087) (0.084) (0.150) 
mF2   0.280*** 0.300*** 0.295*** 0.293***    0.154*** 0.263*** 0.249*** 0.248*** 
   (0.037) (0.040) (0.041) (0.057)    (0.058) (0.077) (0.074) (0.086) 
mF3   0.053 0.024 0.024 -0.021    0.071 0.009 0.022 0.02 
   (0.063) (0.065) (0.067) (0.116)    (0.043) (0.055) (0.056) (0.060) 
Exp×mF1    0.011* 0.011* 0.01     0.02 0.014 -0.002 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)     (0.013) (0.013) (0.033) 
Exp×mF2    0.008 0.007 0.006     0.008 0.006 0.008 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)     (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Exp×mF3    0.014 0.015 0.012     -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 
    (0.012) (0.013) (0.017)     (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
School×mF1    0.017 0.014 0.002     -0.009 -0.029 -0.06 
    (0.014) (0.014) (0.018)     (0.047) (0.049) (0.119) 
School×mF2    0.019 0.023 0.019     0.050** 0.040* 0.045 
    (0.015) (0.016) (0.018)     (0.023) (0.022) (0.030) 
School×mF3    0 0.004 -0.001     -0.026* -0.021 -0.022 
    (0.030) (0.031) (0.047)     (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) 
mF1×Eng    0.341 0.312 0.197     0.385 0.277 0.015 
    (0.222) (0.227) (0.254)     (0.442) (0.434) (0.733) 
mF2×Eng    -0.294 -0.307 -0.276     -0.009 0.079 0.078 
    (0.192) (0.195) (0.247)     (0.250) (0.234) (0.453) 
mF3×Eng    1.096*** 1.100*** 1.060*     -0.017 0.024 -0.194 
    (0.356) (0.367) (0.554)     (0.152) (0.151) (0.211) 
mF1×Fre    0.102 0.086 0.221     0.072 0.011 0.097 
    (0.147) (0.149) (0.214)     (0.231) (0.238) (0.354) 
mF2×Fre    -0.015 -0.036 -0.115     0.112 0.168 0.3 
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Note: Immigrants are 25 to 59 at the time of immigration; mF1, mF2, mF3 indicate a match between “intelligence”, “motor skills” and “strength” factor respectively. All regressions control for months since 
immigration (msm). Additional controls: immigration class (Family (default); Skilled Workers (PA); Skilled Workers (not PA); Bus/Nom/Ref/Other); birth region  (US/W Europe/ UK/ Other Northern Europe/ 
Oceania (default); C & S America/Caribbean & Bermuda; E Europe; S Europe; Africa; WC Asia & M East; E Asia; SE Asia; S Asia); residence region (Toronto (default); Montreal; QB; ON; AB; BC; Other); number 
of children in household under the age of 18; marital status (single (default); married/common law). Bootstrap standard errors in brackets. ***-significant at 1%; **-significant at 5%; *-significant at 10%. 
    (0.132) (0.131) (0.177)     (0.216) (0.212) (0.384) 
mF3×Fre    0.432** 0.465** 0.494     -0.173 -0.204 -0.043 
    (0.197) (0.212) (0.406)     (0.149) (0.147) (0.250) 
Exp×Eng     -0.002 -0.011      0.020*** 0.021*** 
     (0.012) (0.014)      (0.007) (0.008) 
Exp×Fre     -0.008 -0.021      0.015* 0.014 
     (0.013) (0.017)      (0.009) (0.010) 
School×Eng     0.059 0.033      0.069*** 0.092*** 
     (0.042) (0.056)      (0.025) (0.028) 
School×Fre     0.023 0.003      0.014 -0.002 
     (0.025) (0.031)      (0.023) (0.025) 
mF1×Exp×Eng      0.007       0.103 
      (0.037)       (0.145) 
mF1×Exp×Fre      0.051*       0.004 
      (0.027)       (0.070) 
mF1×School×Eng      0.088       0.144 
      (0.088)       (0.522) 
mF1×School×Fre      0.051       0.221 
      (0.051)       (0.302) 
mF2×Exp×Eng      0.026       0.007 
      (0.038)       (0.033) 
mF2×Exp×Fre      -0.004       0.06 
      (0.024)       (0.047) 
mF2×School×Eng      0.033       -0.02 
      (0.090)       (0.139) 
mF2×School×Fre      0.034       -0.012 
      (0.061)       (0.139) 
mF3×Exp×Eng      0.031       -0.012 
      (0.083)       (0.017) 
mF3×Exp×Fre      0.03       0.013 
      (0.062)       (0.036) 
mF3×School×Eng      -0.139       -0.084* 
      (0.271)       (0.048) 
mF3×School×Fre      -0.055       0.087 
      (0.210)       (0.093) 
ܴଶ 0.12 0.14 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24  0.28 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.36 
N-weighted 30,341 30,341 30,341 30,341 30,341 30,341  11,781 11,781 11,781 11,781 11,781 11,781 
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                            Appendix B10. Log wage regressions for University educated vs. Other education levels, females, wave 3 
 University educated  Other education levels 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp -0.012*** -0.009** -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003  -0.009*** -0.008** -0.008** -0.007* -0.008** -0.007* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
School 0.014 0.011 0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002  0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
msm 0.051* 0.052** 0.043* 0.045* 0.042* 0.040  0.066** 0.060* 0.062** 0.066** 0.066** 0.069** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)  (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) 
Eng  0.606*** 0.534*** 0.476*** 0.454*** 0.455***   0.336*** 0.295*** 0.244** 0.361** 0.369** 
  (0.138) (0.131) (0.142) (0.156) (0.159)   (0.113) (0.112) (0.119) (0.150) (0.156) 
Fre  0.172 0.149 0.168 0.092 0.048   0.069 0.129 0.142 0.164 0.184 
  (0.163) (0.158) (0.197) (0.190) (0.211)   (0.146) (0.141) (0.140) (0.155) (0.161) 
mF1   0.320*** 0.265*** 0.260*** 0.388***    0.495*** 0.399 0.403 0.882 
   (0.063) (0.077) (0.077) (0.112)    (0.180) (0.357) (0.359) (23.952) 
mF2   0.444*** 0.495*** 0.489*** 0.359***    0.261** 0.334 0.305 0.298 
   (0.068) (0.081) (0.085) (0.109)    (0.121) (0.255) (0.262) (0.871) 
mF3   0.183* 0.155 0.147 0.508    0.111 0.113 0.117 0.113 
   (0.101) (0.246) (0.249) (0.901)    (0.080) (0.119) (0.120) (0.147) 
Exp×mF1    0.002 0 0.003     -0.027 -0.025 0.077 
    (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)     (0.052) (0.053) (2.630) 
Exp×mF2    0.026* 0.026* 0.018     0.001 0.003 0.003 
    (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)     (0.016) (0.016) (0.136) 
Exp×mF3    -0.007 -0.005 0.007     -0.001 0 -0.001 
    (0.016) (0.016) (0.096)     (0.007) (0.007) (0.015) 
School×mF1    0.013 0.009 -0.018     -0.109 -0.118 -0.003 
    (0.037) (0.038) (0.046)     (0.174) (0.177) (3.784) 
School×mF2    0.028 0.034 0.066     0.04 0.032 0.041 
    (0.040) (0.042) (0.056)     (0.054) (0.053) (0.488) 
School×mF3    -0.008 0.001 -0.178     0 0.006 0.003 
    (0.072) (0.071) (1.302)     (0.031) (0.031) (0.038) 
mF1×Eng    0.459 0.466 0.025     0.188 0.138 -0.643 
    (0.317) (0.329) (0.426)     (1.724) (1.754) (117.000) 
mF2×Eng    -0.303 -0.307 -0.057     0.466 0.484 1.023 
    (0.334) (0.343) (0.422)     (0.493) (0.476) (1.032) 
mF3×Eng    0.459 0.454 -0.089     0.233 0.298 0.311 
    (0.618) (0.619) (1.042)     (0.293) (0.298) (0.464) 
mF1×Fre    -0.021 -0.06 -0.187     -0.033 0.058 4.565 
    (0.264) (0.274) (0.389)     (2.207) (2.216) (191.765) 
mF2×Fre    -0.349 -0.319 -0.305     0.668 0.665 0.885 
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    See notes for Appendix B9.
    (0.273) (0.288) (0.572)     (1.552) (1.595) (6.406) 
mF3×Fre    0.423 0.366 1.005     -0.108 -0.06 -0.076 
    (1.336) (1.361) (11.102)     (0.310) (0.316) (0.750) 
Exp×Eng     -0.019 -0.009      -0.001 0.006 
     (0.017) (0.018)      (0.010) (0.012) 
Exp×Fre     0.017 0.042      0.003 0.004 
     (0.021) (0.033)      (0.015) (0.016) 
School×Eng     0.002 0.009      0.043 0.05 
     (0.074) (0.078)      (0.035) (0.042) 
School×Fre     0.077 0.106      0.006 0.011 
     (0.083) (0.107)      (0.040) (0.045) 
mF1×Exp×Eng      -0.027       -0.124 
      (0.045)       (21.282) 
mF1×Exp×Fre      -0.048       0.632 
      (0.043)       (30.461) 
mF1×School×Eng      0.262       -0.597 
      (0.236)       (63.347) 
mF1×School×Fre      0.035       0.756 
      (0.172)       (114.398) 
mF2×Exp×Eng      -0.024       0.017 
      (0.077)       (0.095) 
mF2×Exp×Fre      -0.112**       -0.051 
      (0.053)       (0.960) 
mF2×School×Eng      -0.384       0.174 
      (0.235)       (0.247) 
mF2×School×Fre      -0.3       0.218 
      (0.242)       (3.410) 
mF3×Exp×Eng      -0.125       -0.025 
      (0.137)       (0.023) 
mF3×Exp×Fre      -0.058       0.005 
      (0.644)       (0.094) 
mF3×School×Eng      0.509       -0.035 
      (0.724)       (0.082) 
mF3×School×Fre      -0.56       -0.065 
      (9.275)       (0.169) 
ܴଶ 0.09 0.11 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23  0.12 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.21 
N-weighted 19,943 19,943 19,943 19,943 19,943 19,943  10,294 10,294 10,294 10,294 10,294 10,294 
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.                            Appendix B11. Log wage regressions for Visible minorities vs. Not visible minorities, males, wave 3 
 Visible minorities  Not visible minorities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.017***  -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
School 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004  0.024** 0.017* 0.015 0.01 0.015 0.014 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
msm -0.009 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012  0.099*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.075*** 0.076*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)  (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
Eng  0.336*** 0.293*** 0.267*** 0.331*** 0.335***   0.725*** 0.550*** 0.413** 0.450** 0.487** 
  (0.067) (0.064) (0.075) (0.081) (0.083)   (0.148) (0.141) (0.182) (0.185) (0.193) 
Fre  -0.055 -0.005 -0.027 -0.028 -0.036   0.13 0.069 0.003 -0.017 -0.034 
  (0.084) (0.083) (0.096) (0.101) (0.106)   (0.141) (0.127) (0.146) (0.146) (0.155) 
mF1   0.250*** 0.239*** 0.255*** 0.241***    0.316*** 0.234*** 0.222*** 0.243*** 
   (0.041) (0.048) (0.048) (0.066)    (0.057) (0.066) (0.065) (0.087) 
mF2   0.255*** 0.265*** 0.276*** 0.265***    0.212*** 0.217*** 0.214*** 0.209*** 
   (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.044)    (0.049) (0.052) (0.052) (0.060) 
mF3   0.110*** 0.083* 0.093** 0.095**    0.006 -0.015 -0.024 -0.017 
   (0.038) (0.046) (0.046) (0.048)    (0.070) (0.079) (0.080) (0.109) 
Exp×mF1    0.008 0.009 0.007     0.01 0.013 0.017 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)     (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Exp×mF2    0.009 0.010* 0.008     -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)     (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Exp×mF3    0.005 0.006 0.008     0.005 0.001 0 
    (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)     (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) 
School×mF1    0.007 -0.003 -0.003     0.009 0.021 0.021 
    (0.016) (0.016) (0.023)     (0.020) (0.023) (0.031) 
School×mF2    0.039*** 0.036** 0.034*     0.004 -0.002 0.005 
    (0.015) (0.015) (0.018)     (0.019) (0.020) (0.023) 
School×mF3    -0.008 -0.007 -0.008     0.012 -0.003 0.002 
    (0.014) (0.014) (0.016)     (0.025) (0.027) (0.039) 
mF1×Eng    0.25 0.158 0.205     1.114*** 1.222*** 1.121*** 
    (0.240) (0.239) (0.236)     (0.316) (0.333) (0.401) 
mF2×Eng    -0.007 -0.101 -0.053     -0.378 -0.375 -0.408 
    (0.185) (0.182) (0.172)     (0.257) (0.268) (0.322) 
mF3×Eng    0.043 0.258* 0.177     -0.059 -0.167 -0.332 
    (0.143) (0.145) (0.200)     (0.340) (0.361) (0.509) 
mF1×Fre    0.085 0.073 0.017     0.310** 0.313** 0.467** 
    (0.177) (0.176) (0.198)     (0.149) (0.158) (0.221) 
mF2×Fre    0.08 0.034 0.082     -0.075 -0.08 -0.047 
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Note: The sample is restricted to age between 25 and 59 at the time of immigration; immigrants who worked before immigration; three indicators for a match between each skill of a source-country occupation and a 
corresponding skill of a main job in Canada in the current wave. All regressions control for months since immigration (msm). Additional controls are: immigration class (Family (default); Skilled Worker (PA); Skilled 
Worker (not PA); Bus/Nom/Ref/Other); residence region (Toronto (default); Montreal; QB; ON; AB; BC; Other); number of children in household under the age of 18; marital status (single (default); married/common 
law). Bootstrap standard errors in brackets. ***-significant at 1%; **-significant at 5%; *-significant at 10%. 
    (0.172) (0.172) (0.181)     (0.132) (0.136) (0.188) 
mF3×Fre    0.018 0.112 0.087     0.01 0.02 0.096 
    (0.140) (0.148) (0.172)     (0.231) (0.239) (0.382) 
Exp×Eng     0.006 -0.001      -0.014 -0.009 
     (0.006) (0.007)      (0.021) (0.031) 
Exp×Fre     -0.006 -0.016      -0.019 -0.02 
     (0.013) (0.018)      (0.013) (0.017) 
School×Eng     0.075*** 0.059***      -0.073 -0.084 
     (0.018) (0.023)      (0.057) (0.078) 
School×Fre     0.014 -0.003      -0.021 -0.01 
     (0.020) (0.024)      (0.028) (0.037) 
mF1×Exp×Eng      0.031       -0.045 
      (0.042)       (0.057) 
mF1×Exp×Fre      0.025       0.002 
      (0.031)       (0.030) 
mF1×School×Eng      0.043       0.009 
      (0.105)       (0.153) 
mF1×School×Fre      0.088       -0.051 
      (0.082)       (0.073) 
mF2×Exp×Eng      0.031       0.055 
      (0.027)       (0.052) 
mF2×Exp×Fre      0.031       0.003 
      (0.028)       (0.030) 
mF2×School×Eng      0.055       0.075 
      (0.068)       (0.133) 
mF2×School×Fre      0.067       -0.073 
      (0.076)       (0.071) 
mF3×Exp×Eng      0.011       -0.029 
      (0.017)       (0.065) 
mF3×Exp×Fre      0.023       0.007 
      (0.027)       (0.064) 
mF3×School×Eng      0.01       -0.021 
      (0.049)       (0.176) 
mF3×School×Fre      -0.002       0.149 
      (0.069)       (0.144) 
ܴଶ 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24  0.16 0.21 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.34 
N-weighted 33,377 33,377 33,377 33,377 33,377 33,377  8,705 8,705 8,705 8,705 8,705 8,705 
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                            Appendix B12. Log wage regressions for Visible minorities vs. Not visible minorities, females, wave 3 
 Visible minorities  Not visible minorities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***  -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
School 0.011 -0.003 -0.01 -0.016 -0.014 -0.015  0.032 0.031 0.027 0.026 0.022 0.022 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) 
msm 0.071*** 0.064*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.060**  0.019 0.011 0.011 0.01 0.017 0.014 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)  (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) 
Eng  0.544*** 0.503*** 0.442*** 0.481*** 0.468***   0.371* 0.381** 0.303 0.231 0.192 
  (0.083) (0.080) (0.087) (0.094) (0.095)   (0.203) (0.193) (0.220) (0.244) (0.254) 
Fre  0.148 0.158 0.045 0.068 0.058   0.371 0.375* 0.393 0.293 0.247 
  (0.140) (0.129) (0.141) (0.145) (0.150)   (0.229) (0.223) (0.251) (0.233) (0.240) 
mF1   0.393*** 0.376*** 0.383*** 0.404***    0.259** 0.311** 0.313** 0.476** 
   (0.067) (0.078) (0.079) (0.114)    (0.117) (0.143) (0.149) (0.228) 
mF2   0.458*** 0.491*** 0.498*** 0.526    0.249** 0.176 0.152 0.203 
   (0.069) (0.070) (0.074) (0.569)    (0.122) (0.173) (0.177) (0.314) 
mF3   0.131* 0.149* 0.136* 0.095    0.135 0.115 0.114 0.138 
   (0.068) (0.080) (0.082) (0.110)    (0.133) (0.180) (0.182) (0.680) 
Exp×mF1    0 0.001 0.004     0.006 -0.002 0.007 
    (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)     (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) 
Exp×mF2    0.012 0.014 0.013     0.014 0.015 0.033 
    (0.013) (0.013) (0.061)     (0.022) (0.023) (0.038) 
Exp×mF3    0 0 0.003     0.01 0.013 0.028 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.014)     (0.030) (0.032) (0.117) 
School×mF1    -0.011 -0.014 -0.005     -0.054 -0.073 -0.13 
    (0.028) (0.029) (0.037)     (0.073) (0.075) (0.116) 
School×mF2    0.060** 0.056* 0.019     0.075 0.09 0.147 
    (0.031) (0.031) (0.258)     (0.073) (0.074) (0.142) 
School×mF3    0.007 0.009 0.021     0.004 0.01 0.039 
    (0.026) (0.025) (0.033)     (0.084) (0.092) (0.304) 
mF1×Eng    0.503* 0.424 0.262     0.066 0.034 -0.409 
    (0.304) (0.305) (0.408)     (0.948) (0.968) (1.110) 
mF2×Eng    -0.31 -0.323 -0.45     0.422 0.38 -0.202 
    (0.275) (0.275) (0.323)     (0.810) (0.837) (1.551) 
mF3×Eng    0.274 0.369 0.643*     0.123 0.229 0.647 
    (0.280) (0.288) (0.388)     (0.735) (0.756) (1.482) 
mF1×Fre    0.463* 0.386 0.008     -0.029 -0.091 -0.431 
    (0.242) (0.256) (0.516)     (0.470) (0.486) (0.802) 
mF2×Fre    0.061 0.094 0.456     0.145 0.084 -0.053 
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    See notes for Appendix B11.
   (0.370) (0.396) (4.764)     (0.431) (0.468) (1.099) 
mF3×Fre    0.084 0.078 -0.027     0.217 0.369 0.446 
    (0.336) (0.341) (0.632)     (0.625) (0.602) (4.425) 
Exp×Eng     -0.011 -0.005      0.001 0.01 
     (0.009) (0.010)      (0.024) (0.026) 
Exp×Fre     0.005 0.004      0.034 0.054* 
     (0.013) (0.015)      (0.026) (0.033) 
School×Eng     0.015 0.004      0.109 0.109 
     (0.028) (0.034)      (0.079) (0.087) 
School×Fre     0.031 0.028      0.123 0.134 
     (0.032) (0.038)      (0.095) (0.106) 
mF1×Exp×Eng      -0.03       -0.048 
      (0.047)       (0.179) 
mF1×Exp×Fre      0.003       -0.061 
      (0.044)       (0.076) 
mF1×School×Eng      0.119       0.365 
      (0.180)       (0.786) 
mF1×School×Fre      0.163       0.181 
      (0.159)       (0.363) 
mF2×Exp×Eng      0.015       -0.173 
      (0.062)       (0.276) 
mF2×Exp×Fre      -0.019       -0.113 
      (0.422)       (0.117) 
mF2×School×Eng      -0.072       -0.295 
      (0.107)       (0.833) 
mF2×School×Fre      -0.391       -0.207 
      (1.791)       (0.456) 
mF3×Exp×Eng      -0.013       0.004 
      (0.021)       (0.328) 
mF3×Exp×Fre      0.055       -0.041 
      (0.090)       (0.728) 
mF3×School×Eng      0.082       0.107 
      (0.072)       (0.970) 
mF3×School×Fre      0.015       -0.057 
      (0.180)       (1.817) 
ܴଶ 0.09 0.12 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.25  0.12 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.23 
N-weighted 23,239 23,239 23,239 23,239 23,239 23,239  6,981 6,981 6,981 6,981 6,981 6,981 
  
169 
Appendix C1. Cross-sectional Variance inflation factors, males 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp 1.83 1.86 1.88 2.82 3.05 3.19 1.6 1.63 1.64 2.34 2.41 2.44 1.43 1.46 1.47 2.09 2.15 2.18 
School 1.76 1.84 1.89 3.68 3.75 3.9 1.73 1.83 1.9 2.88 2.9 2.92 1.59 1.64 1.71 2.46 2.52 2.56 
Eng  1.77 1.84 2.85 3.34 3.5  1.91 1.94 2.69 3.16 3.25  1.93 1.97 2.73 3 3.06 
Fre  2.67 2.69 3.53 3.69 3.74  3.36 3.38 4.32 4.52 4.62  4.46 4.47 5.36 5.56 5.69 
mF1   1.35 2.24 2.35 6.19   1.22 2.06 2.13 4.36   1.19 1.81 1.83 2.88 
mF2   1.4 1.78 1.8 2.14   1.21 1.6 1.62 2.38   1.18 1.46 1.46 1.75 
mF3   1.29 1.94 1.95 2.18   1.22 1.66 1.67 1.76   1.21 1.53 1.54 1.63 
Exp×mF1    2.35 2.5 5.33    1.99 2.03 2.47    1.83 1.89 2.74 
Exp×mF2    2.48 2.52 2.84    1.86 1.89 2.06    1.79 1.81 2.05 
Exp×mF3    3.06 3.17 6.06    2.45 2.54 3.99    2.37 2.43 2.91 
School×mF1    2.96 3.24 11    2.17 2.29 3.97    2.07 2.17 3.13 
School×mF2    2.4 3.04 4.04    1.82 1.84 2.24    1.81 1.81 2 
School×mF3    4 4.12 4.7    3.24 3.32 4.02    2.92 2.97 3.43 
mF1×Eng    2.34 2.49 3.95    1.99 2.11 3.14    2.03 2.08 2.67 
mF2×Eng    1.86 2.02 2.27    1.7 1.75 1.97    1.67 1.71 1.78 
mF3×Eng    2.12 2.34 5.01    2.15 2.26 3.75    2.09 2.24 3.68 
mF1×Fre    2.27 2.34 4.65    1.8 1.86 2.88    1.84 1.86 2.69 
mF2×Fre    2.15 2.3 5.08    1.62 1.63 2.59    1.68 1.72 2.52 
mF3×Fre    1.45 1.49 2.22    1.55 1.65 2.12    1.73 1.83 2.36 
Exp×Eng     3.94 5.73     2.58 3.54     2.52 3.5 
Exp×Fre     2.2 3.16     1.55 2.25     1.64 2.28 
School×Eng     4.96 7     3.07 4.29     2.94 4.16 
School×Fre     2.66 5.67     1.72 2.54     1.88 2.52 
mF1×Exp×Eng      5.08      2.18      2.76 
mF1×Exp×Fre      6.39      2.46      2.65 
mF1×School×Eng      13.43      4.08      3.41 
mF1× School ×Fre      17.67      3.53      3.03 
mF2×Exp×Eng      2.44      2.04      2.08 
mF2×Exp×Fre      6.29      1.88      2.8 
mF2×School×Eng      3.7      2.2      2.57 
mF2× School ×Fre      14.37      2.53      3.08 
mF3×Exp×Eng      11.25      5      5.44 
mF3×Exp×Fre      3.76      3.81      2.5 
mF3×School×Eng      13.56      7.15      7.1 
mF3× School ×Fre      3.11      4.17      3.47 
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Appendix C2. Cross-sectional Variance inflation factors, females 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp 1.41 1.48 1.5 2.05 2.39 2.48 1.33 1.38 1.39 1.87 1.89 1.91 1.34 1.38 1.39 1.86 1.88 1.89 
School 1.52 1.56 1.67 2.62 2.84 2.9 1.43 1.48 1.56 2.12 2.28 2.32 1.44 1.49 1.52 2 2.04 2.05 
Eng  2.14 2.15 2.84 3.29 3.47  2.09 2.11 2.59 2.89 2.93  2 2.01 2.41 2.57 2.6 
Fre  2.51 2.58 3.63 3.94 4.2  3.44 3.47 4.05 4.09 4.2  3.49 3.52 4.1 4.1 4.22 
mF1   1.32 2.41 2.45 7.14   1.19 2.03 2.06 4.13   1.14 1.81 1.84 3.44 
mF2   1.4 2.51 2.57 4.8   1.23 1.67 1.7 2.51   1.13 1.44 1.45 1.59 
mF3   1.35 1.6 1.67 2.06   1.25 1.54 1.55 1.89   1.14 1.32 1.33 1.38 
Exp×mF1    2.55 2.64 9.42    1.71 1.76 2.42    1.72 1.75 2.05 
Exp×mF2    2.72 2.75 8.19    1.99 2.05 3.62    1.83 1.85 2.56 
Exp×mF3    3.53 3.69 4.18    2.39 2.44 3.3    2.12 2.15 2.52 
School×mF1    8.77 8.85 11.13    3.58 3.62 4.16    2.92 2.96 3.85 
School×mF2    8.38 8.47 9.98    3.03 3.14 4.32    2.42 2.45 2.83 
School×mF3    3.17 3.67 10.7    2.75 2.78 3.92    2.5 2.55 2.85 
mF1×Eng    2.22 2.34 4.33    1.47 1.58 3.37    1.53 1.6 2.49 
mF2×Eng    2.24 2.42 3.36    1.8 1.84 2.18    1.59 1.6 1.77 
mF3×Eng    2.21 2.46 6.57    2.5 2.56 4.02    1.92 2 2.7 
mF1×Fre    3.08 3.16 29.85    1.81 2.04 3.93    1.67 1.79 3.55 
mF2×Fre    2.03 2.1 40.92    1.52 1.53 2.91    1.37 1.37 2.02 
mF3×Fre    1.63 1.69 6.79    1.49 1.55 2.82    1.38 1.39 1.49 
Exp×Eng     2.96 4.56     2.27 3.03     2.04 2.73 
Exp×Fre     3.42 4.19     2.21 2.94     1.73 2.32 
School×Eng     2.92 5.44     2.38 3.07     2.35 3.14 
School×Fre     2.53 3.35     2.19 2.75     1.86 2.4 
mF1×Exp×Eng      8.33      3.06      2.23 
mF1×Exp×Fre      22.26      3.26      2.77 
mF1×School×Eng      6.48      4.8      4.35 
mF1× School ×Fre      12.25      6.84      5.23 
mF2×Exp×Eng      2.49      4.74      2.43 
mF2×Exp×Fre      34.73      2.68      2.2 
mF2×School×Eng      3.34      3.2      2.41 
mF2× School ×Fre      9.78      4.18      2.74 
mF3×Exp×Eng      7.86      4.49      3.65 
mF3×Exp×Fre      7.97      3.36      1.86 
mF3×School×Eng      7.3      5.47      5.05 
mF3× School ×Fre      9.79      2.71      1.79 
  
171 
Appendix C3. Variance inflation factors for Skilled Worker principal applicants and Other immigration categories, males, wave 3 
 Skilled Worker principal applicants Other immigration categories 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp 1.2 1.21 1.22 1.74 1.89 1.97 1.59 1.66 1.67 2.28 2.64 2.81 
School 1.16 1.16 1.19 1.94 2.29 2.46 1.52 1.77 1.86 2.46 2.54 2.58 
Eng  2.22 2.27 3.03 3.33 3.53  1.9 1.95 2.75 3.63 3.91 
Fre  5.36 5.39 6.7 7.42 7.96  3.22 3.24 3.68 3.73 3.79
mF1   1.17 2.16 2.22 4.79   1.19 1.35 1.35 1.72 
mF2   1.16 1.8 1.81 3.53   1.18 1.34 1.36 1.82 
mF3   1.12 1.27 1.28 1.77   1.25 2.58 2.73 3.84 
Exp×mF1   2.05 2.1 3.53  1.78 1.89 2.72
Exp×mF2    2 2.01 2.89    1.81 1.81 2.32 
Exp×mF3    1.32 1.33 1.67    3.04 3.13 6.25 
School×mF1    2.32 2.5 4.22    1.88 1.94 2.33 
School×mF2   1.98 1.99 2.58  1.9 1.91 2.09
School×mF3    1.37 1.38 1.67    4.92 5.12 8.89 
mF1×Eng    2.41 2.46 3.96    1.37 1.41 1.69 
mF2×Eng    1.99 2 2.88    1.44 1.47 1.8 
mF3×Eng    2.23 2.28 2.55    2.55 2.68 5.8 
mF1×Fre    2.08 2.1 3.59    1.45 1.49 1.77 
mF2×Fre    1.9 1.93 3.43    1.53 1.55 1.75 
mF3×Fre    2.31 2.42 2.79    1.92 2.06 4.55 
Exp×Eng     2.13 3.03     3.27 4.49 
Exp×Fre     2.34 3.37     1.72 2.33 
School×Eng     2.77 4.46     3.94 5.34 
School×Fre     3.11 4.93     1.74 2.17 
mF1×Exp×Eng      4.21      2.05 
mF1×Exp×Fre   4  1.76
mF1×School×Eng      5.26      1.93 
mF1× School ×Fre      4.11      1.96 
mF2×Exp×Eng      3.36      2.27 
mF2×Exp×Fre   3.53  3.7
mF2×School×Eng      3.28      4.53 
mF2× School ×Fre      3.73      4.66 
mF3×Exp×Eng      3.49      7.69 
mF3×Exp×Fre   3.63  6.84
mF3×School×Eng      2.63      11.87 
mF3× School ×Fre      3.24      11.09 
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Appendix C4. Variance inflation factors for Skilled Worker principal applicants and Other immigration categories, females, wave 3 
 Skilled Worker principal applicants Other immigration categories 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp 1.17 1.17 1.18 1.58 2.29 2.48 1.39 1.44 1.45 1.93 1.96 1.98 
School 1.2 1.23 1.26 1.89 2.91 3.18 1.41 1.52 1.55 2.01 2.11 2.15 
Eng  1.97 1.98 2.44 2.83 3.02  1.97 1.99 2.41 2.64 2.69 
Fre  3.89 3.99 4.68 4.95 5.08  3.42 3.44 4.08 4.11 4.24
mF1   1.31 2.43 2.48 6.95   1.09 1.71 1.73 2.99 
mF2   1.31 2.63 2.71 9.49   1.12 1.32 1.32 1.47 
mF3   1.12 6.45 6.49 72.04   1.17 1.41 1.42 1.5 
Exp×mF1   1.99 2.09 3.4  1.81 1.84 2.06
Exp×mF2    1.95 2.05 3.21    2.17 2.2 3.01 
Exp×mF3    1.8 1.83 37.75    2.34 2.37 2.87 
School×mF1    7.43 7.51 12.78    2.26 2.31 2.93 
School×mF2   6.32 6.54 28.76  2.11 2.12 2.28
School×mF3    1.65 1.67 44.94    2.66 2.71 3.16 
mF1×Eng    2.23 2.34 4.9    1.36 1.41 2.05 
mF2×Eng    1.95 1.96 2.85    1.56 1.59 2.05 
mF3×Eng    7.01 7.04 18.67    1.96 2.05 2.95 
mF1×Fre    2.48 2.65 6.05    1.48 1.58 3.18 
mF2×Fre    1.9 1.92 19.2    1.33 1.35 2.08 
mF3×Fre    2.79 2.8 83.63    1.38 1.4 1.58 
Exp×Eng     2.38 3.13     2.21 2.95 
Exp×Fre     2.76 3.52     1.71 2.24 
School×Eng     3.6 4.57     2.61 3.54 
School×Fre     3.91 5.02     1.76 2.26 
mF1×Exp×Eng      3.87      2.32 
mF1×Exp×Fre   6.24  2.27
mF1×School×Eng      18.05      3.23 
mF1× School ×Fre      17.72      4.04 
mF2×Exp×Eng      2.85      2.97 
mF2×Exp×Fre   2.39  3.33
mF2×School×Eng      11.96      2.64 
mF2× School ×Fre      21.79      2.92 
mF3×Exp×Eng      19.25      4.05 
mF3×Exp×Fre   22.36  1.98
mF3×School×Eng      145.8      5.79 
mF3× School ×Fre      144.63      1.86 
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Appendix C5. Variance inflation factors for Regulated occupations and Unregulated occupations, males, wave 3 
 Regulated occupations Unregulated occupations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp 1.34 1.38 1.38 2.08 2.13 2.18 1.57 1.6 1.63 2.14 2.24 2.27 
School 1.46 1.5 1.54 2.24 2.35 2.39 1.8 1.9 1.99 2.87 2.94 2.98 
Eng  1.95 1.99 2.78 2.91 2.96  1.98 2.03 2.84 3.31 3.42 
Fre  4.58 4.59 5.82 6.03 6.26  4.4 4.45 5.19 5.44 5.54
mF1   1.16 1.89 1.9 2.85   1.29 1.87 1.89 3.27 
mF2   1.18 1.4 1.41 1.65   1.27 2.47 2.47 7.8 
mF3   1.19 1.31 1.32 1.41   1.29 2.39 2.46 2.91 
Exp×mF1   1.82 1.9 3.06  2 2.07 2.79
Exp×mF2    1.86 1.88 2.18    2.73 2.75 4.86 
Exp×mF3    2.17 2.21 2.41    2.76 2.9 7.21 
School×mF1    2.22 2.29 2.96    2.09 2.28 4.25 
School×mF2   2.23 2.23 2.48  1.75 1.76 3.19
School×mF3    2.39 2.41 2.68    4.51 4.64 7.56 
mF1×Eng    2.22 2.29 2.98    2.07 2.12 2.86 
mF2×Eng    1.88 1.94 1.99    2 2.02 4.58 
mF3×Eng    2.3 2.44 3.3    2.17 2.34 5.01 
mF1×Fre    1.88 1.9 2.48    2.01 2.07 3.71 
mF2×Fre    1.88 1.93 2.66    1.79 1.81 4.57 
mF3×Fre    2.15 2.27 2.87    1.48 1.59 2.52 
Exp×Eng     2.19 3.13     2.99 4.08 
Exp×Fre     1.62 2.51     1.84 2.2 
School×Eng     2.59 3.74     3.53 4.83 
School×Fre     1.97 2.75     1.98 2.52 
mF1×Exp×Eng      3.33      2.75 
mF1×Exp×Fre   2.46  3.99
mF1×School×Eng      2.99      5.04 
mF1× School ×Fre      2.48      4.54 
mF2×Exp×Eng      2.45      5.04 
mF2×Exp×Fre   2.51  8.02
mF2×School×Eng      3.76      3.92 
mF2× School ×Fre      3.85      4.79 
mF3×Exp×Eng      5.69      6.63 
mF3×Exp×Fre   2.52  7.15
mF3×School×Eng      7.14      9.13 
mF3× School ×Fre      4.06      6.56 
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Appendix C6. Variance inflation factors for Regulated occupations and Unregulated occupations, females, wave 3 
 Regulated occupations Unregulated occupations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp 1.33 1.36 1.38 1.96 1.99 2.01 1.4 1.45 1.46 1.89 1.92 1.93 
School 1.4 1.44 1.46 2.04 2.12 2.14 1.53 1.58 1.63 2.07 2.1 2.12 
Eng  2 2.02 2.56 2.68 2.73  2.06 2.06 2.43 2.66 2.69 
Fre  3.4 3.48 4.61 4.69 5.06  3.68 3.68 3.95 3.98 4.07 
mF1   1.15 1.71 1.76 4.04  1.23 2.12 2.15 3.6
mF2   1.22 1.95 1.96 2.57   1.2 1.61 1.62 2.32 
mF3   1.26 1.47 1.48 1.74   1.1 1.33 1.34 1.42 
Exp×mF1    1.72 1.77 2.19    2.03 2.04 2.29 
Exp×mF2   1.99 2.04 3.32  2.53 2.55 4.61
Exp×mF3    2.36 2.43 3.48    2.23 2.25 2.51 
School×mF1    2.49 2.6 3.85    4.43 4.44 5.23 
School×mF2   1.99 2.05 3.63  3.98 4 4.72
School×mF3    1.88 1.92 2.19    3.4 3.45 3.86 
mF1×Eng    1.62 1.71 3.1    1.62 1.67 2.46 
mF2×Eng    1.85 1.86 2.02    1.68 1.7 2.77 
mF3×Eng    2.06 2.09 2.34    2.31 2.43 3.61 
mF1×Fre    1.8 1.93 3.75    1.9 2.04 5.56 
mF2×Fre    1.77 1.77 3    1.57 1.58 2.94 
mF3×Fre    1.41 1.42 1.62    1.57 1.58 1.8 
Exp×Eng     1.93 2.55     2.26 2.99 
Exp×Fre     1.86 2.71     1.82 2.27 
School×Eng   2.04 2.73  2.77 3.58
School×Fre     1.97 2.81     1.96 2.38 
mF1×Exp×Eng      2.39      2.51 
mF1×Exp×Fre      2.74      4.42 
mF1×School×Eng   5.64  5.46
mF1× School ×Fre      4.99      9.94 
mF2×Exp×Eng      2.05      5.79 
mF2×Exp×Fre   2.83  2.92
mF2×School×Eng      2.71      4.46 
mF2× School ×Fre      3.13      4.02 
mF3×Exp×Eng      4.84      4.23 
mF3×Exp×Fre   2.53  2.2
mF3×School×Eng      3.86      7.29 
mF3× School ×Fre      1.65      2.52 
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Appendix C7. Variance inflation factors for Professional occupations and Non-professional occupations, males, wave 3 
 Professional occupations Non-professional occupations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp 1.33 1.33 1.33 4.55 4.98 5.75 1.43 1.47 1.47 1.95 2.03 2.05 
School 1.22 1.23 1.26 2.85 3.99 5.02 1.64 1.71 1.8 2.38 2.4 2.41 
Eng  2.38 2.4 5.74 6.88 10.18  1.92 1.95 2.62 2.97 3.08 
Fre  5.11 5.17 9.39 12.37 19.01  4.44 4.48 5.16 5.29 5.41
mF1   1.21 2.73 2.95 5.58   1.06 1.59 1.6 2.4 
mF2   1.18 2.44 2.5 5.06   1.12 1.22 1.22 1.46 
mF3   1.21 21.78 22.05 291.76   1.23 1.68 1.7 1.8 
Exp×mF1   5.44 5.6 8.03  1.33 1.37 2.39
Exp×mF2    3.48 3.53 5.43    1.44 1.46 1.65 
Exp×mF3    6.16 6.22 132.42    2.47 2.55 3.08 
School×mF1    4.1 4.47 5.46    1.74 1.84 4.07 
School×mF2   3.33 3.5 4.41  1.54 1.56 1.71
School×mF3    12.98 13.03 14.64    3.43 3.5 4.1 
mF1×Eng    5.64 5.71 12.09    1.82 1.85 2.15 
mF2×Eng    2.95 2.95 5.62    1.42 1.46 1.52 
mF3×Eng    9.42 9.71 228.74    2.22 2.39 4.04 
mF1×Fre    4.81 4.93 11.09    1.4 1.42 2.08 
mF2×Fre    2.44 2.45 4.86    1.61 1.64 2.39 
mF3×Fre    13.15 13.32 148.47    1.96 2.1 2.7 
Exp×Eng     2.98 8.82     2.66 3.58 
Exp×Fre     2.74 8.3     1.55 2.01 
School×Eng     3.53 7.72     3.11 4.24 
School×Fre     4.59 11.62     1.72 2.2 
mF1×Exp×Eng      11.19      2.65 
mF1×Exp×Fre   8.99  1.77
mF1×School×Eng      7.97      4.24 
mF1× School ×Fre      7.6      2.52 
mF2×Exp×Eng      5.88      1.84 
mF2×Exp×Fre   5.01  2.77
mF2×School×Eng      5.54      2.8 
mF2× School ×Fre      4.54      3.38 
mF3×Exp×Eng      98.14      5.78 
mF3×Exp×Fre   .  2.77
mF3×School×Eng      .      8.06 
mF3× School ×Fre      .      4.03 
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Appendix C8. Variance inflation factors for Professional occupations and Non-professional occupations, females, wave 3 
 Professional occupations Non-professional occupations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp 1.14 1.18 1.2 2.96 3.24 3.59 1.38 1.42 1.42 1.77 1.8 1.81 
School 1.26 1.26 1.29 2.86 3.33 3.9 1.47 1.53 1.55 1.88 1.94 1.97 
Eng  2 2.01 3.73 3.93 4.09  2.07 2.08 2.38 2.58 2.61 
Fre  3.58 3.66 6.48 6.99 7.92  3.53 3.54 3.72 3.74 3.85
mF1   1.31 2.46 2.56 4.68   1.05 1.81 1.84 3.1 
mF2   1.59 3.12 3.16 7.13   1.03 1.23 1.23 1.31 
mF3   1.86 5.15 5.18 24.71   1.08 1.29 1.3 1.32 
Exp×mF1   3.28 3.32 4.09  1.68 1.69 2.21
Exp×mF2    3.73 3.84 5.31    1.95 1.96 2.84 
Exp×mF3    3.16 3.21 7.17    2.18 2.22 2.65 
School×mF1    7.29 7.31 9.99    2.08 2.09 2.44 
School×mF2   5.88 6.12 13.24  2.03 2.05 2.41
School×mF3    1.66 1.68 27.78    2.78 2.84 3.28 
mF1×Eng    2.85 3.1 5.61    1.5 1.52 1.92 
mF2×Eng    2.67 2.71 7.17    1.41 1.42 1.91 
mF3×Eng    6.66 6.72 9.43    1.86 1.94 2.68 
mF1×Fre    3.52 3.66 6.65    1.63 1.75 7.16 
mF2×Fre    1.6 1.61 4    1.39 1.4 1.72 
mF3×Fre    1.7 1.78 32.49    1.45 1.46 1.53 
Exp×Eng     1.88 3.32     2.14 2.75 
Exp×Fre     2.29 5.29     1.83 2.09 
School×Eng     3 5.34     2.49 3.22 
School×Fre     2.91 6.41     1.85 2.17 
mF1×Exp×Eng      3.84      2.5 
mF1×Exp×Fre   5.08  7.28
mF1×School×Eng      12.39      4.04 
mF1× School ×Fre      10.38      8.69 
mF2×Exp×Eng      4.66      2.62 
mF2×Exp×Fre   2.66  2.58
mF2×School×Eng      13.73      2.71 
mF2× School ×Fre      4.86      2.54 
mF3×Exp×Eng      5.73      3.83 
mF3×Exp×Fre   5.07  2
mF3×School×Eng      15.01      5.51 
mF3× School ×Fre      30.01      2.11 
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Appendix С9. Variance inflation factors for University educated and Other education levels, males, wave 3 
 University educated Other levels of education 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp 1.17 1.18 1.19 1.69 1.8 1.83 1.74 1.8 1.82 2.48 2.77 2.87 
School 1.17 1.17 1.18 1.82 2.07 2.18 1.78 1.9 1.94 2.9 3.02 3.1 
Eng  2 2.03 2.6 2.97 3.13 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.13 1.15 1.17 
Fre  4.63 4.67 5.6 6.58 6.92  2.21 2.27 3.38 5.35 6.28
mF1   1.17 2.09 2.14 3.84  4.58 4.61 5.56 6 6.32 
mF2   1.16 2.01 2.02 3.44   1.17 2.06 2.07 3.19 
mF3   1.09 1.29 1.3 1.91   1.24 2.32 2.34 2.6 
Exp×mF1   1.99 2.05 3.04  1.23 2.48 2.55 2.87
Exp×mF2    1.94 1.95 2.61    2.35 2.4 7.08 
Exp×mF3    1.38 1.38 1.57    1.88 1.92 2.29 
School×mF1    2.46 2.62 3.67    3.19 3.25 5.02 
School×mF2   2.15 2.2 2.62  2.65 2.7 10.31
School×mF3    1.48 1.5 1.76    2.99 3.14 4.42 
mF1×Eng    2.18 2.22 3.64    5.73 5.84 7.27 
mF2×Eng    1.79 1.8 3.03    2.18 2.2 3.33 
mF3×Eng    1.77 1.8 2.68    1.96 1.99 5.29 
mF1×Fre    2.03 2.05 4.12    2.94 2.98 6.2 
mF2×Fre    1.69 1.71 3.55    1.96 2.01 2.76 
mF3×Fre    1.6 1.63 1.94    2.24 2.29 5.29 
Exp×Eng     1.68 2.29    2.57 2.62 5.01 
Exp×Fre     1.84 2.66     3.72 5.21 
School×Eng     2.74 4.06     1.79 2.23 
School×Fre     3.2 4.73     5.31 8.1 
mF1×Exp×Eng      3.29     2.18 3.04 
mF1×Exp×Fre   3.16  8.32
mF1×School×Eng      4.43      4.62 
mF1× School ×Fre      4.12      15.66 
mF2×Exp×Eng      2.88      5.28 
mF2×Exp×Fre   3.02  2.54
mF2×School×Eng      3.35      4.33 
mF2× School ×Fre      3.63      8.99 
mF3×Exp×Eng      2.41      8.94 
mF3×Exp×Fre   2.78  7.45
mF3×School×Eng      3.33      4.92 
mF3× School ×Fre      3.03      11.8 
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Appendix С10. Variance inflation factors for University educated and Other education levels, females, wave 3 
 University educated Lower levels of education 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp 1.16 1.2 1.22 1.67 1.85 1.95 1.48 1.52 1.53 1.98 2.13 2.17 
School 1.21 1.21 1.22 1.73 1.86 1.92 1.58 1.67 1.67 2.23 2.39 2.44 
Eng  1.72 1.73 2.12 2.61 2.74  2.35 2.37 2.83 3.94 4.2 
Fre  3.18 3.21 4.25 5.3 6.17  4.61 4.64 4.72 5.28 5.66
mF1   1.15 2.22 2.28 4.66   1.08 1.46 1.46 23.01 
mF2   1.14 2.21 2.22 3.76   1.19 1.95 1.98 2.19 
mF3   1.13 2.64 2.67 13.45   1.21 1.95 1.96 2.31 
Exp×mF1   1.96 2.07 2.51  1.45 1.47 55.64
Exp×mF2    2.08 2.11 2.86    1.85 1.93 14.18 
Exp×mF3    1.32 1.33 3.51    2.86 2.94 3.64 
School×mF1    4.18 4.24 5.78    1.73 1.74 8.47 
School×mF2   3.29 3.35 7.26  2.58 2.62 3.41
School×mF3    1.41 1.43 53.22    3.94 4.05 5.27 
mF1×Eng    1.71 1.75 3.55    2.63 2.64 4.33 
mF2×Eng    1.59 1.6 2.83    1.94 1.97 5.64 
mF3×Eng    2.14 2.14 3.34    2.38 2.46 4.46 
mF1×Fre    2.02 2.04 4.99    2.44 2.47 76.98 
mF2×Fre    1.32 1.33 2.98    1.94 1.94 2.32 
mF3×Fre    1.46 1.5 45.1    1.88 1.92 2.13 
Exp×Eng     1.6 1.98     2.85 3.82 
Exp×Fre     1.83 3.27     1.9 2.17 
School×Eng     2.49 3.12     3.96 5.51 
School×Fre     3 4.4     2.36 2.99 
mF1×Exp×Eng      2.63      3.29 
mF1×Exp×Fre   3.96  116.4
mF1×School×Eng      7.48      4.62 
mF1× School ×Fre      8.02      9.49 
mF2×Exp×Eng      2.26      4.86 
mF2×Exp×Fre   2.15  14.73
mF2×School×Eng      6.34      6.52 
mF2× School ×Fre      3.72      5.26 
mF3×Exp×Eng      2.96      5.24 
mF3×Exp×Fre   2.58  2.12
mF3×School×Eng      4.68      8.87 
mF3× School ×Fre      76.98      2.49 
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Appendix С11. Variance inflation factors for Visible minorities and Not visible minorities, males, wave 3 
 Visible minorities Not visible minorities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp 1.44 1.45 1.47 2.01 2.22 2.29 1.36 1.37 1.38 2.24 2.42 2.51 
School 1.7 1.75 1.81 2.48 2.55 2.59 1.27 1.3 1.38 2.4 2.74 2.86 
Eng  1.45 1.45 2.14 2.35 2.4  1.7 1.82 2.81 2.88 2.98 
Fre  2.97 2.98 3.72 3.9 4.04  4.13 4.23 5.45 5.91 6.22
mF1   1.2 1.93 1.95 3.77   1.16 1.92 1.96 3.2 
mF2   1.17 1.57 1.58 2   1.14 1.47 1.5 1.79 
mF3   1.17 1.58 1.59 1.65   1.27 1.56 1.57 1.91 
Exp×mF1   1.82 1.85 2.85  2.06 2.26 4.16
Exp×mF2    1.8 1.83 2.26    2.15 2.21 2.36 
Exp×mF3    2.56 2.6 3.17    1.71 1.84 2.39 
School×mF1    2.06 2.12 2.76    2.43 2.74 6.72 
School×mF2   1.78 1.79 2.1  2.15 2.21 2.59
School×mF3    3.27 3.3 3.89    2.09 2.39 3.38 
mF1×Eng    2.04 2.1 3.07    2 2.09 3.06 
mF2×Eng    1.66 1.71 1.85    1.83 1.85 2.03 
mF3×Eng    2.08 2.3 4.21    2.2 2.39 4.13 
mF1×Fre    1.83 1.84 2.37    2.29 2.37 4.28 
mF2×Fre    1.76 1.81 2.41    2.08 2.15 3.46 
mF3×Fre    1.79 1.93 2.64    1.64 1.72 2.39 
Exp×Eng     2.66 3.61     2.27 3.73 
Exp×Fre     1.66 2.32     2.39 3.8 
School×Eng     3.12 4.34     2.95 4.21 
School×Fre     1.83 2.33     2.47 3.87 
mF1×Exp×Eng      3.07      3.91 
mF1×Exp×Fre   2.82  4.23
mF1×School×Eng      2.94      7.75 
mF1× School ×Fre      3.2      4.84 
mF2×Exp×Eng      2.18      2.81 
mF2×Exp×Fre   2.69  3.88
mF2×School×Eng      2.7      3.64 
mF2× School ×Fre      3.64      3.32 
mF3×Exp×Eng      5.86      3.79 
mF3×Exp×Fre   2.85  2.36
mF3×School×Eng      7.77      5.3 
mF3× School ×Fre      4.64      2.38 
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Appendix С12. Variance inflation factors for Visible minorities and Not visible minorities, females, wave 3 
 Visible minorities Not visible minorities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exp 1.37 1.37 1.39 1.92 1.96 1.97 1.3 1.38 1.39 1.86 1.96 1.99 
School 1.5 1.59 1.64 2.21 2.26 2.28 1.31 1.31 1.34 1.68 1.73 1.74 
Eng  1.37 1.38 1.79 1.91 1.95  1.88 1.88 2.28 2.44 2.48 
Fre  2.73 2.75 3.39 3.45 3.57  2.78 2.85 3.48 3.64 3.78
mF1   1.14 2.01 2.04 4.14   1.14 2.1 2.14 4.39 
mF2   1.13 1.95 1.96 2.38   1.17 1.64 1.67 2.16 
mF3   1.14 1.48 1.51 1.94   1.15 1.32 1.32 1.64 
Exp×mF1   1.78 1.8 2.13  2.06 2.13 2.85
Exp×mF2    1.96 1.98 5.82    2.06 2.1 3.05 
Exp×mF3    2.19 2.21 3.05    3.16 3.27 7.27 
School×mF1    2.59 2.62 3.38    5.53 5.67 9.53 
School×mF2   1.92 1.95 3.88  5.09 5.18 8.35
School×mF3    2.75 2.78 3.12    2.5 2.6 5.17 
mF1×Eng    1.47 1.54 2.72    2.4 2.48 3.66 
mF2×Eng    1.59 1.6 1.93    2.2 2.25 3.33 
mF3×Eng    1.96 2.07 2.96    2.14 2.22 3.38 
mF1×Fre    1.53 1.72 4.57    3.01 3.04 5.06 
mF2×Fre    1.91 1.92 3.17    1.6 1.65 4.34 
mF3×Fre    1.48 1.53 2.14    1.91 1.94 2.74 
Exp×Eng     2.19 3.08     1.65 1.94 
Exp×Fre     1.8 2.4     1.82 2.48 
School×Eng     2.66 3.65     1.91 2.19 
School×Fre     1.98 2.65     2.12 2.49 
mF1×Exp×Eng      2.15      3.81 
mF1×Exp×Fre   2.31  5.06
mF1×School×Eng      3.86      14.04 
mF1× School ×Fre      5.96      10.85 
mF2×Exp×Eng      2.64      4.42 
mF2×Exp×Fre   6.08  2.45
mF2×School×Eng      2.2      10.64 
mF2× School ×Fre      4.62      8.27 
mF3×Exp×Eng      4.04      4.4 
mF3×Exp×Fre   2.85  3.47
mF3×School×Eng      6.12      5.24 
mF3× School ×Fre      1.87      4.82 
 
